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ABSTRACT 
 
The focus of the thesis is on the HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation of 
people who try to live positively with HIV/AIDS within the pandemic. The basic 
assumption is that there is interplay between the HIVAIDS-related stigma as a 
cultural phenomenon and the negative perception of the human body. Since a 
human being is created corporeal and re-created due to the fact that human 
embodiment is a fundamental ingredient for the understanding of soul, It is argued 
that in a pastoral approach, a person should be understood holistically. Anthropology 
within the traditional kerygmatic approach focused mainly on the notion of sin 
(corruption totalis) within the theological understanding of God’s judgement 
(judgemental attitude). I have proposed that pastoral anthropology should adopt 
constructive paradigms and point towards the integration of embodiment 
(wholeness) in a realistic approach rather than emphasising the notion of sin and 
forms of dualism. The thesis departs from an eschatological and pneumatological 
view of the human being, in which the concepts of resurrection and hope are equally 
crucial. I further argue that a Christian spiritual perspective on embodiment is 
potentially destigmatising itself. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic I have shown that 
in destigmatisation the transformation of the HIV and AIDS-related stigma 
corresponds to the transformation of the mindset and paradigm of a person 
(habitus). Through the process of destigmatisation people discover meaning and are 
enabled to live fully embodied and responsible lives.  
The thesis is designed as a literature study based on text analysis and 
hermeneutical reflection. Moreover, in order to develop a pastoral anthropological 
view, the Scripture is used as a reference point.  
 
Keywords 
Destigmatisation, HIV/AIDS pandemic, pastoral care, pastoral hermeneutics, 
corporeality, embodiment, pneumatology, eschatology 
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die navorsing fokus op die fenomeen van stigmatisiering binne die HIV/AIDS 
pandemie. Die kernargument is dat stigmatisering as ŉ sosiaal-kulturele konstrukt 
binne die netwerk van verhoudinge direk in verband staan met ŉ bepaalde 
destruktiewe persepsie wat die vraagstuk van liggaamlikheid onmiddellik raak. 
Vandaar die verdere fokus  op die verband tussen liggaamlikheid en die verstaan 
van die menslike siel binne die raamwerk van ŉ pastorale antropologie. Die 
teologiese invalshoek is die eskatologiese paradigma, die mens as ŉ pneumatiese 
wese en nuwe skepping.  Liggaamlikheid deel gelykoorspronklik aan hierdie nuwe 
wees-funksie van die mens sodat ŉ verstaan van die mens as ŉ „beliggaamde siel“ 
en ŉ „besielde liggaam“ alle vorme van dualisme in ŉ teologiese antropologie 
teëwerk. Die totale mens is as ‘n beliggaamde mens geskep sodat in ŉ pastorale 
antropologie die menslike  persoon holisties verstaan moet word. Om menswees 
bloot vanuit die perspektief van sonde te benader hou nie rekening met die realisme 
van die Bybel wat die mens binne die raamwerk van die wysheidsliteratuur sien 
vanuit die perspektief van genade en vernuwing. ŉ Eensydige fokus op die  
paradigma van sonde dra by tot ŉ destruktiewe veroordelende houding (judgemental 
attitude). Volgens die aard van ŉ kruisteologie is die „smet“ en „stigma“ van sonde 
daar oorwin.  In die lig van die opstandingsperspektief is die „dood van stigma“ totaal 
uitgewis. Hierdie opstandingperspektief moet verreken word in ŉ teologiese model 
wat gerig is op prosesse van destigmatisering binne ŉ pastorale hermeneutiek. Die 
implikasie hiervan is die transformasie van stigmatisernde paradigmas en die skep 
van ŉ pastorale houding (habitus) van begrip en medelye.   
Deur ‘n dergelike proses van destigmatisasie word mense in die kern van hul wees-
funksie kwalitatief bemagtig ten einde vervulde lewens te kan ly. Die tesis volg ŉ 
kwalitatiewe benadering. Dit is voorts ŉ literêre studie gebaseer op teks-analises, 
kritiese reflektering en ŉ hermeneutiese metodologie.  
 
Sleutelwoorde  
Destigmatiesasie, HIV/AIDS pandemie, pastorale bediening, pastorale 
hermeneutiek, liggaamlikheid, lyflikheid, pneumatologie, eskatologie 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
● Background and description  
To introduce the alarming proportions of stigmatised persons trying to live positively 
with HIV and AIDS, I borrow Eunice Kamaara’s words:  
“Due to the culture of stigmatisation, persons living with HIV and AIDS 
[…] are discriminated against or they isolate themselves socially. They 
may choose to avoid public occasions and social interactions that are 
important for human life, or may feel unloved, useless and uncared for. 
They may hate themselves and suffer from feelings of self-blame, guilt 
and denial. These feelings translate into stress and suffering not just 
for the individual person living with HIV [and AIDS] but also for the 
entire society around the person” (Kamaara 2004:42).  
The HIV and AIDS pandemic leads human beings into borderline situations. There 
continues to be no medical cure as an option. Likewise, the HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma seems to stand in where words are no longer able to transfer meaning. Still, 
attached to the HIV and AIDS-related stigma is great suffering and behind it lurks 
meaningless. What would be a constructive and meaningful way to deal with the 
pandemic and the realities it includes in order to speak of “AIDS competence” in a 
pastoral response (Louw 2006:1)? In this study the hermeneutical process of 
interpretation is an important theological tool in the pandemic, based on the 
presupposed assumption that there exists a correlative interplay between the 
eventual notion of stigma and the perception of human embodiment.  
 
In the case of the HIV and AIDS pandemic, I assume that HIV and AIDS-related 
stigmatisation is connected to negative and destructive perceptions regarding the 
value and status of the human body. More specifically, in pastoral theology, a one-
sided perception regarding the place of the human body in human identity, can add 
to the complexity of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation within Christian circles and 
communities. Because of the HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation, the life quality of 
people trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS is dramatically at stake.  
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Simultaneously, as a consequence of stigmatisation, the occurrence of HIV is more 
likely due to denial, repression, and ignorance of the issue. Silence about HIV and 
AIDS makes fighting it more difficult. Hence, HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is 
one factor which makes HIV and AIDS an individual as well as a societal threat. If 
pastoral care, cura animarum, the healing of the soul, is actually cura vitae, the 
healing of life (Louw 2007), then an approach to pastoral anthropology has to take 
into account the need for structural healing regarding the notion of HIV/AIDS and its 
related stigma and stigmatisation. Structural healing pastorally implies that all 
members of the community, the body of Christ, are inflicted. Thus, the research 
topic: Destigmatisation in the HIV and AIDS pandemic: towards a pastoral 
anthropology of embodiment.  
 
Although stigmatisation is a phenomenon that happens in certain contexts, among 
certain people, in a certain time, the task in a pastoral theological reflection is to 
question the anthropological paradigm behind the cultural and relational 
phenomenon.  
 
First, in the centre of the pastoral theological reflection is the mistaken human being, 
the sinning human being and the suffering human being. The focus on the body 
arises from the assumption above and the fact that it is only through the body that 
human beings do relate with one another. In theological and philosophical history the 
view of the body as subordinated to the human mind, and the body understood as 
“flesh” associated with “being sinful” has dominated. In the theological context one 
can even speak of the stigmatisation of the human body “in a hierarchy of values by 
relegating it into an inferior position to the mind and the spirit” (Ackermann 2006:12). 
The human being at sin may not be narrowly understood in the sense of moral 
transgression. Rather, the notion marks a relational status in being distanced from 
God’s everlasting faithfulness.   
 
Second, the theological argument for the reassessment of the human body and the 
wholesomeness of the human being stands in line with the notion of creation and re-
creation through the inhabitation of the Spirit in the human being; being human can 
become a means “to glorify God”, a means through which life attains new meaning 
despite the contextual reality of suffering. 
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● Problematic field of research  
It is of highest importance to reflect in pastoral theology whether, and to what extent, 
the traditional association between our human sinfulness (see my Chapter Two) and 
human embodiment is contributing to negative perceptions within the debate on HIV 
and AIDS-related stigmatisation. The theological paradigm of sin in itself is 
problematic, if it remains unreflected, because it invites for a one sided judgment of 
what is right or wrong. Hence, the paradigm of sin opens up a tension between 
dogmatical and ethical reflection, which especially challenges practical theological 
questions like how to understand HIV/AIDS-related stigmatisation of people who are 
trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS.  
The assumption of the thesis is that the problem lies in the perception of the human 
body and embodiment. This negative pereception is expressed in the notion of 
stigma and stigmatization. In the background of a pastoral approach towards 
destigmatization stands the question of images of God and the human being. The 
challenge in the thesis is to identify the paradigm behind those images which add 
fuel to HIV/AIDS-related stigma and stigmatization. In asking, what is the attitude 
behind HIV/AIDS-related stigma, the difficulty is to interpret the finding appropriately 
in a relational instead of an ontological approach.  
 
● Research problems  
In the HIV and AIDS pandemic stigma and stigmatisation are  problematically 
connected to the negative perception of the human body. Stigmatisation of people 
who are trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS often happens in Christian circles 
under the label of “Christian norms and values” focussed on the notion of the sinning 
human being. The difficulty is to clear out the actual connection between sin and 
stigmatisation. The challenge of research is then to describe the shift from 
stigmatisation to destigmatisation in terms of a Christological approach. 
For this understanding the notion of eschatology, the human being in the light of 
God’s grace, is determining. How can destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic take place despite the experiences of indifference, rejection and 
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discrimination in life situations of human beings? How in terms of destigmatisation 
can human beings experience trust and gratefulness, and develop an affirmative 
attitude towards human corporeality and life itself? 
 
● Hypothesis and research assumptions 
It is hypothesised that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is closely related to 
skewed perceptions. A judgemental attitude directly impacts human identity. At stake 
is the notion of human dignity and its relatedness to human embodiment. In order to 
change perceptions, paradigms should be changed. In this regard a pastoral 
approach to the problem of stigmatisation implies a total re-evaluation of the human 
body, thus the importance of the research topic: towards a pastoral anthropology of 
embodiment. In the thesis I state that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is 
essentially a problem of perception due to presupposed judgements about worth and 
value of the human being.  
 
In Chapter One the main assumption is that the phenomenon of stigmatisation is 
related to negative paradigms and schemata of interpretation of the human being, 
which leads to the degradation of human embodiment. In Chapter Two the thesis 
considers the assumption that stigmatisation goes along with the degradation of 
human embodiment within the context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. The aim of 
the chapter is to show the complexity of HIV and AIDS-related stigma and to unmask 
its connection to the notion of sin (hamartiology), as well as to look at this 
connection’s impact on theological anthropology. In Chapter Three the concepts of 
corporeality and embodiment in theology and philosophy will be investigated. The 
chapter begins with an inspection into the theological and philosophical discussion of 
body concepts. It will then consider those paradigms that have contributed to the 
degradation of the human body in the history of philosophy and theology, and finally 
proposes a pastoral anthropological reflection of embodiment based on a biblical 
understanding of the human being. In Chapter Four the aim is to interpret previous 
scholarly discussions on the notion of stigma and embodiment in the light of 
Scripture. In terms of pastoral hermeneutics, the pneumatic notion of 
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destigmatisation means a new stance and attitude in life determined by the 
eschatological perspective.  
 
● Methods 
The approach of this topic in pastoral theology is based on the hermeneutical 
connection between situational context, theological reflection and Scripture. The 
research is designed as a literature study based on critical analysis of existing data 
from the perspective of pastoral anthropology. In analysing and assessing the 
meaning of concepts and rational constructs and their impact on human behaviour, 
the study also implies a qualitative approach. Throughout, the thesis follows a 
hermeneutical approach in the interpretation of the phenomenon of stigmatisation 
within a pastoral anthropology. In theological thinking, the term “hermeneutic,” on the 
one hand, refers to the necessity of interpreting texts (including rites and arts) of the 
Christian tradition, and on the other hand, the term points to both human 
understanding and self-understanding in contexts in which theological thinking 
participates, and towards which it contributes (Jeanrond 1994:1654f.).  
 
 
● Research objectives 
The way in which Christian churches (the body of Christ) responded to the HIV and 
AIDS-related stigma, should be assessed against the background of specific cultural 
contexts. I unmask stigma as a social construction and as an ethical and theological 
dilemma. In so doing, the meaning and importance of reintegration of the body in 
pastoral theology, in context of the notion of stigmatisation, will become clear. The 
theological argument is an eschatological perspective on human embodiment. This 
Christian spiritual perspective turns out to be potentially destigmatising itself.  
The research`s key objective is to probe into the realm of schemata of interpretation 
and evaluate its impact on human embodiment. This will be achieved through the 
following:  
- Identifying stigmatisation as an offence far more serious than so-called “moral 
misdeeds”; 
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- developing, in theory formation, a constructive understanding of the human body 
and its relatedness to human identity; and 
- Pointing out in what way and to what extent a Christological approach can help us 
to destigmatise human embodiment.  
 
 ● Research contributions to future developments in this field 
The approach taken herein towards a pastoral anthropology chooses to build on a 
normative anthropology, in the sense that how we deal with HIV/AIDS and the 
related stigma is indeed a moral issue. Unmasking stigma as a social construction 
and an ethical and theological dilemma can open up the way in pastoral theology to 
become sensitive to the re-integration of the human body in the theological discourse 
about HIV and AIDS and their related stigmas. Hence, pastoral theology also needs 
to reflect about societal and structural conditions of human beings as texts in their 
contexts. Pointing out the vulnerability of being human, this study also opens up the 
way for further research concerning the opportunities of being embodied.   
 
● An extant presupposition  
The centrality of the body in theology is a basic feature that should not be 
underestimated. Many misunderstandings, such as the notion of stigmatisation, arise 
from the neglect and indifference towards a holistic perspective of human beings. At 
the same time, the Gospel and its destigmatising power offer a remedy in the sense 
of cura vitae. 
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CHAPTER ONE                                                                                
THE PHENOMENON OF STIGMA AND STIGMATISATION:    
DEGRADATION OF HUMAN EMBODIMENT 
 
In the first chapter I shall begin by considering the concept of stigma and 
stigmatisation in order to offer a working definition. Likewise, I refer to human 
embodiment in describing how stigma and stigmatisation affect the human being in 
his or her total existence. This will be done from a pastoral theological perspective 
while taking into consideration studies outside the field of theology.  
 
 
1. PRELIMINARY DEFINITION OF STIGMA 
In ancient Greek, the term stigma (sti,gma) means sign, brand or engraving. It served 
as a mark of decoration, belonging or property (Mödl 1994:1736). Other meanings 
included a wound or a tattoo. On the one hand, for the ancient Greeks, stigma 
referred to bodily signs or branded marks, while on the other hand, these marks 
were meant to express something “unusual” or “bad” about the “moral status of the 
signifier”. Signs were cut or burnt into the skin of the bearer, who often was a 
criminal, a slave or an otherwise blemished person, said to be out of the moral 
framework of society. The purpose was to recognise somehow the other in order to 
be able to differentiate, and to exclude the individual or the group from normal 
society (Goffman 1990:11). 
 
Today in anthropological sciences, as in sociology and psychology, stigma defines a 
mark or a sign that attracts attention and usually expresses otherness in terms of 
devaluation of an individual or a group. Here the emphasis on the mark and sign 
does not lie consciously on the physical appearance of a stigma anymore. According 
to Goffman (1990:11), the term stigma “is widely used in something like the original 
literal sense, but it is applied more to the disgrace itself than to the bodily evidence of 
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it”. Nevertheless, the reference to bodily expression of a stigma may be prevalent in 
social status (e.g. material wealth) or sexual orientation. In addition, sharing certain 
characteristics with other people such as being physically disabled, being from a 
specific ethnic background, or being infected with a specific virus, is enough to be a 
sign or a mark referring to bodily expression. 
 
In what follows, I shall refer to the term stigmatisation as the phenomenon in which 
an individual or a group of individuals consciously or unconsciously define another 
individual or a group as “different”. The definition serves as a preliminary working 
definition for the study.  
 
2. RELIGIOUS CONNOTATION OF STIGMA 
In Scripture1, the word stigma is scarcely mentioned. Rather, the word shmei/on 
(sign),2 which is theologically closely connected to stigma, is common in passages of 
Scripture.3 Talking about stigma in the broader sense of Scripture also entails an 
eschatological sign.4 Paul uses the expression ta. sti,gmata  in a literal sense in 
Galatians 6:17: “From now on let no one cause me trouble, for I bear on my body the 
marks of Jesus.” Interpretations suggest that he refers to the visible signs of his 
apostolic service and to the wounds Jesus had to suffer (Mödl 1994:1737; 
Heiligenthal 2000:1116). In later Christian eras, metaphorical layers were added. In 
mysticism, stigma refers to “bodily signs of holy grace;” whereas the medical allusion 
to the religious connotation refers to “bodily signs of physical disorder” (Goffman 
                                           
 
1
 Bible references are taken from BibleWorks 2003, LLC, version 6.0: 
The Holy Bible, English Standart Version (ESV) (2001). Wheaton: Crossway Books / Good News 
Publishers.  
Biblica Hebraica Stuttgartensia (BHS) (1990) 4th ed. Ellinger, K. & Rudoph, W. (eds). Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft. 
Novum Testamentum Graece (BNT), Nestle - Aland (1993), 27thed. Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Bibelgesellschaft.  
2
 Examples of passages, that deal with the term shmei/on, are Luke 2:35 and Genesis 4:15. 
3
 Hebrew terms for “sign” in the Old Testament have two equivalent terms in the New Testament, 
sti,gma and shmei/on. 
4
 The doctrine of eschatology refers to assertions concerning “the already, but not yet” of God`s 
kingdom in the world. Examples using a term for “sign” found in Scripture: Isaiah 44:5, Ezekiel 9:4 and 
Revelation 13:16ff. Different terms for “sign” are used, which also refer to an eschatological dimension 
(Mödl 1994:1737). I will focus on the eschatological dimension of stigma in Chapter Four. 
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1990:11). In the history of theology, appearances of stigma have been understood 
according to the context of biography and the intention of the bearer. The question is 
whether a natural or supra-natural cause (e.g. charisma) lies behind a particular 
stigma (Mödl 1994:1737).  
 
In the thesis I go a step further and hermeneutically inquire into the meaning of (the 
HIV/AIDS-related) stigma. What is the paradigm of stigma in the context of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, theologically, and what are the meaning dimensions that can 
be added? 
 
3. CONCEPTUALISATION AND DESCRIPTION  
This section discusses stigmatisation based primarily on the work of Erving Goffman 
(1963. Stigma. Notes on the management of the spoiled identity), who was one of 
the pioneers in the research on stigma and whose work has been built upon by many 
sociologists.5 This section is also indebted to Jürgen Hohmeier’s sociological work 
on stigma (1975).6 For an investigation of HIV and AIDS-related stigma, I will refer to 
Gregory M. Herek (1999), who is known for his research on HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma. 
 
3.1 Stigma: deviance and “spoiled identity” 
In Goffman’s view, society has the potential and “means of categorising persons”. 
Society lays down “the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for 
members of each of these categories” (Goffman 1990:11).7 The encounter between 
a “stranger” and “us” is constituted in a way that, with first appearances, one is able 
to anticipate categories and attributes of the other. Both attributes and categories 
                                           
 
 
5
 The term stigmatisation, in reference to processes of exclusion and separation in sociological 
sciences, has only emerged at the beginning of the 1970s. Goffman describes the social process, in 
which stigmatisation is likely to happen as one, in which one does not meet the expectations of 
another category. 
6
 Stigmatisierung als sozialer Definitionsprozess builds on Goffman’s research and complements it in 
certain aspects.  
7
 “Category” here refers to various sectors of a society. 
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define a “social identity.”8 Goffman’s observation that “anticipations” are soon to be 
transformed into “normative expectations” and from there to “righteously presented 
demands”9 is outstanding. Goffman suggests that the “demands we make might 
better be called demands made ‘in effect’, and the character we impute to the 
individual might better be seen as an imputation made in potential retrospect – a 
characterisation ‘in effect’, a virtual social identity”.10 This virtual social identity stands 
beside the actual social identity, which eventually could be proved to be factual 
(Goffman 1990:12).  
 
Goffman points out that a special discrepancy between virtual and social identity 
constitutes stigma. Stigma therefore refers to a deeply discrediting attribute, “which 
is incongruous with our stereotype of what a given type of individual should be” 
(Goffman 1990:13). Hence, for Goffman, stigma is a relational term, a term that 
describes social relations. In fact, “stigmatizing labels” or attributes have a 
discrediting and exposing effect, often with heavy consequences on the life situation 
and identity of the people affected.  
 
Theologian Gillian Paterson considers Goffman’s approach to stigmatisation more 
closely, and identifies three insights. The first is that Goffman shows that there is 
nothing ontological about stigma and stigmatisation. Rather, it is connected to one’s 
context and perception; it emphasises norms and values and it is rooted in human 
attitude. Sociologists agree that the phenomenon itself (stigma) and prejudices “do 
not necessarily inhere [sic!] in behaviours or types of persons” (Ainlay, Becker & 
Coleman 1986:91). Another almost self-explicating point that Paterson draws on, is 
that norms have the function to give orientation and to demarcate from phenomena 
differing from the norm. Consequently, where one speaks of norms, which have a 
special meaning and function in society, there is also deviance bound to exist.11 She 
                                           
 
8
 Goffman uses the term “social identity” instead of the term “social status” because personal 
attributes (e.g. honesty), as well as structural ones (e.g. occupation) are involved (Goffman 1990:12).   
9
 Here, the thesis needs to question further the ‘demanded’ norms behind such expectations. 
Nonetheless, we are neither aware of making demands, nor of their contents “until an active question 
arises as to whether or not they will be fulfilled” (Goffman 1990:12). 
10
 Goffman’s italics. 
11
 In organized societies there do exist values, which can become norms, which can become rules, 
and which can finally become laws.  
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also stresses that persons characterised as the normal and the stigmatised are not 
to be regarded as persons. With Goffman we can speak of virtual social identities, to 
which Paterson refers to as perspectives (Goffman 1963:12; Paterson 2005:34).12  
 
The sociologist Hohmeier also builds on Goffman’s concept of stigma. Instead of 
emphasizing the discrediting attributes as Goffman does, Hohmeier points out to the 
negative definition, which is ascribed to the notion of stigma (Hohmeier 1975:7). He 
argues from a sociological perspective by describing deviance as the result of a 
social process of compromising. In this process of compromising, ways of behaviour 
or attributes are characterised as “deviant” (Hohmeier 1975:6). Hence, Hohmeier like 
Paterson recognises that deviance is not a quality of acting and being itself 
(ontological), but the result of a societal definition. Like all social phenomena, which 
are contextual, deviance, as a social definition, also underlies historical changes.13  
 
Both Hohmeier and Goffman focus on the phenomenon of stigma. Goffman points to 
a stigmatizing label; so to speak, the stigma is attached to a discrediting attribute of 
the bearer, through which the latter is recognised as deviant and even spoiled. 
Differently, Hohmeier stresses the process of a negative social definition. With 
Hohmeier it is the perspective, the attitude of an individual or a group, who defines 
another individual or a group downwards as deviance. In so doing, Hohmeier affirms 
that deviant attributes (which are worth stigmatizing) are not rooted in the state of 
being different of persons or certain groups. It is the process of definition itself, in 
which the fact of being different is pinned down in a judgemental way.  
 
According to Hohmeier, stigma is the special case of a social prejudice towards a 
person or a group to whom a negative attribute is ascribed. Therefore, stigma is 
based on generalisations, typification and stereotyping; on the one hand, it is 
grounded on own experiences, and on the other hand, it is based on unproven and 
adapted experiences (Hohmeier 1975:7). Furthermore, a characteristic of stigma is 
                                           
 
12
 The latter outcome calls for a systemic approach, which analogically deals with the notion of 
position. 
13
 Note that “history” is always written from a specific perspective.  
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that a certain attribute at hand is defined in an explicit negative way, so that other 
negative attributes are added easily.  
 
Stigmatisation, therefore, is a verbal or non-verbal behaviour, based on an ascribed 
stigma (e.g. social prejudice) which is brought upon the individual or a group 
(Hohmeier 1975:7). One of the fatal effects of stigmatisation is that generalisations 
about the person lead to a definition of the person in terms of the stigma in all social 
relations. Stigma then becomes a “master status”, that like no other feature of the 
person determines the place in society, and the social intercourse with other human 
beings (1975:8).14 
 
From the above-mentioned understanding of deviance, a deviant person can be 
described as someone to whom certain “etiquette” has been ascribed successfully 
(Hohmeier 1975:6). Here, the link with creating paradigms and the need to shift 
destructive paradigms arise. As institutions caring for traditions and values, 
theological schools and churches have a great responsibility to create and keep alive 
paradigms, and each generation of theology and church practitioners is challenged 
to reflect (self-) critically on the appropriate understanding of the Christian message.  
 
3.2 General conditions and functions of stigmatisation 
From a sociological point of view, Hohmeier asserts that investigating the conditions 
for the occurrence of stigmatisation in societies is one of the most important aspects 
of research on stigma and simultaneously, the least regarded aspect of those 
researches. Preconditions of stigmatisation lie in generalisations, clichés and in 
common and committing norms. In addition, power relations15 between the person 
who stigmatises another and the person to whom stigma is ascribed play an 
important role. Another condition is that stigmatisation is likely to occur in societies 
which function according to principles of individual achievement and competition. In 
the same way, tensions between different groups within society provide the soil for 
                                           
 
14
 “Das Stigma wird zu einem‚ master status’, der wie keine andere Tatsache die Stellung einer 
Person in der Gesellschaft sowie den Umgang mit anderen Menschen bestimmt” (Hohmeier 1975:8). 
15
 I will pay attention to the notion of power relations later.  
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stigma (Hohmeier 1975:9).16Here I question the conditions of stigmatisation on an 
individual level as well as on a societal level. Facing individual stigma in social 
interaction may serve as a means of categorising a person. It functions as a relief for 
one’s attitude,17 in this sense it reduces insecurity by being a decision aid (i.e. 
concerning the stance or attitude one should adopt).18  
 
Another possible function of stigmatisation is grounded in theories which deal with 
“identity strategies”.19 People may make use of identity strategies such as rejection, 
avoidance of social intercourse with stigmatised persons or through isolating them, in 
order to keep or restore their own psychic balance and to protect one self. The 
encounter with a stigmatised person is seen as a threat to one’s own identity 
because, for example, it may remind one of one’s own tendencies of deviance. Since 
a person may lack the ability to deal with the differences in another person, that is 
cognitively, emotionally and practically, one may conclude that the threat of the 
stigmatised person lies in the disability of the stigmatizing person (Hohmeier 
1975:11). 
 
On a societal level Hohmeier identifies four functions of stigmatisation. 
Stigmatisation may regulate the social intercourse between different groups, for 
example, between majorities and minorities.20 Stigmatisation may also stabilise the 
system in that it channels frustration and aggression towards weaker members, the 
powerless and the less-equipped, who can be regarded as the scapegoats of 
society. Simultaneously, one can say that stigmatisation enhances and strengthens 
the norm conformity of the person who stigmatises; since if there were no stigma, 
                                           
 
16
 The description can be regarded as an analogue to what we call an industrialised nation (Hohmeier 
1975:9). 
17
 An interpretation according to depth psychology is the understanding of stigma as a projection. It 
serves as a release of aggressions. However, aggressions may be rooted in justified frustration or 
may be connected to social prejudice. Another interpretation of stigma as projection is based on the 
suppression of natural drives. A person may not allow him or herself to express personal wishes and 
drives, because he or she assumes they are forbidden or not acceptable. Hence, forbidden wishes 
become projected and rejected in the stigmatised individual (Hohmeier 1975:10). 
18In societies, which undergo a rapid change or underlie a high frequency of territorial mobility, the 
need for orientation is especially high (Hohmeier 1975:10). 
19
 “Identitätsstrategien sind Verhaltensweisen, die der Bewahrung eines gefährdeten bzw. der 
Herstellung eines gestörten psychischen Gleichgewichts dienen” (Hohmeier 1975:11). 
20
 Social intercourse includes the access to rare resources such as status or professional possibilities 
(Hohmeier 1975:12). 
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there would be no advantage of being “normal” or non-deviant. Finally, stigma may 
also serve as a tool of suppression. A typical instance is the affiliation of 
catastrophes or disasters with a stigmatised group (Hohmeier 1975:12). 
 
3.3 Possible origins of stigmatisation 
Hohmeier admits that causal relations are hard to grasp and are rather vague. He 
provides general hypotheses that trace back the origin of stigmatisation in societies 
(Hohmeier 1975:20). The first hypothesis is that interests of global societal 
institutions, such as politics, economy or religion, are crucial to the complex subject 
of stigmatisation and its origin.21 In this understanding stigmatisation objectively 
serves the interest of global institutions.22  
 
According to Hohmeier, a second hypothesis on the cause of stigmatisation in 
societies can be traced back to the dynamic interconnection between norms and 
stigmatisation. A set norm is the precondition for being stigmatised. For the 
realisation of stigmatisation due to existing norms, power relations or the influence of 
an institution play a decisive role. The incapability to match up with common 
principles of achievement can also lead to stigmatisation, which is sustained through 
conventional norms, values and ideologies of a society. 
 
The third hypothesis refers to the anthropological constitution of human beings, 
which is grounded in either a natural or a learned need of differentiation towards the 
other. At the same time, one can also suspect anxiety towards the perceived 
difference of the other. Additionally, the need for orientation, release of aggressions 
and projections of stressing desires, offer a clue to clarifying the openness of a 
stigmatizing attitude (Hohmeier 1975:22). 
                                           
 
 
21
 For example, the institution of “private property” does bring about “theft”, just as churches produce 
the “sexual deviant” (Hohmeier 1975:21).  
22
 See the notes in Chapter Two from a discussion during the seminar on “HIV and AIDS: Biopolitik in 
South Africa”, held at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the 2007/08 winter semester. 
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3.4 Consequences of stigmatisation  
On three levels, Hohmeier describes the consequences of stigmatisation from the 
perspective of the stigmatised individual, who naturally seeks approval as a person 
and as a partner in interaction within the society. These are a) participation within the 
society, b) interaction with non-stigmatised persons, and c) identity change of a 
stigmatised person (Hohmeier 1975:13).  
a) Participation within the society happens through formal and informal roles that one 
assumes. Stigmatisation can lead to the loss of these roles or hinder the fulfilment of 
a role. The loss of one’s roles in society also reduces the possibility of one’s societal 
participation.  
b) Participation within the society is further questioned, in that social interaction with 
non-stigmatised persons is continuously threatened by disruption. The stigmatised 
person does not know if (and under which conditions) the interaction partner accepts 
him or her. The stigmatised individual is under stress to keep up a permanent 
“stigma management” (Goffman 1990). Hence, tensions, insecurity, embarrassment, 
and anxiety are characteristic of the social interaction between stigmatised and non-
stigmatised persons. 
c) Participation and interaction within the society is a precondition for social and 
personal development of human beings. In worst cases, participation and interaction 
within society can also become a source of social and personal regression, for 
example, in a culture of stigmatisation and discrimination. Thus, it is a challenge for a 
stigmatised person to keep-up his or her identity authentically, or even to make 
further attempts towards growth (Hohmeier 1975:14; Louw 2004:95).23 
                                           
 
23
 One of the possible consequences of the “attitude” of stigmatised persons is that society offers 
certain roles to the stigmatised. Further, Hohmeier asserts that in the process of stigmatisation 
people are urged to take on such roles (i.e. immediate socialization). There is the urge for self-
identification with the role of being stigmatised (i.e. internalized stigma). Hohmeier calls this a 
happenstance and “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Hohmeier 1975:15). Another aspect he mentions is the 
“secondary deviance” in which people adapt their self-image towards the stigma which has been 
ascribed to them.  
The stigmatised carry within themselves in an inner certainty that the others like themselves are 
aware of their supposedly tainted identity. Likewise, their experience of being treated according to 
the stigma reminds them of being different (Hohmeier 1975:16). 
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4. THE MANIFESTATION OF STIGMA: HABITUS  
From the discussion of stigma above, the notion of attitudes of people can be 
derived and is manifested in judgement towards so-called “deviant attributes.” 
Goffman identifies “attitudes normals have towards a person with a stigma” (Goffman 
1990:15). Likewise, Hohmeier has focussed on the dynamic process of 
stigmatisation, which is equivalent to a negative definition (judgement/ judgemental 
attitude). He emphasises the “dynamic relational aspect” inherent in stigma as an 
ascribed prejudice, and stigmatisation as a “verbal or non-verbal behaviour”. Hence, 
one can speak of stigmatizing attitudes people hold. 24  
 
Paterson also points to the notion of “perspectives” instead of demarcating “persons” 
in order to define “the deeply held attitudes and beliefs of […] groups that lead to 
labelling, stereotyping, setting apart, devaluing and discriminating”. The notion of 
“perspectives” refers to both, the process of judging and stigmatizing, as well as 
stigma itself. Here, Paterson sees a main danger in the internalisation of 
stigmatisation that people receive, so that they feel like “having a stigma” or “being 
stigmatised”. According to Paterson, an approach focussing on the avoidance of 
stigmatizing attitudes and behaviour should be rooted in two principles. Firstly, the 
mechanisms that lead to disadvantage and issues of individual and structural 
discrimination should be named. Secondly, the approach must address the 
fundamental cause of stigma and stigmatisation, and help “chang[ing] the deeply 
held attitudes and beliefs of powerful groups that lead to labelling, stereotyping, 
setting apart, devaluing and discriminating” (Paterson 2005:40). In general, three 
positions exist with regard to attitude. To begin with, attitude always refers to an 
object either on a concrete level (e.g. attitude towards the human body or 
corporeality) or on an abstract level (e.g. attitude towards life). Next, in social 
                                           
 
 
24
 Note the connection between the Latin words habitus (English, attitude) and habere (English, to 
behave). 
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sciences, it has been established that attitudes are acquired through learning. 
Finally, attitudes can be described as relatively long lasting, and operational. This 
means that continuously the same clusters of behaviour are produced towards the 
object of attitude. According to Abele and Nowack (1975:146), attitude is the 
“affective-judgemental expression” towards the object of attitude. Moreover, Abele 
and Nowack explain the sociological use of the term “attitude” (Einstellung, Haltung) 
in connection with behaviour, for example, in connection with stigmatisation. 
 
Sociological theories about stigma have provided insight into conceptualisation, 
conditions, functions, possible causes, and consequences of stigmatisation. The 
focus has also been on the conditions and functions of HIV and AIDS-related stigma, 
which may be of symbolic or instrumental nature. Consequently, one can 
differentiate between stigmatizing attitudes based on fear and the urge for protection, 
and the attitudes of negligence, ignorance and social meanings connected to norms 
and values of society. Stigma can be described as the result of the social process of 
the definition of deviance. As mentioned above, stigma is the special case of social 
prejudice towards a person or group to whom a negative attribute is ascribed 
(Hohmeier 1975:7). 
 
 
5. STIGMA AS RATIONAL CONSTRUCTION: SCHEMATA OF INTERPRETATION 
Goffman has introduced the notion of a “virtual social identity”, which is actually 
ascribed to a person who is judged as somehow deviant. The person then is 
regarded through a special “frame”. In the same way, a person who identifies him or 
herself with a certain deviant attribute, called a stigma, likewise understands him or 
herself through a specific “frame”.  With this, another relevant dimension of stigma is 
opened up by understanding stigma rationally as schemata of interpretation. 
According to Daniël Louw, stigmatisation and discrimination are often linked to 
perceptions created by “schemata of interpretations”. Louw also refers to Goffman 
who uses the term “frame” to describe the schemata of interpretation, which 
determines how events or circumstances are perceived. He notes that, “Frames are 
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the ways we perceive events or circumstances. They are the guidelines that shape 
reality for each of us. Frames may be seen as patterns through which we put 
together and interpret information and experiences” (Stone 1994:233, cited in Louw 
2003:210).25 26  
 
Frames or schemata of interpretation are largely determined by culture, which refers 
to human structures within concrete context as shaped by needs, values, norms, 
rituals, symbols, and language. Up to modern times in Western culture, the term 
“culture” was identical with religion. Today, both are distinct, though still influencing 
one another.27 Culture is no uniform term since it includes co-existence in terms of 
difference, for example, regarding ethnicity, gender and class (Louw 2004:124).  
Louw suggests that perceptual schemata of interpretation help to understand 
everyday life encounters and co-existent (human) beings. Due to conflicting 
interests, competing ideologies or the anthropological constitution of the human 
being, co-existence and encounter can be interpreted negatively within cultures.28 
This interpretation of encounter and co-existence is a totally negative one. 
 
On an individual level, Louw probes deeper and identifies that due to “partiality and 
narrow perspectives, negative associations of experiences are stored in the mind as 
suspicion. Through labelling, suspicion is linked to all phenomena associated with [a 
certain]… experience” (Louw 2004:123). Finally, suspicion manifests itself in 
prejudice and prejudice becomes a biased schemata of interpretation, which leads to 
the “-isms” of prejudice (Louw 2004:123).29  
                                           
 
25
 Stone, H. (1994). Paradox in pastoral counselling. In Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 13 (3), 
232-241. 
26
 Patterns of thought develop due to perceptions and experiences. People may generate schemata 
of interpretation that are disconnected from reality, if their perception is one-sided and if it had earlier 
gone through a process of “dissection” (Louw 2003:210). 
27
 Culture can also be understood as a shared “living space” in which people transform their 
immediate environment (Louw 2003:210).  
28
 See my Chapter One, section 3.3.  
29
 Though South Africa is a secular state, religious orientation has played an enormous role in 
enacting state power. For example, the ideology of ‘a nation created by God’ during the Apartheid 
regime (which legitimised its power as “God given”), the vision of the “Rainbow Nation” designed by 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the ideals of forgiving and forgiveness as the basis for the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, and finally, the new “ubuntu” – culture nationalism, all have a religious 
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Louw traces stigmatisation and stigma (as the outcome of prejudices) back to an 
accumulation of suspicion in human beings created by perception and learned 
patterns of thought (Louw 2004:124).30 Noteworthy is the combination of emotions, 
perception and thought in the construction of a “frame” through a person’s 
encounters with the world. The human being in its total ratio-emotional-perceiving 
being in the world is carrier of a certain attitude, moreover carrying a certain quality 
of attitude (e.g. suspicion).  
 
Consequently, the notion of “frame”, how events or circumstances are perceived, 
always refers to the whole human being in its totality. When it comes to the “isms” of 
prejudice, we can speak of rational schemata of interpretation, because the carrier of 
a prejudice is rarely able to clearly trace back where the feeling of suspicion is 
rooted.   
 
 
6. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STIGMA AND POWER  
The phenomenon of stigma is not grasped if the dynamic and relational connection 
between stigma and power is missing. It is prejudice combined with hierarchy and 
misused power that leads to stigmatisation. 
  
Gillian Paterson argues that stigma and power belong inseparably together. She 
further states that human nature inherently creates hierarchies with the tendency “for 
moving someone downwards” (Paterson 2005:39). The occasion of stigma then 
offers a basis for devaluing, rejecting and excluding other individuals. In this way 
                                                                                                                                   
 
connotation (Schäfer 2005). Im Schatten der Apartheid. Frauen-Rechtsorganisationen und 
geschlechtsspezifische Gewalt in Südafrika. Münster: LIT, 203.) 
30
 Louw describes ideology “as the violence of the mind when an idea is absolutised in order to 
maintain power… when it is isolated from existential and moral issues which shape the quality of 
human dignity when it violates the ethics of unconditional love”. He further comments that “rational 
patterns of thought, detached from values and a realistic approach, easily degenerate into ideology” 
(Louw 2004:123). 
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Paterson sees the correlation between stigma and social, economic and political 
power. She notes that, “If you have no power, you may stereotype but you cannot 
stigmatise” (Paterson 2005:39). Here, she agrees with the observation of Bruce Link 
and Jo Phelan31 who state that relatively powerless groups may create labels and 
stereotypes about more powerful groups. Although they treat the more powerful 
group in accordance with these stereotypes, the latter would never end up being a 
stigmatised group. “This clarifies why the definition of stigma must involve reference 
to power differences. Without such a reference, stigma becomes a very different and 
much broader concept” (Link & Phelan 2001, cited in Patterson 2005:39).32 A 
decisive aspect of stigma and stigmatisation is the relational component, which is 
characterised by a specific use of power. Individuals or groups regarded as more 
powerful are likely to stigmatise people who have less power, whereas people in 
“weaker” positions are not able to stigmatise “more powerful” individuals or groups.  
 
For example, in the South African context, power is a delicate topic. The public 
consciousness judges power mainly as negative; this is mirrored in the people’s 
historical experience with political, economic and social powers. The negative 
historical experience of corrupt power leads to the reaction of critique and resistance. 
In this way, it is not power in itself that is subject to rejection, but rather the misuse of 
it. This calls for sensitivity to a reflected understanding of power in the South African 
context. The renouncement of power would entail relinquishing any social conduct. 
Since this is neither possible nor preferable, only two means of keeping the danger 
of power in check remain, namely institutional control and personal responsibility (cf. 
Gerhardt 1999:343). 
 
                                           
 
 
31
 Link, B. G.  and Phelan, J. C.  (2001). Conceptualizing Stigma. Annual Review of Sociology 2001, 
27, 363-385. 
32
 Patterson speaks of the misuse of power in connection with stigma while Volker Gerhardt 
approaches power more neutrally. He asserts that many negative judgements about power are based 
on the assumption of violence or force, supremacy, reign, and sovereignty. Possibly, power may find 
expression in violence or force (Gewalt), which takes on amorphous or often physically destructive 
forms. Power may also be expressed in supremacy or sovereignty (Herrschaft), which is structured 
according to hierarchies affected (Gerhardt 1999:342). 
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Another concrete example is provided by Denise Ackermann. She emphasises the 
influence of institutional power put forward by global injustice, which causes poverty 
in parts of the developing world. Additionally, she critically points to the situation of 
disordered gender relations in the South African context, and the question of having 
power over one’s own body in a patriarchal society (Ackermann 2005:47). The 
remarkable role that power relations play prompts Ackermann to speak up for the 
legitimate questions about God’s justice, power and presence in a suffering world 
(Ackermann 2005:49).33 34 
 
Power itself is not problematic in nature but it becomes dangerous when humans 
misuse it and make it a purpose in itself.35 36 At the same time, power can only be 
restricted with power.37 Up to this point, the definition of stigma involves references 
to societal power differences. Power can also be circumscribed as the possibility of 
bringing about any mode of effect in any area of life (e.g. in everyday life, and in 
political as well as social contexts).38  
                                           
 
33
 The question of power in a theological context inevitably leads to the question of the power of God. 
I shall refer to God’s power in dealing with the notion of destigmatisation in Chapter Four.  
34
 Ackermann describes a connection between a distanced (i.e. unembodied) self-understanding and 
the low threshold of hurting others (Ackermann 2003:72). She supports Hannah Arendt and thus: If… 
a torturer allows ‘the reality of the other’s suffering to enter his own consciousness, [it] would 
immediately compel him to stop the torture’. The victim’s pain becomes the torturer’s self-blinding 
power. ‘It is not merely that his power makes him blind, nor that his power is accompanied by 
blindness, nor even that his power requires blindness; it is, instead, quite simply that his blindness, his 
willed amorality, is his power, or a large part of it.’   
Ackermann (2003:72) concludes that the torturer’s ability to distance him or herself from the bodies of 
those being tortured leads to the destruction of the same. 
35
 Likewise, Gerhardt points out the danger of power. A characteristic of power is its dangerous 
tendency to become independent, a purpose in itself. With power, temptation proceeds carelessly to 
get itself through all hindrances (“In der Macht selbst steckt allerdings eine Gefahr, als sie zur 
Verselbstständigung tendiert und die Menschen mit einer gewissen Zwangsläufigkeit verführt, sich 
über alle Widerstände hinwegzusetzen.”) (Gerhardt 1999:342). 
36
 According to Gerhardt, the metaphysical power concept is determined by the “model of human 
action”. Even Friedrich Nietzsche, who had tried to overcome the “model of human action” in his work, 
Der Wille zur Macht, did not overcome the inherent anthropomorphism. Gerhardt (1999:341) quotes 
Nietzsche, who concedes that the only acknowledgeable access to the understanding of power in his 
time is ‘to make use of the analogy “human being” in a consequent way’ (“sich der Analogie des 
Menschen zu Ende bedienen”) (ibid.). 
37
 Gerhardt regards both institutional control and personal responsibility as imperfect; both are always 
subject to improvement (Gerhardt 1999:343). 
38
 In German, the term “power” is translated with Macht (Indogerm.: magh= mögen, vermögen; Engl.: 
to be able). Max Weber has defined power as being “amorphous”, meaning it is before all concrete 
reality (Gerhardt 1999:340). 
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In the philosophical context Plato understood power (dynamis) as pure being itself 
and the notion of virtue to be an expression of power. Aristotle, who built on Plato, 
differentiated power as the potential for movement and change. He explicitly 
distinguishes virtue as habitus (hexis) from indeterminate potential (dynameis).  
 
Stigma and stigmatisation arise in a cultural context in which norms and values exist. 
Regimented norms and values are rules and laws, and to live accordingly is a virtue. 
Stigma and stigmatisation have been identified as perspective, frame or schemata of 
interpretation. A stigma is then rather a social construction, a relational process in 
which stigmatisation is the (pretending of) sticking to certain norms, in order to live a 
life of virtue and justice. According to Plato and Aristotle virtue and habitus (as the 
more distinguished expression of power) qualify a human being in his or her status of 
power.39 Moreover, virtue (Plato) and habitus (Aristotle) are embedded in a certain 
ethos, which defines norms and values.40 If one lays open norms and values in a 
Christian ethos, for example, and compares these with unmasked norms and values 
(consciously or unconsciously) applied in the process of stigmatisation, then a gap 
between the Christian ethos and the paradigm behind stigma and stigmatisation 
becomes obvious.   
 
If the notion of power is defined by human virtuousness and behaviour in the holistic 
sense of habitus, then one needs to question whose norms and values one is talking 
about. Who establishes those norms and values? Is it society who dictates what is 
“good” or “bad”, or is there a “law” pre-existent to all human society, which gives 
orientation, like that revealed in the Christian belief? 
                                           
 
39
 According to Volker Gerhardt (1999:340), virtue is the connection between power and a body-soul 
constitution (leibseelische Verfasstheit). 
40
 Antique ethics requires the adjustment of the individual who is striving towards possibilities of 
individual behaviour. Simultaneously, it is connected to effect and the notion of freedom. In the Old 
and New Testaments, omnipotence becomes the character of a personal, living God. With his 
understanding of divine power, Augustine bridges the notion of will, freedom and reason as the 
measure for human power. In modernity, Leibniz sets the foundation for the conception of power. 
Power is characterised as human power, namely what is possible through human action and 
metaphysical power becomes the transcendent pendant for human power (Gerhardt 1999:340).   
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There is interplay between stigma and power if we trace back the norms and values 
behind stigma and if the definition of power remains vague for the moment. The 
question in a pastoral context grounded in the Christian ethos is whether truly 
Christian norms and values, the will of God (Christian ethos), offer the base for 
human relation or if suspicion and prejudice based on fear, ignorance or negligence 
offer a base for stigmatisation and discrimination. 
 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION: STIGMA, A CHALLENGE TO PASTORAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
When pastoral theology is concerned with the healing and salvation dimension of the 
Gospel, then it becomes relevant in clarifying the notion of stigmatisation. To begin, 
a working definition of the concepts of stigma and stigmatisation have been 
provided; subsequently, a deeper understanding of the phenomena will be probed.  
 
Chapter One has dealt with the conceptualisation of stigma and stigmatisation. The 
finding is that there is nothing ontological about stigma. Either stigma is attached to a 
discrediting attribute of the bearer, through which the latter is recognised as deviant 
and even spoiled. The process of stigmatisation has been identified as the process 
of a negative social definition. A glimpse into the preconditions of stigmatisation has 
shown that prejudices or the actual evaluation of certain deviant attributes (from 
which stigmatisation derives) are dependent on power relations.  
 
The preliminary definition departed from the literal meaning of stigma, in being a sign 
or a mark, which refers either to a bodily condition or one of moral blemish of the 
human being. It is interesting how both the bodily, as well as the moral aspect, come 
together in HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation. This will be further 
discussed in the next chapter. I will sustain the argument that within the context of 
the HIV and AIDS pandemic, stigmatisation goes along with the degradation of 
human embodiment. Human embodiment always includes the human being in its 
totality. In Chapter Two I focus on the human body as an aspect of human 
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embodiment because of the assumption that the object of HIV and AIDS-related 
stigmatisation is human corporeality. 
 
The aspect of stigma as a social definition of deviance and stigma as schemata of 
interpretation connected to prejudices are important for pastoral theology because 
religion also offers a schema for “framing interpretation,” in terms of paradigms. The 
notion of the quality of attitude behind the HIV and AIDS-related stigma and the 
potential of the Christian belief will be relevant to further discussion. The paradigm 
behind stigma so far has been circumscribed by the quality of the attitude of the 
human being. Stigma is either ascribed or internalised by human beings. 
Stigmatisation is a process, behaviour or habitus of human beings. 
 
Ackermann also sees the connection between stigmatisation and the human body. In 
support of Ackermann, a most urgent and central issue is the stigmatisation of the 
human body as a way of alienation from being. As a theologian, she is (self-) critical 
of how Christian theology (enacted in a Christian ethos) has contributed to the 
stigmatisation of the human body (Ackermann 2006:12). She sees a dark part in 
Christian history in that the body has been regarded as secondary to the human soul 
for too long, so that Christian thinking must become “embodied theological thinking” 
(Ackermann 2005:49). 
 
From a Christian pastoral viewpoint, the consequences of stigmatisation point to the 
aspects of community and acceptance versus exclusion and suffering. The Christian 
potential deserves more attention and will be discussed later in the thesis. At the 
same time, the consequences of stigmatisation in general are analogous to those of 
the HIV and AIDS-related stigma. 
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           CHAPTER TWO                                                            
HIV/AIDS-RELATED STIGMA: A CHAOTIC DILEMMA 
 
In Chapter Two I outline specific features of HIV and AIDS-related stigma and 
stigmatisation. The chapter shows that the general perception of HIV and AIDS is 
intertwined with a negative perception of the human body, which leads to the 
degradation of human embodiment. In pastoral theology the human body then is 
associated with being sinful. Subsequently, in naming the ethical, theological and 
ecclesiological dilemma, I probe into the notion of sin (hamartiology), and its impact 
on the discussion of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation and pastoral anthropology. 
 
 
1. HIV/AIDS AND LANGUAGE: NAMING THE PANDEMIC 
Language and thinking are inevitably linked. Because language structures the world 
in which we live, an approach to life reality via the hermeneutic of language should 
be chosen consciously and carefully. In the 1980s, when the virus HIV was first 
identified, it was called an epidemic (i.e. it could go away with time). Next, it was 
identified as endemic (such a disease remains). Today, HIV and AIDS are generally 
referred to as pandemics (global diseases). This change in naming mirrors the 
perception of HIV and AIDS as things that are no longer external, rather they 
concern all human beings. For an assessment and approach to deal with HIV and 
AIDS, Louw stresses that in the HIV and AIDS pandemic it is necessary to have a 
realistic view of the situation, which is neither pessimistic nor over-optimistic. Since 
thinking and language go together it is important how information about HIV and 
AIDS become communicated.  
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The acronym HIV names the virus, as well as the condition, of the person who has 
been tested HIV positive.41 In later stages, HIV causes AIDS, the acronym for 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. This is the condition of the body when it has 
lost its ability to defend itself against infections and various types of cancer. Since 
the 1980s, the interaction between the nervous system, the immune system, the 
neuro-endocrine system, and the psychosocial components that influence immunity 
and their effects on health and disease, has been discovered. Though the effect of 
emotions and stress is ancient knowledge, “the suggested relationship between 
mental state and disease has not gone unchallenged” (Karren et al. 2006:6).  
 
The philosopher and scientist, René Descartes, “had a dramatic impact on the 
‘holistic’ attitude and philosophy of medicine”, which came to dominate not only 
medical philosophy but also religious philosophy (Karren, Hafen, Smith & Frandsen 
2006:6). Descartes hypothesized that there were two separate substances in the 
world: matter, which behaved according to physical laws, and spirit, which was 
dimensionless and immaterial. The body was material, and the mind spiritual. Thus, 
Descartes’ notion was of “a fundamental, unbridgeable chasm between the body and 
the spirit – between the brain and the mind” (Karren et al. 2006:6).42 The impact of 
the physical state of the body on mental health and vice versa is common knowledge 
today. Unfortunately, this decisive information is still neither central in medical nor 
religious philosophy. Rather, in cases of illness, people tend to regard the body 
negatively as an opponent that is just not working. The distanced attitude to ones 
factual bodily nature becomes supported by language and metaphors, which stress 
internal and external perspectives. 
 
                                           
 
41
 The infection can finally lead to death. Medication in the form of anti-retroviral drugs can slow down 
the multiplication of the virus, but the virus itself cannot be eliminated. For transmission, the virus 
needs access to the bloodstream of a person. Since the virus is present in semen, vaginal fluid, 
breast milk, and blood, the main ways of transmission are intimate sexual contact, blood transfusion, 
sharing needles of intravenous drug users, mother-to-child transmission, or health care work via 
accidental pricks by contaminated needles (Van Dyke 2005:3; UNAIDS, in Louw 2007:397). 
42
 Chinese physicians (4000 years ago), Egyptian physicians and Greek physicians, (Hippocrates and 
Galen) noticed the strong relationship between mental state and disease. Ancient Indian scriptures 
warn that emotions such as violence, hatred, grief, and ingratitude are stronger than the body’s 
capability for healthy balance, so that a poor prognosis is given to patients afflicted by intensely 
negative emotions (Karren et al. 2006:6). 
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A rather more dramatic description of HIV and AIDS might refer to it in terms of a 
“war metaphor,” such as the body under invasion or a subversive act in the inner part 
of the body. In contrast, the enemy HIV is the infectious external cause. However, if 
the emphasis is on transmission, HIV and AIDS are perceived as infiltrating society, 
and “contamination” is one of the key terms. Susan Sontag refers to the kind of 
language associated with the political paranoia, with its typical suspicion against a 
plural world (Sontag 1989:21). Sontag speaks of the labels and attributes connected 
with HIV and AIDS in terms of metaphors. For example, she mentions the strong 
association of HIV and AIDS with death. In her essay, “AIDS and its Metaphors”, 
Sontag critically argues against common interpretations of HIV. She does not solely 
comment on certain metaphors of HIV, rather she points out the human mechanism 
of thinking in metaphors (i.e. as the transfer of a word, and the expression of its 
meaning in terms of an image, which is not identical to the word). At this point, we 
can recall the above understanding of stigma as schemata of interpretation. 
 
In my own view, however, the stigma following HIV and AIDS goes beyond the 
meaning of a metaphor. Stigma itself means “being a sign”, transferring its very 
special meaning. There are metaphors attached to HIV and AIDS that help to 
produce the HIV and AIDS-related stigma; and even though there are no visible 
scars or wounds, “stigma” remains a sign or even a “symbol”.43 An important step is 
to become aware of the use of language in the HIV/AIDS context. Dube (2005:60) 
claims that, “Language is central in communicating the message of breaking the 
stigma”; hence, the necessity of appropriate communication of a theological 
framework for breaking HIV and AIDS-related stigma and discrimination. 
 
The recent discourse on HIV and AIDS takes place amidst different discourses that 
influence the HIV and AIDS debate. The discourse is about the populace and 
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 Symbol (Grk. “thrown together”). A symbol is meant to bring back the lost unity that gives sense 
and meaning. In this regard, the symbolic function of stigma can be understood in restoring a lost 
unity. “Ursprünglich Wiedererkennungszeichen für Getrenntes; fortentwickelt zum Inbegriff jeder 
Zeichensprache, durch die sich der in Zufälle, Irrtümer, Widersinne des Lebens geworfene Mensch 
der Ganzheit und Einheit des Weltgrundes versichert hält” (Pongs 1954:1301); (Grk./Lat. sign; germ 
Kennzeichen, Zeichen) (Duden Fremdwörterbuch 9th ed). 
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individual members within the populace who are either the “normal” woman, the 
“normal” man, or the “normal” child, or in contrast, the woman, the man or the child 
infected with HIV, or the one who is ill because of AIDS. 
 
A closer look at the different discourses that surround the HIV and AIDS issue 
shows that operators of these discourses are predominantly institutions. Among 
these institutions, we can name the state or the government, which provides a 
judicial system, a public health system and regulates access to treatment and 
medication. Simultaneously, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and activists 
take part in the discourse on education and information and are interested in the 
production of laws and prohibitions. The international pharmacy industry and 
Western medicine are of interest and may have their own interests as well. Another 
aspect in the discourse is offered by the so-called “AIDS dissidents” (who may deny 
the existence of HIV and AIDS), or alternative medicine or healers. Religious 
authorities, represented by churches and their leaders, participate in education and 
information campaigns. The notion of sex and sexuality, which is closely linked with 
HIV, gives rise to the regulation of sex and sexuality and the construction of normal 
or deviant sexuality. Various institutions participate in the debate about HIV and 
AIDS. Different discourses are prevalent and represent different interests (one has 
to note that the discourses and the interests are mainly directed to talk about the 
population and its individuals instead of talking with them). Institutions discuss 
definitions of HIV and diagnostic criteria of AIDS. Likewise, the access to condoms 
is controversial in some churches, and the question of birth control extends beyond 
a medical discourse into one on political strategies.  
 
In the South African context, in particular, the discourses concerning HIV and AIDS 
are diverse. They range from the assertion of Western medicine as a hegemonic 
system of knowledge to the argument on a colonial and postcolonial construction of 
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“Africa”. The claim of racism, especially rooted in the context of Apartheid, becomes 
repeatedly louder.44  
 
 
2. HIV/AIDS AND PREJUDICE: JUDGING THE PANDEMIC 
Originally, the main feature of the popular and media-based conception of HIV was 
the supposed connection to and representation with male homosexuality (Louw 
2006:398).45 Particularly in the beginning, homosexuals were blamed as responsible 
for the “epidemic” (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46).46 Today, one can still speak of a 
reciprocal stigma, which seemingly creates an indissoluble connection between male 
homosexuality and HIV.47 In a stigmatizing view, both living with HIV/AIDS and being 
homosexual are associated as including one another and therefore as being 
reciprocal. 
 
Weinreich and Benn remark that, in certain contexts, prejudices against people trying 
to live positively with HIV/AIDS may, for example, derive from already existing fears 
of women, sexuality and poverty. AIDS is often seen as an illness men get from 
prostitutes or as the consequence of promiscuity. Among women, the thinking is that 
it is caused by prostitution or by sex outside marriage, or with multiple partners. It is 
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 This information was obtained from a discussion during the seminar on “HIV and AIDS: Biopolitik in 
South Africa”, held at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the winter 2007/08 semester. 
45
 Existing social metaphors of HIV and AIDS invite people to associate “plague, punishment, 
contamination, bodies out of control, fear, and death with the virus” (Chapman 2002:396). 
46
 Statistics reveal a great difference between HIV transmission in Africa and industrialised countries. 
In Africa, statistics shows that 87% of HIV transmissions happen through heterosexual activities, 10% 
is based on mother-to-child transmissions, 2% on blood transfusions, 1% on drug-use, and nearly 0% 
on homosexual activities. 
In industrialized countries, statistics show that 39% of HIV transmissions happen through homosexual 
activities, 37% through drug-use , 24% through heterosexual activities, 1% through mother-to-child 
transmissions, and nearly 0% through blood transfusions (Weinreich & Benn 2004:4). 
47
 The virus itself does not discriminate (see also Louw 2006:398). The discriminations made against 
people living with HIV and AIDS are unjustified, but hostility has no rational basis and is able to resist 
correction (Weinreich & Benn 2004:104). Smithurst (1990:107) remarks that, “intolerance needs no 
reasons, [it needs] only excuses”. Smithurst argues that the dread of HIV and AIDS is largely a 
reflection of a culture’s dread of homosexuality, which is based on restricted statistics and media 
reporting. In this sense, certain groups (mis)use HIV and AIDS as a “God-given propaganda vehicle” 
(Smithurst 1990:104). Concerning the “realities of sex” Smithurst asserts that nature rarely deals with 
categories; “only the human mind invents categories and tries to force facts into separate pigeon-
holes” (Smithurst 1990:107).  
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further stated that sometimes HIV and AIDS are even understood as a woman’s 
disease, like other sexually transmitted illnesses. Women are likely to be accused of 
transmitting HIV and of being responsible for its spread (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46). 
 
Likewise, the “incurability” of HIV and AIDS has structured the public perception. 
There is the widespread notion of HIV and AIDS as a “contagion”, and as being 
“highly infectious” (Smithurst 1990:100).48 People who are trying to live positively 
with HIV and AIDS are judged infectious or contaminated, and therefore are to be 
avoided (Ackermann 2006:1). Often people experience rejection and exclusion from 
families and communities; for example, they lose their job,49 or experience refusal of 
care, the loss of living space, neglect, physical violence, and/or the collapse of 
partnerships and marriage (Weinreich & Benn 2004:46). One has to be aware that 
descriptions of HIV and AIDS often unintentionally present the condition as a “death 
sentence” (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).50  Living with HIV and AIDS then likely bears 
the risk of being judged and stereotyped without evidence. Due to common 
assumptions, one is assumed either to have behaved shamefully or to be morally at 
fault and therefore deserves to be punished. 
 
The judgements going along with HIV and AIDS are fuelled by the paradox of the 
fundamental connection between life-creating sexuality and death, which causes a 
strong effect in people (Louw 2007:334).  
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 On a rational level, these considerations, which are connected to fear and anxiety, should be 
overcome by now. Furthermore, such ideas should be eradicated because there is no justifiable 
proportion that can be seen between the risk (of transmission in social intercourse) and 
discrimination. This supports the idea that further education and information concerning HIV/AIDS is 
needed. Smithurst (1990:100) wonders how one can attempt to correct misinformation from the 
reporting media, “but what is to be done when the public refuses to learn?” Likewise, his remark 
shows the need for further education concerning the notion of what it means to be human. 
49
 The International Labour Organization has stated in its Code of Practice that HIV is to be treated 
like any other illness, and that working people may not be discriminated against or stigmatised based 
on their HIV status. HIV tests cannot be made a requirement for employment (Weinreich & Benn 
2004:46). 
50
 The other extreme is to underestimate HIV for what it actually means. HIV has already been 
referred to as a “manageable, chronic illness, much like hypertension or diabetes” (UNAIDS, cited in 
Louw 2007:397). 
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a) The realm of sexuality  
Since one way of transmitting the HIV virus is through sex, the assumption here is 
that HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation is strongly connected to human sexuality. 
From the beginning, sexuality in the Christian tradition has been determined by purity 
laws. Paterson sees Mary Douglas’ work as an important critique, in that she 
identifies the subconscious role of religion in supporting purity rules.51 Paterson and 
Douglas consider religion a key factor that underpins social order. According to 
Douglas, order is society’s highest value, and it is the purpose of religion to 
safeguard this order associated with purity. It can be stated that because religion 
articulates a belief system and culture, it consciously or subconsciously plays a key 
role in the process of stigmatisation by the way it underpins social order.  
 
An underlying factor also may be the biblical perception of sin as impurity, pollution 
or defilement. In the Old as well as the New Testament, the negative definition of 
holiness means the avoidance of impurity.52 Paterson argues with Douglas that when 
society stigmatises and excludes,  it is trying to protect itself from danger, namely 
contagion.53 The reasoning is that one is polluted by breaking a taboo, and the 
stigmatised individual is a polluting influence which has to be avoided. Consequently, 
individuals who have broken a taboo must be cast out and punished (Paterson 
2005:38). 
 
Furthermore, Stephen Barton notes that in history rules of purity served the purpose 
of maintaining segregation. Israel’s purity rules and holy wars were meant to 
maintain separation from the Gentiles, while Christian purity rules and holy wars 
were meant to keep up the separation between believers and unbelievers (Barton 
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 Douglas, M. (2002). Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo. 
London: Routledge Classics. 
52
 Particularly in the Old Testament, the Levitical Law provides dietary rules and rules for women (cf. 
Lev 11; Deut 14). In the New Testament, cultic purity rules are set aside. Holiness is primarily defined 
by the avoidance of spiritual impurity but the notion of sin as a contagious defilement remains (cf. Mk 
7:1-23; Rom 1:24-32; see also Barton 1997:761).  
53
 The motivation behind this may be identified in society’s will for survival (Paterson 2005:38). 
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1997:761). Barton states that, “the violence directed at ‘sinners’ whether in biblical 
times or since, is a violence directed at those whom a society or group regards as 
anomalous and therefore threatening to the group’s purity” (Barton 1997:761). From 
this point of departure one can argue that, historically speaking, the notion of purity 
and impurity had a deleterious effect. In general, pollution laws have affected women 
more than they have affected men, especially in the area of sexuality (Paterson 
2005:38).54 The power of images regarding pollution can create neuroses of guilt and 
obsessional concerns about cleanliness (Paterson 2005:38). By crossing internal 
and external boundaries, one theoretically does not only risk polluting oneself but 
also the whole system.  
  
The Judaeo-Christian tradition of the notion of wholeness and completion, especially 
physical wholeness, is regarded as a sign of freedom from pollution.55 Douglas 
observes that the messianic counterpart of the Mosaic Law is the Sermon on the 
Mount.56 Paterson cites Douglas below:  
“From this time on, the physiological condition of a person, whether leprous, 
bleeding or crippled, should have become irrelevant to their capacity to 
approach the altar. The foods they ate, the things they touched, the days on 
which they did things … should have no effects on their spiritual status…” 
(Douglas, in Paterson 2005:38).  
 
Paterson comments that despite the spiritual intentions of the early church, a 
spontaneous resistance to the idea that bodily conditions were irrelevant to ritual 
(and the relationship with God) has continued (Paterson 2005:38). She sees the 
necessity for understanding and challenging pollution laws; meaning, it is important 
to understand the subconscious role of religion in supporting purity rules and the 
potential of Christian tradition to challenge those rules (Paterson 2005:38).57  
 
                                           
 
54
 In some cultures, taboos about menstruation and childbirth still contribute to the subordination of 
women. One also needs to mention the attempts to take control of women’s bodies and to exclude 
women from public domain (Barton 1997:761; see also Schäfer 2005).  
55
 Lev 21. 
56
 Mat 5-8. 
57
 Here, Paterson builds on R. Gill’s argument that historical facts show that the Christian tradition has 
resisted the purity laws of particular cultures (Gill, cited in Paterson 2005:38). 
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Douglas identifies sex and sexuality as a particular trigger for polluted thinking 
(Paterson 2005:38). She claims that there are no other social pressures potentially 
as explosive as those which constrain sexual relations (Douglas, in Paterson 
2005:38). There is also the tendency to regard sexual sin as the gravest sin of all. In 
the same way, one may say that HIV and AIDS is the result of sinful sexual relations. 
The consequence is that people living with HIV and AIDS are subjected to greater 
stigmatisation that sets them apart from the so-called “lesser sinners” (UNAIDS 
report 2005:14). On the one hand, Barton suggests that taboos about sex and the 
resulting stigmatisation lead to the denial of the human body. On the other hand, it is 
due to this denial that the notion of sex and sexuality becomes associated with 
promiscuous behaviour (Barton 1997:761). This gives rise to the understanding of 
the powerful interplay between HIV and AIDS -related stigma and the taboo of 
sexuality. 
 
Anthony Coxon points out that, historically, Christian thinking on sexuality has been 
largely negative.58 The notion of sexuality in the Christian tradition has been 
restricted to marriage and to marriage for the purpose of procreation (Coxon 
1997:759).59 Up to this day, more conservative Christian traditions, such as 
Catholicism, point to sexuality’s exclusive procreational purpose and forbid the use 
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 Another perspective of sexuality and truth is opened up by Michel Foucault. The postmodernist 
critically asks whether the point is to say ‘yes’ to sex for whatever reason or to say ‘no’. Foucault opts 
to open up the “polymorph techniques” and mechanisms of power, in order to show the “will for 
knowledge”, which functions as both basis and instrument at the same time (Foucault 1992a:22).  
Foucault shifts the focus from the hypothesis of repression of sexuality. Although he does not deny 
the repression of sex as a historical fact, he argues that particularly in Western societies discourses 
serve as power strategies for various institutions. For Foucault, repression of sex and sexuality is not 
the first aim, instead, it is the accomplishment of power. Thus, “life” itself becomes the political theme. 
Here, the meaning of sex and sexuality becomes obvious (in political conflicts as well as under the 
notion of embodiment): sex is the hinge between the two axes of development of a political 
technology of life. The one axis belongs to the disciplines of the body. The other axis, due to its global 
effect, is attached to the regulation of population. Sex opens up the access to the life of the individual 
body as well as to the life of a whole population. Hence, discourses about sexuality and sex are 
principles of regulation of power. The mechanisms point towards the body, towards life itself and its 
expansion, its upkeep, its fitness, its authorization, and its exploitation. In this understanding, 
sexuality stands not as a symbol or a sign but, rather, as the object and the target (Foucault 
1992b:176). 
59
 The two creation reports in Genesis diverge in accounting for sexuality. The Priestly account (1:1-
2:4) stresses the reproductive role of both male and female while the second, Yahwistic (2:4ff.) 
account, reflects aspects of companionship and/or pleasure (Coxon 1997:754). 
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of contraceptives. Furthermore, the puritan ideal is celibacy, through which one 
should liberate oneself from the bondage of the world (Louw 2007:334). 
 
In the Christian tradition the locus classicus for the strong association of sin with 
sexuality is the story of the Fall in Genesis 3. The UNAIDS report states that the 
story of the Garden of Eden is partly the story of human beings’ alienation from their 
sexuality (2005:12). In the creation story, one can perceive God’s gift to human 
beings - enjoying each other as sexual beings. Although in Eden humankind 
squandered this gift, there is fundamentally a positive scriptural perspective of 
humankind (Louw 2005:157). In particular, interpretations of the book of Genesis 
have led to the stigmatisation of women’s sexuality (UNAIDS Report 2005:12). 
Blaming women for their sexuality has had the tendency to portray women as the 
scapegoat of the society. 60 In this regard, feminist and sociological re-interpretations 
of biblical texts are important because they strip the associations and ideas from 
conceptions of sin that are damaging and have a long-lasting history. Additionally, 
they help to foster new directions in understanding sin (Barton 1997:760). 
  
In the last century, contributions to the disciplines of psychology, biomedical science 
and social science,  such as anthropology and sociology, have had a wide impact on 
the thinking of sexuality. In addition, developments in biblical as well as historical 
criticism have led to a change in sexual attitudes in theology (Coxon 1997:758). 
From a psychological angle, which introduces the notion of the subconscious, one 
can argue that concerning the notion of sin, defence mechanisms are also at work. 
We want to push sin, or what we associate with it, far away from us, as if it was not 
related to us. In other words, although we do not want to become impure, we do not 
notice that in denying human sexual nature one already acts in an impure way by 
denying God’s creation in human beings.  
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 Perhaps Tertullian’s statement concerning women as Eve has had a lasting effect on Western 
civilisation under the Christian tradition: “You are the Devil’s gateway. You are the unsealer of that 
forbidden tree. You are the first deserter of the divine law. You are she who persuaded him whom the 
Devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God’s image of man. On account of 
your dessert, that is death, even the Son of God had to die” (de Cultu Feminarum 1:1). 
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When HIV and AIDS are associated with stigma and discrimination, it leads to 
individual suffering and makes it more difficult to have open discussions concerning 
HIV and AIDS. The latter has a negative impact on fighting against the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic, since keeping silent about HIV and AIDS also promotes stigmatisation 
and discrimination (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47). In one way it becomes 
understandable that negative messages on sexuality as a means of prevention have 
a rather harmful effect.61 All the same, in order to avoid one-sidedness, the problem 
should not be reduced to the notion of sex and sexuality alone.62 On a communal 
and national level, “denial of HIV and AIDS means that important and controversial 
themes in the fight against HIV and AIDS – such as cultural standards of sexuality 
and inequalities in gender relations and social life – are evaded” (Weinreich & Benn 
2004:47).  
 
From here arises the “need to denounce the identification of sin with sex, as well as 
the stigmatisation and debased theology of sin that results from it” (UNAIDS 
2005:14). Nevertheless, sexuality has its place in intimate human relationships so 
that it is not justified to judge people because of their sexuality. Since sexual 
expression takes place in different ways, sexuality challenges us to face differences. 
A pastoral approach to sexuality should not aim to condemn others, nor should HIV 
be misused for establishing a new sexual moral.  
 
Departing from an incarnational approach, one can argue that because human 
beings are created by God, sexuality should be regarded as a gift from God. This 
simultaneously challenges us to acknowledge the centrality of the human body in 
theological thinking. Ackermann wonders that Christians, whose faith is grounded on 
Incarnate Love, “are so reluctant to grapple with what it means to have bodies” 
because “[a]ll reality and all knowledge are mediated through our bodies. We do not 
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 One critically needs to question what should be promoted - the prevention of HIV/AIDS or of sex. In 
this way the bare association between sex, sexuality and HIV/AIDS becomes obvious. 
62
 This implies that the distribution of condoms cannot be the final word in responding to HIV/AIDS. 
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live disembodied lives. Our bodies are more than skin, bones, and flesh. The fact 
that we can see, hear, touch, smell and feel is the source of what we know” 
(Ackermann 2005:48). This statement explains why the place and meaning of 
sexuality should be integrated in theological teaching. Ackermann, like James B. 
Nelson (1978), raises the question of what it means to be a sexual human being 
living in a community of sexual human beings. If we can assume a spiritual meaning 
of sexuality, one may ask how spirituality, the notion of embodiment and expression 
of sexuality fit into a design for pastoral theology (Louw 2002:157). Focusing on 
embodied living, John A.T. Robinson comments: “For the body is not simply evil: it is 
made by and for God. Solidarity is the divinely ordained structure in which personal 
life is to be lived” (Robinson, cited in Janssen 2005:37).63 
 
b) The fear factor  
The notion of sexuality underlies all debates about HIV. It is the most striking trigger 
of stigmatizing attitudes concerning HIV and AIDS, as it appears that the paradoxical 
combination of procreative sexuality and the bodily restriction of death scares people 
(Weinreich & Benn 2004). The fear of HIV/AIDS increases considerably by the fear 
of loss and death (Van Dyke 2006). Dealing with fears should be taken seriously but 
“death is not the ultimate tragedy in life. The ultimate tragedy is to die without 
discovering the possibilities of full growth” (Norman Cousins, cited in Karen et al. 
2006:667). 
 
In modern times, in philosophy and theology, Sören Kierkegaard has been occupied 
with the phenomenon of anxiety. Kierkegaard differentiates between fear and Angst. 
In Kierkegaard’s paradigm, the term Angst lies beyond the notion of “good and bad”, 
and should be located before the biblical Fall (from innocence). While Angst 
corresponds with innocence due to ignorance and a psychic state of sleep, fear is 
rather connected to guilt, because of the knowledge and consciousness that 
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 Robinson, J.A.T. (1957). The Body. A Study in Pauline Theology, London. 8f. 
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something has gone wrong against or through oneself (Winkler 2000:301).64 For 
Kierkegaard, Angst also has an important function after the Fall. It continuously 
points to the fact that “nothing” is steadily present.65 Angst, for Kierkegaard, turns out 
to be an Urphenomenon of human existence. Angst lays open the illusion of security. 
The human being continuously has to make choices and does not know the 
outcome.66 In deciding (even though it is out of Angst), the human being is 
confronted by his or her freedom. According to Kierkegaard, Angst leads the human 
being to freedom, and produces the “dizziness of freedom”. Finally, Angst becomes 
the attribute of a free and differentiated human being (Winkler 2000:302).67 
 
Klaus Winkler also refers to Heidegger in dealing with the notion of Angst. For 
Heidegger, the basis of the state of Angst is an outstanding reconstruction 
(Erschlossenheit) of being (Dasein).68 He describes Angst as an outstanding state of 
being (Heidegger 1984:184), and phenomenologically differentiates between fear 
and Angst. Whereas the origin of fear is found in something specific in the world 
                                           
 
64
 Winkler explicates Kierkegaards thoughts: “In diesem jenseits von Gut und Böse angesiedelten 
Angstzustand gilt vielmehr nur eine einzige Alternative: Alles ist mit mir zusammen “irgendwie” da. 
Darin bin ich mir (in entängstigter Weise sicher. Oder: Alles ist mit mir zusammen vom „Nicht-mehr-
dasein”, vom Vernichtetwerden, vom Nichts bedroht. Eben diese Bedrohung hat nichts mit meinem 
Verhalten zu tun. Sie geschieht, ohne da[ss] eine wissende Zuordnung (Warum? Durch wessen Tun 
oder Lassen?) nachvollziehend oder antizipierend möglich wäre. Das alles bedeutet: Zuerst und 
zunächst kommt die Angst jenseits von Gut und Böse zum Tragen. Sie hat als ihr Gegenüber das 
“Nichts” “ (Winkler 2000:302).  
65
 Winkler (also Kierkegaard) characterises Angst and sets the notion of nothing (nichts) as the object 
of Angst. Angst then delves into the actual “humanum” of human freedom. Without Angst, the world 
would seem to be a totally secure space. If there was no Angst, there was no possibility of choice 
because then the human being would solely have to choose by knowledge (“mit zuordnendem Geist”) 
between good and bad, which would correspond to right and wrong as existence fostering or 
existence impeding. Human beings would be in the position to preserve their existence on their own, 
and would be in the forced position to do always the right thing. We can argue against that view by 
showing that to regard one’s existence in this world as secure is an illusion (Winkler 2000:302). 
66
 “Sie erweist sich als “Urwissen” im Hinblick darauf, da[ss] die Annahme eines Ewigkeitswertes von 
Gut und Böse, von Richtig und Falsch eine Täuschung oder sogar die Täuschung schlechthin ist” 
(Winkler 2000:303).  
67
 Winkler (also Kierkegaard) sees in Angst a “Konstitutivum des Humanum”. Without Angst, human 
beings would understand neither themselves nor the world. Without Angst, human beings become 
distorted images of themselves. Angst creates sense, and it is indispensable for a sound world view 
(Winkler 2000:304). 
68
 Heidegger would rather gain ontological insight into being itself (Seiendes) through the possibilities 
of being, and this is only possible through the reconstruction of the state of being (Befindlichkeit) and 
its understanding (Verstehen). “Die Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst als eine ausgezeichnete 
Erschlossenheit des Daseins” (Heidegger 1984:184). 
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(Heidegger 1984:185),69 Angst hits one in one’s being thrown into the world;70 it 
destroys the everyday familiarity with the world. Being becomes isolated as ‘being in 
the world,’ and the latter reaches an existential mode (modus) of being not-at-home 
(Unzuhause; cf. Heidegger 1984:189).71 Nevertheless, Heidegger also sees the 
outstanding potential of Angst in the way it operates. Angst alone has the potential to 
reconstruct ‘being’ (erschließen) because it can isolate. This isolation points towards 
essentiality and inessentiality.72  
 
From a pastoral perspective, it is difficult to differentiate between the essential and 
inessential aspects of life, because what is important is what “the heart” latches onto. 
If stigmatisation is rooted in Angst or fear, then in terms of a new orientation, it can 
also become a chance for growth in overcoming Angst.73 Facing the threat of the 
                                           
 
69
 On the other hand, the origin of Angst, being in the world itself, is quite undetermined. The world 
itself, and what is in it, is not relevant in terms of Angst: “[D]as Wovor der Furcht ist je ein 
innerweltliches, aus bestimmter Gegend, in der Nähe sich näherndes, abträgliches Seiendes, das 
ausbleiben kann” (Heidegger 1984:185). 
70
 For Heidegger, the familiar mode of being in the world is a mode of the eeriness (Unheimlichkeit) of 
being, and not the other way round. Angst is a characteristic state of being in the world. Only because 
in being-in-the-world, Angst is always latently present, fear is possible. The form of fear concerns the 
“world” and is in itself hidden Angst. “Furcht ist an die “Welt” verfallene, uneigentliche und ihr selbst 
als solche verborgene Angst” (Heidegger 1984:189). 
71
 According to Heidegger, one experiences an eerie feeling in Angst. In German, the attribute/noun 
“unheimlich/Unheimlichkeit” linguistically resembles the notion of being “not-at-home”: “Das In-Sein 
kommt in den existentialen, Modus’ des Un-zuhause. Nichts anderes meint die Rede von der 
‘Unheimlichkeit’” (Heidegger 1984:189). 
72
 “Existenziell ist zwar im Verfallen die Eigentlichkeit des Selbstseins verschlossen und abgedrängt, 
aber diese Verschlossenheit ist nur die Privation einer Erschlossenheit, die sich phenomenal darin 
offenbart, daß die Flucht des Daseins Flucht vor ihm selbst ist… Allein in der Angst liegt die 
Möglichkeit eines ausgezeichneten Erschließens, weil sie vereinzelt. Diese Vereinzelung holt das 
Dasein aus seinem Verfallen zurück und macht ihm Eigentlichkeit und Uneigentlichkeit als Möglichkeit 
seines Seins offenbar” (Heidegger 1984:191).  
73
 The following four definitions are Louw’s explanations for the implications of life’s existential issues. 
Anxiety hinders one from anticipating the future meaningfully: “Existential anxiety describes the 
human predicament related to the fear of rejection, isolation and loss… Anxiety invades one’s 
schemata of interpretation. Dread becomes the only paradigm to interpret and understand suffering” 
(Louw 2004:99). 
Guilt is connected to conscience and “implies ethics and moral awareness. [i.e. the insight that a 
norm or value has been transgressed]. Guilt can [also] play a constructive role in crisis management, 
because it designates responsibility, sensitivity and consciousness […] and [can] contribute to the 
process of growth and healing” (Louw 2004:99). Louw regards shame and regret as corollaries of 
guilt. Later, I shall differentiate more clearly between guilt and shame. 
Despair “derives from doubt: the cul de sac of a human soul” (Louw 2004:99). 
Helplessness indicates dysfunctionality, and can become anger turned inwards.  
Louw further describes these existential issues as “the darkness of the soul or the shadow of 
soulfulness. An alternative to these shadows […] can be called the brightness of soulfulness. 
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pandemic, being exposed in the process of being embodied in the world should also 
have a predominant place in the theological discussion of ethical and existential core 
issues.  The medical historian, Sander Gilman, adopts a psychoanalytical approach 
and shows that positive and negative stereotypes are the historical product of a 
social group. The use of stereotypes is the externalisation of fear.74 Externalisation of 
fear states that what we fear lies outside of ourselves. Gilman concludes that human 
beings cannot live without stereotyping (Orell 2005:13).75 Responding to Gilman’s 
suggestion, Esther Orell emphasises the purpose of unmasking stereotypes in the 
necessity to acknowledge and understand why we need stereotypes; the occupation 
with stereotypes opens up the opportunity to deal with our fears (Orell 2005:14).76  
 
Prejudices against people trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS or denial of HIV 
and AIDS and the related stigma,77 all serve the same function, which is the 
avoidance of the time consuming and often-unpleasant preoccupation with an aspect 
of truth. One aspect of truth is that we are thrown into the world and seemingly lack 
of all meaning. Exposed to meaningless human beings are scared 
(Grundbefindlichkeit) and hold skewed perceptions about the world and life issues. 
Consequently, existential life issues, like being embodied in the world (which 
includes, for instance, being both sexual and mortal) offer the opportunity to judge 
according to ones perception shaped by suspicion.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                   
 
Brightness represents a horizon of meaning and a different perspective on anxiety, guilt, dread, and 
helplessness” (Louw 2004:99).  
74
 The function of externalization, according to Gilman, is to make sure that what we fear lies outside 
ourselves (“sicher zu stellen, dass “das was wir fürchten, nicht in uns selbst liegt””) (Gilman 
1992:308).   
75
 “Sie [die Stereotype] bilden eine Pufferzone zwischen und unseren schlimmsten Ängsten, vor 
denen sie uns schützen, und ermöglichen uns Verhaltensweisen, die einen Kontrollverlust über die 
Quelle unserer Ängste suggerieren” (Gilman, Sander L., (1992). Rasse, Sexualität und Seuchen. 
Stereotype aus der Innenwelt der Westlichen Kultur. 8f. 
76
 We should also realise how ideologies (including those self-made) structure our world (Orell 
2005:14). 
77
 Denial may take place due to the association of HIV and AIDS with taboo themes such as sexuality 
and death, or with the attached stigma itself; because in many societies, due to existing norms and 
perceptions, these sensitive topics cannot be named easily, especially in public (Weinreich & Benn 
2004:47).  
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3. SCOPE OF THE HIV/AIDS-RELATED STIGMA 
Gregory M. Herek, who is specialised in studies in the area of HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma, offers insights into the social psychology of the HIV and AIDS stigma. In 
following Goffman’s arguments, he points out that HIV and AIDS manifest at least 
four characteristics that are likely to evoke stigma. 
 
 □ The first characteristic suggests that stigma is more likely to be attached to 
diseases whose bearer seems accountable and, therefore, responsible for the 
cause. “To the extent that an illness is perceived as having been contracted through 
voluntary and avoidable behaviours – especially if such behaviours evoke social 
disapproval – it is likely to be stigmatised and to evoke anger and moralism rather 
than pity and empathy” (Herek 1999:1109). Herek concludes that, since ways of HIV 
transmission are “widely considered voluntary and immoral”, the public often regards 
people living with HIV and AIDS as responsible for their condition and consequently 
stigmatises them (Herek 1999:1109).  
 
□ Herek stresses a second factor that favours stigma associated with conditions that 
are unalterable and degenerative (Herek 1999:1109). From the beginning, HIV and 
AIDS were known to be fatal conditions. Being diagnosed with HIV and AIDS has 
been closely related to a death sentence. For others, the person infected with HIV 
may be a reminder or even the personification of death and mortality.78  
 
□ A third factor that makes stigma more likely is the possibility of harm and danger to 
others, since the common tendency is to overestimate the contagiousness of HIV.79  
                                           
 
78
 Even though there are effective therapies and there is the hope of transforming being HIV-positive 
from a fatal condition into a chronic illness, HIV will probably continue to be perceived as a fatal 
disease for a long time to come (Herek 1999:1109). 
79
 It is a fact that being infected through social intercourse is actually impossible. HIV infection is 
transmitted primarily through sexual intercourse, by HIV-infected blood passing directly into the body 
of another person, or by breastfeeding from mother to child (van Dyk 2005:23).   
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□ The fourth condition that tends to make stigmatisation more likely is when the 
condition is obvious to and perceivable by others. In an illustrative way, the condition 
of deviance is said to disrupt the social interaction and is even “perceived by others 
as repellent, ugly or upsetting” (Herek 1999:1110). In particular, the last stages of 
HIV infection can have a dramatic effect on the physical appearance and vitality of 
individuals, which may result in distress and in stigma from others (Herek 
1999:1110).80 
 
Theories of HIV and AIDS-related stigma developed by social psychologists often 
describe two sources for individual attitudes concerning the HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma. Herek describes possible sources and functions of an HIV and AIDS-related 
stigmatizing attitude.  
 
The first source of attitude results in an “instrumental HIV/AIDS-stigma”. The attitude 
of the instrumental stigma is grounded in the fear of HIV and AIDS as a disease, and 
an accompanying desire to protect oneself from it due to its infectiousness and 
lethality. Stigma based on fear functions as a means of protection against the 
disease. The second source of stigmatizing attitude is the symbolic association 
between HIV and AIDS and groups identified with the virus.  
 
A “symbolic HIV/AIDS stigma” exists due to social meanings attached to HIV and 
AIDS. The latter “represents the use of the disease as a vehicle for expressing a 
variety of attitudes like negligence or ignorance”. Basic to the symbolic stigma are 
social meanings connected to norms and values of a society (Herek 1999:1112). 
 
                                           
 
 
80
 Interestingly, from these characteristics, Herek shows that from its epidemiology and social history, 
HIV and AIDS would have evoked stigma independently. However, the special character of stigma in 
the United States predominantly derives from the association between HIV and AIDS and particular 
sectors of the population, especially gay and bisexual men, and injecting drug users. 
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The above data has indicated that beyond the fact that HIV is a virus and AIDS is the 
medical consequence of the HIV infection, HIV and AIDS-related issues have to do 
with more than the medical context. Today, it is obvious that HIV affects and is 
affected by cultural (religious) norms and practices, socio-economic conditions, 
development, gender issues, and sexuality – to name a few aspects (WCC 1997:4). 
 
Ackermann defines stigma theologically as, “broadly speaking, a term that marks 
and then excludes a person as being tainted or alien, of less value, blameworthy or 
to be feared as undesirably different” (Ackermann 2006:4). The nature of stigma is 
multi-faceted. In being a sign and symbol for something, its nature is ambivalent. In 
its essence, stigma refers to another level of meaning. Although the understanding of 
stigma may vary in historical and cultural contexts, regarding the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic, the perception of people who try to live positively with HIV and AIDS 
through the lenses of stigma is clearly a negative one.  
I 
n approaching the HIV and AIDS stigma, Ackermann identifies two appearances of 
stigmatisation. One is “brutal” and “violent”, while in the other stigma manifests with 
“great subtlety”. Both brutal violence and scheming subtlety may have a devastating 
effect on the human being (as already discussed above; cf. Ackermann 2006:4).81 
Ackermann further states that the starting point in dealing with stigma and its effects 
is to become aware of its complexity; understanding stigma becomes the “first line of 
defence” (Ackermann 2006:4).82 83 
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 According to Louw (2007:401), “[S]tigmatization and labelling are synonymous with immediate 
isolation. HIV therefore becomes the leprosy of the twenty-first century”. On an existential and social 
level, rejection means exclusion from community, in life and closeness to death, “which is the ultimate 
state of loneliness” (Louw 1998:3). If HIV/AIDS is the leprosy of the 21st century (Louw 2007), then 
stigma can be understood as the stone people throw at one another – “He who is without sin may 
throw the first stone”. 
82
 The aspect of attitude is intrinsic to human beings, whereas the quality of attitude is varying. 
Attitude finds orientation in norms and values. The pastoral challenge would be to establish the norm 
of the will of God. Destigmatisation would presume an overhaul of a person’s normative system. 
83
 HIV and AIDS-related stigma points out to “pre-existing stigmata” like race, poverty, sexuality, and 
gender. Their reality needs to be acknowledged in the discussion.  
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Due to its complexity, one approach may not be to ask what HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma is (explanatory and causal approach), but rather to enquire how it affects 
human beings in their context (its quality in the HIV and AIDS pandemic in terms of 
hermeneutics (Louw 2007)). In their approaches, both Ackermann and Louw touch 
the very essence of what stigmatisation beyond theories actually means: it is hard to 
name the unnameable.  
 
 
4. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA: REJECTION OR  ACCEPTANCE? 
One can approach the ethical dilemma of stigmatisation from two sides, namely, 
from the stigmatizing perspective, and from the perspective of the person who 
receives the stigma (i.e. the question of motivation and intention [stigmatiser], or guilt 
and shame [stigmatised]). From another perspective, the ethical dilemma of 
stigmatisation takes place on two levels - on a personal level, in which individuals 
personally evoke stigma or are affected by stigma, as well as on a societal level, in 
which people have an effect on or are delivered to certain structures. Here, the 
assumption is that on both levels stigmatisation not only leads to isolation and 
disconnectedness but stigmatisation is also consequently the manifestation of 
isolation and disconnectedness. 
 
Ethic, as the “theory about the human way of life” (Eschmann 2000:171), deals with 
the notion of guilt in order to articulate human transgressions according to whether 
human action and behaviour can be called good or bad. Christian ethics have their 
orientation in systematic theology. According to G. Sauter, sin and guilt are to be 
differentiated, because sin is less accompanied with the understanding of ethical 
transgression than guilt. For this reason, sin is not central to understanding norms 
and violating them; rather, sin is solely understood through the grace of God, who 
confronts us with our sin (Sauter, in Eschmann 2000:167). Sauter does not explicitly 
regard sin in terms of human relation towards God, or guilt solely as human beings’ 
social relations, because these areas are too closely intertwined. Rather, for the 
purpose of this discussion, the differentiation between sin as a transgression in 
  
 
 
44
terms of the God-human relationship and guilt as a primary ethical transgression is 
useful. The differentiation refers to the understanding of human beings as both 
coram deo as well as coram mundo (Eschmann 2000:167). 
 
The conceptualisation of stigma and the outline of prejudices in HIV and AIDS-
related stigmatisation have shown that stigma affects and is affected by cultural (e.g. 
religious) norms and practices, socio-economic conditions, development, gender 
issues, and sexuality (WCC 1997:4). One may ask, therefore, for the measures, 
principles, criteria, conditions, and commitment of moral norms and values that are 
effective in stigmatisation (Prechtl 1999:159). In the Christian tradition (ethos), norms 
and values are basic to ethics. Next, I shall indicate that there is an ethical dilemma 
for practical theology rooted in the doctrine of sin and theological anthropological 
premises. This ethical dilemma is considered to be, from an anthropological 
perspective, connected to the HIV and AIDS-related stigma. 
 
Systematic theological reflection functions as the critical means to connect to the 
source and message of the Gospel. At the same time, in practical theology, 
systematic reflection helps to connect the reflected tradition to the present context of 
time. In addition, a pastoral perspective entails constantly mediating between 
Christian doctrines and ethical reflections of the same. Practical theology mediates 
between dogmatic references in theological reflection and a reflected stance in a 
responsible theological practice of the Christian church.84 Thus, a pastoral 
hermeneutic is decisive for putting the commitment to Christian norms and values 
into practice. Otherwise, even Christian theology runs into the danger of becoming a 
tool in the process of stigmatisation. Hence, the questions what are Christian norms, 
and what does it mean to violate them? 
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 The term “church” here is used to refer to the ecclesiological aspect.  
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4.1 Stigmatisation and the biblical notion of sin 
The biblical view of sin is a central category in the theologies of the Old Testament. 
Sin refers to a universal aspect of the human condition.85 The ways sin manifests is 
as varied as the human life itself. Sin is both individual and corporate and it 
fundamentally disorganises relationships with other human beings and with God 
(Härle 2000:480). Wilfried Härle approaches sin from the point of view of the calling 
of human beings before God. Human calling, according to the Christian 
understanding of creation, is the calling for love. Sin, therefore, means to fail in this 
calling. Different interpretations of why human beings happen to fail in their calling 
are possible (Härle 2000:461).86 In this regard, the UNAIDS theological report states 
that sin in the Bible is understood relationally. Sin means “the breaking of our 
essential relatedness to God, one another and the rest of creation. Sin, therefore, is 
alienation… estrangement, and infects us all” (UNAIDS 2005:13). Stigmatisation of 
the individual is a sin against the Creator God, since all human beings are made in 
God’s image. Stigmatisation of the individual means “to reject the image of God in 
the other and to deny him or her life in its fullness” (UNAIDS 2005:13). 
 
Hence, the theological argument here is that the act of stigmatizing the other is sin 
and a denial of the Creator and creation. Underlying this argument is the basic 
biblical assumption that we all are sinners, whether we are HIV-infected or not. It is 
the individual and the community that have fallen short of the glory of God (i.e. have 
become guilty). However, we deny this truth by being self-righteous in stigmatizing 
others for what they are or are not. To deny that we are all “sinners” and instead 
stigmatise the other, is to deny this truth (UNAIDS 2005:13).  
 
Nevertheless, in theological history the common over-emphasis on “sin” rather than 
on, for example, the notion of human dignity, in a cultural climate determined by 
                                           
 
85
 The doctrine of original sin stands close to the doctrine of human freedom and responsibility 
(Barton 1997:760).   
86
 Härle points out the task of interpretation in using the term “sin”, which requires a responsible 
theological reflection. The sole substitution of the term sin with transgression, estrangement or 
alienation, or the substitution of the term guilt with responsibility is not complete. Much more, it is 
about the distinct illustration of the problem area (Härle 2000:465). 
  
 
 
46
metaphysical and dualistic thinking, had a major impact on Christian anthropology 
(Huber 1992:579). 
 
4.2 Sinfulness and stigma 
The ethical dilemma for practical theology concerning HIV and AIDS-related stigma 
is rooted in the seemingly paradoxical tendency to either overemphasise the 
doctrine of sin or to neglect it.87 If the notion of sin is neglected and misunderstood, a 
central aspect of Christian anthropology falls short, because with the notion of sin, 
the human being is portrayed in a realistic way in order to overcome sin. Human sin 
and human dignity do not exclude each other. Rather, the notion of human dignity 
becomes concrete where it is threatened and negated by sin (Huber 1992:578). 
Wolfgang Huber claims that three factors have delayed the Christian conception of 
human dignity. One important aspect has been the conception of original sin and the 
understanding of the sinfulness of all human beings. Since human beings have 
forfeited their right before God with the Fall, consequently, they have forfeited their 
right concerning dignity beyond secular and ecclesial power (ibid).88 
 
A second critical aspect, which has delayed the Christian conception of human 
dignity, is the notion of differentiation. Up to modern times, Christians often have 
understood human dignity as a Christian privilege. Finally, Christian anthropology 
had the tendency to understand society in classes as well as having a hierarchical 
understanding of churches. On this basis, the differentiating function of the notion of 
dignity was legalised (Huber 1992:579). The basis for human dignity in the Christian 
tradition is the connection to the biblical creation report and human as being created 
in the imago dei (Gen 1:26; Huber 1992:579). 
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 In everyday life experience, as well as in the theological context, the attitude to sin is likely to be 
that of suspicion and indifference (Härle 2000:457). 
88
 Barton (1997:761) notes that “conceptions of sin have served sinful ends”.  
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The ethical dilemma of stigma is reflected in the neglect of discussions of sin, 
because stigma is also about keeping silent and denial.89 The inherent nature of sin 
is that it withdraws from human understanding and rationalising (Eschmann 
2000:160). Holger Eschmann summarises different understandings of why 
theological discussions of sin today are to be regarded as ‘keeping-silent’. 
Eschmann also comments that this assertion implies, on the one hand, that presently 
theology is unable to talk appropriately about sin and, on the other hand, it speaks 
for the centrality of the doctrine of sin in theology. 90 
 
One argument is that the proclamation and action of the churches have failed to give 
witness to the biblical message and to face the specific contextual question. At 
present, theology does not address the sin.91 Another argument lies in the historical 
changes human sciences have gone through since the Enlightenment and post-
modernity. The loss of open discussion of sin and forgiveness go hand-in-hand with 
the “loss of meaning” in talking about God in the modern era. Yet another 
interpretation refers to the mechanism of denial and the suppression of everything 
that is negative due to a certain lifestyle, for example, the tendency to moralise sin 
rubs off its deeper dimension (Eschmann 2000:160). 
 
 
                                           
 
 
89
 Silence and hindrance to the spread of information create barriers to an open discussion or they 
even reinforce stigmatizing attitudes by neglecting the issue of HIV and AIDS, for example, by seeing 
it as the problem of the other ethnic group (WCC 1997:5). 
90
 Similarly, Gestrich asserts that if we were able to talk clearly and with commitment about sin, 
theology would win back all other contents of Christian doctrine for our time. “Könnten wir wieder 
verständlich und verbindlich von der Sünde sprechen, hätte unsere Theologie auch alle übrigen 
Inhalte der christlichen Glaubenslehre für unsere Zeit zurück gewonnen” (Gestrich, in Eschmann 
2000:159).  
91
 Louw asserts that, currently, the trend in pastoral care in a post-modern context is to re-interpret sin 
in terms of our normal limitations and from a psychological viewpoint. Sin is understood as an inner 
alienation or obstruction of inner potential rather than as estrangement from God. 
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5. THE THEOLOGICAL DILEMMA: SCAPEGOATING OR GRACE 
(COMPASSION)? 
The UNAIDS report of a theological workshop focusing on HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma deals with the notion of Christian responsibility and identifies stigmatisation 
as the main hindrance to effective prevention and treatment of HIV and AIDS. 
Simultaneously, the report exposes those aspects of Christian theology that promote 
stigmatizing attitudes (UNAIDS 2005:11).92 In order to clarify the understanding of 
HIV and AIDS as the “sinner’s disease”, the UNAIDS theological report identifies four 
main strands of sin related to stigmatisation. In Christian theology, the following 
aspects interrelate with the notion of sin and the phenomenon of stigmatisation.93  
 
□ Associated connection between sexuality and sin  
□ Understanding of HIV and AIDS as a punishment for sin  
□ Sin as a failure to take responsibility 
□ Stigmatisation as sin in itself  
 
The religious connotation of the term “scapegoat” occurs mainly in the name of 
religious denunciation.94 I shall consider whether the anthropological assertion of the 
“sinful human being” (sinful due to the notions discussed above) correlates to a 
certain understanding of God.95 A prevailing argument in justifying stigmatisation is 
                                           
 
 
92
 It also emphasises the potential and the resources of Christian theology, which provide the 
framework for a deepened Christian reflection (UNAIDS 2005:11). 
93
 While the first three notions often serve as justification for stigma, the latter aspect, “stigmatisation 
as sin itself,” argues against stigma (UNAIDS 2005:13) 
94
 As mentioned above, stigma can function as a means of regulating the social intercourse (which 
includes the access to rare resources, such as status or professional possibilities) between different 
groups or, for example, between majorities and minorities. As a function, stigma may also channel 
frustration and aggression towards weaker and powerless people, who can then be called the 
“scapegoats” of society (Hohmeier 1975). 
95
 In a pastoral context, one may question the existence of stigmatisation, if people are truly 
committed to the “paradigm of sin” (indifference and disconnectedness). Likewise, Louw approaches 
the theological dilemma rooted in stigmatisation expressed in three aspects namely the notion of 
contamination, ‘scapegoating’, labelling, stereotyping, and the cause-question concerning HIV 
infection (Louw 2007:401). 
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that HIV and AIDS is a punishment of God for those who are promiscuous or in 
some other ways “sinful” (Vitillo 2005:21). Robert Vitillo unfolds an important 
discussion,96 which leads to the question of our God-image as the final argument 
and point of departure for the question of HIV and AIDS as punishment for sin.97 His 
argument is that misreading Scripture has hampered the church’s task of engaging 
with people who try to live positively with HIV and AIDS but who might be affected by 
stigmatisation. This suggests that the capacity to help affected people in their 
structures and prevention of further transmission has been diminished. A theological 
argument against the linking of HIV and AIDS with punishment can be based on the 
book of Job (Gutiérrez 1988:15) and the healing narratives of the Gospel. 
 
When the pandemic was first identified, some theologians responded in terms of a 
moralistic approach and interpreted HIV and AIDS as a punishment by God.98 99 
                                           
 
96
 First, Vitillo argues that “while sexual transmission was the most frequent means of contracting the 
virus, it certainly was not the only one. [Secondly,] that even among those who had been infected by 
sexual means, many (especially women) had been faithful to one partner – namely, their husbands – 
for life. [Thirdly,] that many of history’s greatest saints – including Saint Augustine – had admitted to 
being ‘promiscuous’ at one or other time in their lives and yet none was reputed to have been 
punished with a virus sent by God; and finally, that I [Vitillo] could not place my faith and hope in a 
capricious, vindictive and punitive God” (Vitillo 2005:21).  
Vitillo suggests that discriminatory behaviour is based on a reaction of ignorance and fear of infection 
or negative reactions by others (reputation) than on punitive attitudes. In contrast to this, Louw argues 
that the understanding of HIV and AIDS as a punishment for sin is based on a judgmental attitude 
(people who have contracted HIV and AIDS are reaping the fruits of their immoral actions). One may 
conclude that ignorance and fear go hand-in-hand with a judgmental and punitive attitude (Vitillo 
2005:21). 
98
 Louw cites D. Chilton as an example of one who relates HIV/AIDS to disobedience, expressed in 
cases of homosexuals who were infected: “The homosexual is at war with God, and, in his very 
practice, is denying God’s natural order and law” (Chilton, cited in Louw 2007:402).  
99
 Although Chilton represents a general “anti-position” towards homosexuality, there are usually two 
theological options. One option is a rejecting-but-non-punitive position; it corresponds to a qualified 
acceptance position, which holds that “homosexual orientation falls short of God’s intent while one 
should recognise its irreversibility. If celibacy is not possible, same-sex monogamy is acceptable” 
(Louw 2007:355). An example of the rejecting-but-non-punitive position offers Rotter in his book 
“Sexualität und Christliche Moral” (1991). He argues in a completely ambivalent way that, ‘for more 
understanding and tolerance towards homosexual people, simultaneously, a socially preferential 
treatment of heterosexuals is fundamentally legitimate and necessary in order to counteract the 
danger of temptation and unnecessary reinforcement of any homosexual disposition’ (“Sicher 
bedeutet die oft sehr ablehnende Einstellung der Gesellschaft gegenüber Homosexuellen für diese 
eine zusätzliche Beeinträchtigung. Etwas mehr Verständnis und Toleranz wären hier wünschenswert. 
Anderseits ist aber die soziale Bevorzugung der Heterosexualität grundsätzlich doch legitim und 
notwendig, um den Gefahren der Verführung und unnötiger Verstärkung homosexueller 
Veranlagungen entgegenzuwirken” (Rotter, Hans (1991). Sexualität und Christliche Moral. Wien: 
Tyrolia – Verlag, 114. ) 
More general positions in the gay debate include a pro-position: “due to human rights, gay people 
have the right of choice”; 
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However, Louw strongly suggests that HIV and AIDS should not be misused to 
establish a new sexual morality. HIV and AIDS challenge our theological paradigm in 
that they question, “a theology based on imperialism and affluence” (Louw 2007:1). 
Louw adds that HIV and AIDS challenge our understanding of human progress and 
achievement ethics in that they show us how fragile and fallible humans are despite 
all technological progress. He claims that, “HIV forces medical science back to the 
confines of life: death. It radicalizes human’s fallibility, fragility, weakness, mortality 
and fear of death” (Louw 2007:399).  
 
In order to understand stigma in pastoral theology, the notion of the God-Image 
would play an important role, in that one needs to question how people perceive, 
experience and understand God (Louw 2006:1). The challenge to interpret and 
understand the Christian truth in terms of human understanding and experience is 
the critical point for the pastoral approach. The understanding of HIV and AIDS as a 
punishment for sin is based on a judgmental attitude, in that people who have 
contracted HIV and AIDS are reaping the fruits of their immoral actions (Louw 
2006:2). Due to this assumption the God-image is fundamental in any pastoral 
diagnosis. Among the various God-images, one can make out two common 
understandings of God in the HIV and AIDS pandemic.  
 
□ At the heart of stigmatizing attitudes to HIV and AIDS within a theological or 
ecclesial context, there are widely different understandings of God such as the 
image of a vindictive God. 
                                                                                                                                   
 
an emphatic position: “due to unconditional love one should try to understand the predicament of 
being gay in a heterosexual world”;  
a love-but-position: “one should tolerate gays”; 
an emphatic, but-position: “don’t practice being gay”;  
an neutral dialogue-position: “due to uncertainty one should accommodate gays (even in the church)”; 
Finally a trans-pro-responsibility position: “at stake is the question whether sexuality and different 
sexual expressions are the core issues in a Christian spiritual assessment of being gay” (Louw 
2007:357).  
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□ The feeling of being rejected by the community can finally lead to a feeling of being 
rejected by God (i.g. the image of a transcendent God in terms of causal 
interpretation and the internalized stigma). 
 
The image of a vindictive God against a God of compassion stands in contrast to the 
other; hence, the urgent need to reclaim biblical images of God that are “trinitarian, 
non-patriarchal and grounded in divine love” (UNAIDS 2005:12). From the 
perspective of the person who receives the stigma, the feeling of being rejected by 
the parish can lead to the feeling of being rejected by God. From those perspectives, 
the question and theological problem arises: what God-image is upheld?100 
 
Louw (2005:2) says that in the Gospel, “God’s identification with human existence 
[…] is explained in anthropomorphic terms”. Furthermore, he stresses the need to 
introduce God into the pandemic, since stigmatizing attitudes within a theological 
and ecclesial context can be traced back often to widely different understandings of 
God. The central theological question, according to Louw, is how to link God to the 
pandemic? Is suffering the will of God? At the same time, the human quest for 
meaning, human dignity and questions concerning theodicy and the power of God 
are important. It is to be noted that the understanding of theodicy in practical 
theology needs a hermeneutical approach, in which suffering is not philosophically 
abstract, but rather is an honest existential struggle (Louw 2004:44). 
 
From a religious point of view, one could argue in terms of providence, that God is 
involved somehow in the origin, sending or management of the virus, in that God, in 
suffering, “illuminates” meaning metaphors regarding His faithfulness within the 
context of human misery (Louw 2004:44; 2007:402). Nevertheless, understanding an 
omnipotent and loving God, and the contradiction between God’s power freely 
                                           
 
100
 Louw mentions that in the ethical debate, the following God images can be traced: God as “A 
vindictive judge – due to mankind’s misunderstandings of divine justice”; God as “A rigid bookkeeper 
of our mistakes”; God as “A sadistic brute who takes pleasure in our sufferings; A fateful force who 
has determined the destinies of all”; an indifferent God who does not care about humanity’s suffering”. 
Alternatively, Louw argues for positive images of God proclaimed by the church “in its struggle against 
stigma, discrimination and the subsequent feelings of guilt and shame” (Louw 2007:402).  
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disposed to the world (destiny), and human calling (ethos) are hard to grasp and 
pose questions to human beings.  
 
In this context, Link discusses the crisis of belief in providence (2005). He opens up 
the framework for the theological enterprise to interpret human experience in and 
with the world, in which the belief in providence cannot serve a cause and effect 
model anymore. In order to free the understanding of providence from the principle 
of causality, God’s will (providence) should be interpreted in terms of an 
accompanying and empowering principle (Link 2005:428; Louw 2004:169). Both Link 
and Louw see providence as being theologically rooted in pneumatology, which is 
theory formation the sphere of the Holy Spirit. 
 
In terms of a biblical argument, one can say that the “isolation model stands in sharp 
contrast to the compassionate model of Christ” (Louw 2007:402).101 Louw sees two 
possible points of departure: a causal explanatory model or a hermeneutical, 
interpretative model. While the explanatory model interprets God in terms of 
metaphysical ontology,102 a hermeneutical model applies a metaphorical concept of 
God.103 In a hermeneutical approach, the question is “about the essence and quality 
of the encounter with God in terms of the human quest for meaning in suffering” 
(Louw 2007:403). Louw stresses the point that the primary problem is not the 
question of sin but one should rather question the concepts of life and meaning 
(Louw 2007:403).  
 
                                           
 
101
 See the story of Christ and the leper in Mk 1:40-41.  
102
 An explanatory model operates within the relation of cause and effect. In this approach, one tries 
to describe God ontologically in terms of being. In doing so, anthropomorphic elements are used, 
which can lead to the misuse of specific descriptions of God’s essence or being (Louw 1998:82). This 
understanding is characterised by God as the ‘callous despot’; “everything is programmed according 
to the law of providence and prediction” (Louw 2007:403). 
103
 A metaphorical concept of God implies “that all reference to God is indirect … That does not imply 
that God is not ‘real’. Rather, the reality of God can only be phrased in finite human terminology. But, 
in terms of faith, the reality of God is a meaningful and substantial issue” (Louw 1998:83; see the next 
chapter on the notion of embodiment).  
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Thus, the choice of a hermeneutical approach to the pandemic and stigmatisation 
has a direct effect on a theology of pastoral care. It is no longer possible to interpret 
God in terms of metaphysical ontology and its anthropomorphic elements (Louw 
1998:82). Instead, the choice of a dialogical and metaphoric model of God is linked 
to a personal concept of the God-human relationship.104 Following Louw, theology is 
therefore interested in the understanding and interpretation of the God-human 
encounter and the way God is involved with humanity (Louw 1998:83).  
 
Regarding the pandemic, the question is about God’s relatedness and engagement 
with human suffering (Louw 2007:403). For Louw, the notion of HIV and AIDS as a 
punishment from God appears inappropriate, irresponsible and irrelevant in 
theologising. Louw also remarks that only suffering people who are guilt-loaded and 
want to accept responsibility for something in their life by turning to God can bring 
the punishment element to the fore, which should lead to a constructive confession 
of sin (Louw 2007:403; 1998:416).  
 
Moreover, Louw (2005:120) claims that the analysis of a person’s God-image helps 
a pastor to make a diagnosis of the person’s faith. In the pastoral encounter, which 
can be viewed “as an embodiment of God’s salvific intervention” (Louw 1998:82), the 
pastor as an “interpreter of meanings” (Louw 2007:84) should first also be aware of 
her or his own concept of God (Louw 1998:85) in order to be able to identify the God 
image of the person to be counselled. Louw offers further alternatives for a re-
interpretation of the concept, “God as Father”, because at present “patriarchal and 
national cultural associations which are based on status, hierarchy and distance 
between subject and God” may create an abstract or even repelling understanding of 
God (Louw 1998:82).  
 
In terms of the theological dilemma one may conclude that any approach to HIV and 
AIDS and the related stigmatisation strongly depends on the God-image, first behind 
                                           
 
104
 From the point of view of pastoral care, theology is a hermeneutical science and undertaking 
(Louw 1998:83).  
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a person, and then collective behind a group of people.  Louw stresses the point that 
the primary problem is not the question of sin but one should really question the 
concepts of life and meaning. Hence, metaphors of God should be applicable to 
various contexts of meaning, in order to open up people’s attitude to experience 
God’s presence. In the context of faith care, Louw particularly recommends 
metaphors such as God as the shepherd, the servant, the wisdom, and the 
Paraclete. In particular, the concept of God as a Soul Friend should play an 
important role in the communication of care and comfort (Louw 1998:85).105 The 
hermeneutical key is a God who is concerned about human beings, a God of love 
and compassion. The actual question at stake is now, how unconditional is Christian 
love (Louw 2007:399)? 
 
 
6. THE ECCLESIOLOGICAL DILEMMA: INDIFFERENCE (APATHY) OR 
IDENTIFICATION (AGAPÉ)? 
A radicalising effect of the HIV and AIDS pandemic is the question of identity,  
integrity and dignity of the Christian church (Louw 2007:399). Through churches, 
narrow morally enacted understanding of sin can contribute to processes of 
stigmatisation. The challenge to face difference (e.g. in the case of an HIV positive 
status or homosexual expression of sexuality) becomes the stone of proof, if the 
Christian model of compassionate identification is applied (Louw 2007:402). 
HIV/AIDS and its related stigma and stigmatisation challenge “fixed ecclesial 
doctrines and rigid clerical convictions” behind which a neutral attitude of apathy or 
the attitude of hypocrisy and prejudice may lurk (Louw 2007:400).  
 
                                           
 
105
 According to Louw (1998:85), “An effective metaphor for God should express dimensions of 
sensitivity and compassion (pathos), identification (woundedness), insight and understanding in terms 
of paradoxes (wise-fool); as well as consolation, encouragement (paraclesis) and empowerment. The 
concept of ‘God as Soul Friend’ (God’s friendship in terms of his covenantal and compassionate 
faithfulness) should play an important role in pastoral communication of care and comfort. Therefore, 
a theology of pastoral care is about the faithfulness of God, whose caring presence is expressed in 
the pastoral encounter as a metaphor of covenantal presence and mutual 
partnership/companionship/friendship”.  
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Unfortunately, the response of churches has been inadequate, and has even 
worsened the problem in many cases (WCC 1997:5). The relevance of a pastoral 
response becomes obvious in the way Christian churches have supported the 
stigmatisation of people who try to live positively with HIV and AIDS, for example, in 
accusing people with HIV and AIDS of having sinned morally, and in excluding them 
from community. This failure of Christian churches is a practical argument against 
linking HIV and AIDS with punishment for sin (and the image of a vindictive God), 
because of its damaging effect from a practical theological perspective. Likewise, 
resulting judgmental attitudes highly undermine the churches’ tasks and efforts in 
care and prevention. Stigmatisation hampers any approach that diminishes new HIV 
infections, since people rather repress the subject of HIV and AIDS and, in this way, 
they avoid dealing with it (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47).106  
 
In addition, the World Council of Churches’ (WCC 1997) document argues that the 
relevance and credibility of churches will be determined by their response. The 
church bears a special responsibility in the fight against HIV and AIDS because 
action can be derived from their mission of salvation entrusted by Jesus Christ 
(Weinreich & Benn 2004:100). It is their members’ task to become in their very 
nature the body of Christ’s healing communities (Weinreich & Benn 2004:103). 
Hence, the task of theology is to reflect on the human conditions in the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic and sharpen the awareness of people’s inhumanity to one another 
(WCC 1997:2). From a pastoral point of view, therefore, it can be stated that the 
ethical dilemma of stigma is rooted in the doctrine of sin and the failure of churches 
to respond in a Christian way.  
 
                                           
 
106
 The effect of the missed vocation of the church is that people, who directly or indirectly suffer from 
HIV and AIDS, experience discriminatory behaviour due to their serum positive status, or the status of 
a friend or relative. The effects of HIV and AIDS itself and its related stigma go hand-in-hand: HIV and 
AIDS cause stigmatisation, and stigmatisation causes HIV and AIDS. Both together constitute a 
vicious circle. Simultaneously, stigmatisation impoverishes the life quality of people living with HIV 
and AIDS (Weinreich & Benn 2004:47). 
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Louw (1998:162) notes that, “[…] sin is about irresponsible choices, hypocrisy, false 
motives and distorted needs of self-interest. Essentially, sin is a problem of distorted 
relationships”. He remarks that:  
The theme of sin in Scripture does not appear in order to design a negative 
anthropology. Rather, the notion that the human person is a sinful being, 
creates a realistic view of our human being, and has the primary intention of 
setting human beings free from sin. Sin, therefore, should be assessed within 
the perspective of salvation and grace (Louw 1998:161).  
The basis of a theological anthropology is essentially positive: people are 
evaluated not in terms of their sin, but in terms of God’s grace. Sin should 
thus be interpreted within a broader framework as freedom from guilt, 
reconciliation and forgiveness (Louw 1998:162).  
 
In this chapter I have demonstrated the perception of HIV and AIDS, and how it is 
expressed in language. I have questioned the paradigm behind the stigma, which 
goes along with specific assumptions and expectations about the other person. The 
scope of the HIV and AIDS-related stigma actually points to the person or group who 
hold certain expectations. HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation in the 
Christian context open up an ethical, theological and ecclesiological dilemma. The 
underlying question is if anthropology should be approached from the perspective of 
sin or rather if not God’s grace and faithfulness is the determining reality concerning 
the human being. HIV/AIDS and its related stigma challenge practical theology in 
that we do not solely have to learn about a virus in a medical sense, but we should 
understand our own human nature, behaviour and perception.  
 
In the framework of this study, I suggest a spiritual perspective and orientation for 
addressing the problem of destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic. The 
notion of stigmatisation reveals that sin is a problem of distorted relationships, and 
should not be understood in terms of a negative anthropology (e.g. the degradation 
and denial of the human body).   
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          CHAPTER THREE                                                      
CORPOREALITY AND EMBODIMENT IN THEOLOGY - TOWARDS A 
RE-ASSESSMENT OF THE BODY IN A PASTORAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
The history of theology and philosophy, even history of human kind, is mediated 
history about and from human bodies in their specific contexts. Instead of 
gratefulness for this precondition of existence, corporeality and human embodiment 
have from the start been regarded rather suspiciously in theology. So far, the 
degradation of the human body in pastoral anthropology has been exposed through 
the process of stigmatisation. I have pointed out the connection of stigmatisation 
exemplified in the HIV and AIDS-related stigma to the perception of the human being 
in relation to the doctrine of sin. I indicate here understanding of corporeality and 
embodiment from a philosophical and theological perspective. Finally, I argue for a 
re-assessment of the body in pastoral theology. 
 
 
1. COPOREALITY AND EMBODIMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND 
THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE  
1.1 Platonic dualism: the degradation and denial of the body 
Originally, philosophy was determined by existential questions; and the question for 
wisdom was raised from everyday life experiences. In order to support philosophical 
assertions and concepts, philosophy was determined mainly by reason and logic. 
Moreover, when theology became conceptual, engaging with philosophy was 
inevitable. Over centuries, philosophy and theology as “the arts”, beside power-
political influences, have shaped the societal ethos as well as the image of the 
human being. In the following text, I describe formative influences pertaining to the 
view of corporeality and embodiment beginning with the Hebrew tradition and 
extending up to modernity.  
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Nelson notes that in pre-Christian Hebrew tradition, the human being was often 
associated with the “flesh” rather than with the “spirit”. The prevalent syncretism and 
antagonism of Jewish Old Testament tradition held a holistic conception of a person 
that can be broken down to the phrase, “I am an animated body” (Feichtinger 
2004:12).107 Although the idea of a spiritualistic dualism was minimized and sexuality 
was regarded as a gift of God, a form of sexist dualism was present throughout 
because the culture was male-dominated (Nelson 1978:47).108 
 
First, one can make out body-denying impulses that are probably connected to 
Persian influences, such as the fact that the notion of salvation was intertwined with 
sexual restriction. Sexual repression among the Jews occurred often under specific 
historical circumstances, for example, during the return from exile. Nelson agrees 
with Vern that:  
The most logical explanation for the changes in attitude seems to lie with the 
Jewish attitude toward themselves; when Judaism seemed threatened, when 
the Jews, both as a group and as individuals, were insecure, and their sexual 
attitude was the most repressive; when there was a greater feeling of 
security, attitudes were more tolerant (Vern, cited in Nelson 1978:47). 
 
Consequently, Vern links bodily repression to repression in social order.109 One can 
tentatively add the observation that the Jewish repression can be linked to the 
experience of stigmatisation. This observation would also give rise to the idea of the 
internalization of stigma, which was expressed in the own restrictions in social life.110 
In addition, Nelson sees sexual repression and sexist dualism in reaction to certain 
historical circumstances as being connected to the freedom of the individual and the 
social body (Nelson 1978:47).111 112 
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 My translation. 
108
 There are exceptions to patriarchy in the Old Testament, e.g. Gen 2 and 3, the Song of Songs, 
Ruth, Jeremiah 31:15-22, Hosea 4:14 (Nelson 1978:47). 
109
 Here, he refers to elements from Karl Marx, Max Weber and Sigmund Freud (Nelson 1978:42); 
Vern L. Bullough (1976) Sexual Variance in Society and History. New York: Wiley, 75.  
110
 Literature regarding the aspect of stigma in Scripture: Mödritzer, Helmut (1994). Stigma und 
Charisma im Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt : zur Soziologie des Urchristentums. Freiburg: 
Univ.-Verl.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 
111
 Nelson refers to Herbert Marcuse, who states that, “alienation from society and alienation from 
one’s own sexuality go hand-in-hand” (cited in Nelson 1978:42). 
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The Hellenistic culture had a major influence on Christian tradition and the 
perception of the body. Although the attitude of Greeks towards sexuality and 
sensuality was quite affirmative until the late Classical Age, a spiritualistic dualism 
arose especially in the period after the death of Alexander the Great (Nelson 
1978:48). With Hellenistic and (neo-) platonic heritage, a rather dualistic 
understanding of a separation of soul and body developed.113 The phrase “I am a 
soul, who does temporarily have a body” can be associated with that time 
(Feichtinger 2004:12).114 Moreover, Roman influences brought up changes in the 
Christian era, when Stoicism became the reigning ethical philosophy and 
passionlessness was one of the highest values.115 116 
 
The Church father, Augustine of Hippo (354-430 AD), had a lasting influence on the 
Christian tradition. Therese Fuhrer shows that Augustine did not have a clearly 
negative attitude towards the body, for example, concerning illness and pain. 
Augustine ascribed a positive function to illness and pain in terms of an expression 
of God’s grace, because illness and pain were signs of the deficient state of being 
human (Fuhrer 2004:176). Moreover, Augustine’s assessment of sexuality needs to 
                                                                                                                                   
 
112
 Nelson (1978:34) draws a distinction between polarity and dichotomy. While polarity derives from 
a creative tension and differentiates between elements, dichotomy designates a fundamental 
difference that cannot be resolved and even hinders communion (Nelson 1978:34).  
113
 Recently, Plato researchers have argued against the claim that the ontological body-soul dualism 
can be traced back to Plato because Plato intended the integration of dualistic elements of the soul, 
striving towards divine unity. Consequently, the deprivation of the bodily value would be based on 
Pythagoras’ (580-470 BC) idea of the transmigration of souls. Despite this disagreement, Naurath 
follows Hermann Schmitz and others, who see in Plato’s philosophy the crucial turning point in the 
conception, which had determining consequences for a dualistic understanding of the human being 
(Naurath 2006:25). 
114
 The identification of the soul with being human, and a part of the soul (the sensible and controlling 
one) with the actual humanum, promoted the psychosomatic dualism and the devaluation of 
corporeality (Schmitz, Hermann (1978). Leib und Seele in der abendländischen Philosophie. In PhJ, 
85. 221-241. Psychosomatic dualism in modern Western philosophy is based on the physiologism 
concerning perception and objectivisation of the external world, which gave rise to rationalism 
(Naurath 2006:25). 
115
 “Seneca, the Stoic philosopher and a contemporary of Jesus, taught that the sign of true greatness 
was the achievement of the state in which nothing could possibly disturb or excite one. To the Stoic, 
sex was not bad in itself, but passion was greatly suspect, and the only justification for marriage was 
procreation” (Nelson 1978:49). 
116
 Nelson cites an interesting point by Enslin: “Christianity did not make the world ascetic; rather the 
world in which Christianity found itself strove to make Christianity ascetic” (Enslin, Morton S. (1930). 
The Ethics of Paul. New York: Harper, 180. In Nelson 1978:49). 
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be differentiated. The ‘desires of the flesh’ (concupiscentia carnis, cupiditas, libido, 
voluptas) as hindrances are present throughout in his description of striving for a 
fulfilled life, beata vita. In his Confessiones, Augustine provides insight into his own 
attitude to the body’s connection to the sexual drive and erotic experiences which 
clearly characterises his moral theological point of view. A critical evaluation shows 
that Augustine struggled with his own sexuality and tried to fix the problem through a 
rigid and body denying ethic that declares this practice as valid for everyone (Fuhrer 
2004:179).117  
 
Nevertheless, Fuhrer notes that, in later years, Augustine’s stance towards sexuality 
and the body became more liberal, since without the help of God, nobody could 
restrain from sexual drive (Fuhrer 2004:182).118 Fuhrer, likewise, points out the 
efforts Augustine made in trying to combine antique conceptions of the soul and 
body with a revolutionary idea of a bodily and fleshly eternal existence. In this 
respect, Augustine’s body conception remains pessimistic. He uses the platonic 
image of the body as a ‘chain’ or ‘cage’ for the bodiless and immortal soul. In this 
metaphor and perception, the body receives a negative connotation. Augustine 
maintained his view of combining the platonic body conception with the doctrine of 
the bodily resurrection (Fuhrer 2004:83). 
 
Centuries later in the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas’ formula of anima forma 
corporis also emphasised the body-soul-unity of the human being in historicity and in 
eternity,119 yet, Greek dualism was not overcome. Rather, the dualism of a transitory 
body and an everlasting soul remained (Naurath 2006:27). On the part of Luther, it 
was evident that there was a rejection of scholastic substance ontology in favour of 
the ontology of relation. In contrast to the scholastic view in which metaphysical 
explanations were given, Luther interpreted the immortality of the human soul as the 
expression of the relation of the human being (who is in need for justification) 
                                           
 
117
 Augustine “was almost exclusively concerned about the genital aspect of human sexuality… and 
fatefully, [saw] no power in love to transform the sex act in any significant way” (Nelson 1978:53).  
118
 Regrettably, the corpus containing more liberal assertions of Augustine remains missing 
throughout the Middle Ages up to modern times (Fuhrer 2004:182).  
119
 Thomas Aquinas favours a biblical monism (Naurath 2006:27). 
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towards God. The anthropological assertion of the immortality of the human soul, 
which in terms of creational theology does not think without the body, is based solely 
on the theological promise of the faithfulness and grace of God towards creation.  
 
Hence, the eschatological anticipation (sola gratia), based on Christology and 
scepsis towards philosophical proofs for immortality, can be traced back to Luther 
and his theology. The motif “anima medium inter corpus et spiritum” is, for Luther, 
the expression of a dual locus in life: the bodily constitution of human beings whose 
existence is restricted by death, and human beings’ calling for community with God. 
For Luther, the soul inevitably belongs to the body; it is the principle of life.120 Like 
Paul, Luther does not divide the human being into flesh and spirit but sees totos 
homo confronted with both, either the power of sin or God’s grace (Naurath 
2006:28).121  
 
The synthesis of body and soul, for which high scholastic and reformation have 
strived, began to crumble with the beginning of the modern era. Mathematics and 
natural sciences revolutionised the worldview, and with the rational deconstruction of 
metaphysics the body-soul-problem (Leib-Seele-Problem) became the body-mind-
problem (Körper-Geist-Problem) (Naurath 2006:28).122 123 
 
In sum, one can historically identify two forms of dualism that can be circumscribed 
as spiritualistic and sexist dualism. Spiritualistic dualism arose in the Greek Classical 
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 “Das Motiv ‘anima medium inter corpus et spiritum’ wird für Luther Ausdruck eines für das Sein des 
Menschen verfaßten und durch den Tod begrenzten Daseins in der Welt, und seiner Berufung zur 
Gemeinschaft mit Gott” (Jöst, W. (1967:193). Ontologie der Person bei Luther. Göttingen, in Naurath 
2006:28). 
“Die Seele gehört damit unabdingbar zum Leib, ‘sie ist das Prinzip der Belebung des Leibes’”, 
während der Geist den Menschen als Person in seiner Leib-Seele-Einheit vor Gott stellt” (Erdmann 
S.(1969). Fleisch und Geist nach Luthers Lehre unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Begriffs ‘totus 
homus’. Darmstadt, 56. In Naurath 2006:28). 
121
 See Luther, WA 2, 585, 31-33.  
122
 The terminology concerning the body-mind-problem varies and differentiation is difficult. Under the 
notion of the body, there is a development of the terms for soul and mind (Naurath 2006:28). 
123
 In English, one speaks of the mind-body problem which does not show the reference to the older 
word, Seele (Grk.: Psyche; Lat.: Anima; Engl.: soul). 
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Age (i.e. Hellenistic dualism). Perhaps the fear of transience and the longing for 
immortality has been the deepest driving force in this form of dualism (Geest, cited in 
Naurath 2006:34).124 Moreover, Hellenistic dualism influenced the Christian 
interpretation of the human being (Nelson 1978:46). The second form of dualism, 
sexist dualism, was prevalent in the Israel of the Old Testament and continued in the 
Christian tradition.125 Both forms of dualism can be interpreted and traced back to 
the alienation of the body.126 
 
1.2 The quest for ontology  
Through practical aspects of the reality of HIV and AIDS and their related 
stigmatisation, the paradigmatic appearance of stigmatisation of human corporeality 
becomes obvious as a way of alienation from embodiment rooted in theological and 
philosophical history. In 13th century universities, the tendency was to regard 
academic theology as a science, that is, next to philosophy. In order to be a part of 
the academic enterprise, “theology ran into the danger of becoming a purely 
rationalistic enterprise which tried to capture the mystery of God in terms of 
rationalistic categories: the thread of dogmatism” (Louw 1998:103). In fact, “theology 
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 Geest, H. v. d. (1990). Verschwiegene und Abgelehnte Formen der Sexualität. Eine Christliche 
Sicht, 178. 
125
 “It was the subordination of women – systematically present in the institutions, the interpersonal 
relations, the thought forms, and the religious life of patriarchal culture” (Nelson 1978:46). 
126
 Nelson gives several theories which account for sexual dualism, and its possible origin (Nelson 
1978:60-62). One theory is the fear of men over the biological powers of women, especially the 
capacity for pregnancy and giving birth. Further, when women in history have been regarded as 
creatures with supernatural gifts, men responded in two ways: they either adored women as divine or 
treated them as demonic. Both expressions have occurred in Christian tradition (Nelson 1978:60). A 
second hypothesis is connected to male fear concerning women’s sexual power in so far that men are 
separated from their own instinctive sexuality. Nelson mentions the transition of tribal to urban 
societies, away from biological processes and consciousness. The latter then became associated with 
women whereas a new definition of [man] himself towards a more-than-sexual identity shall be 
achieved: “as one created not in the image of any biological thing, but as a being sharing in the 
covenanting-legal power that rules the universe” (Richardson, H. W. (1971). Nun, Witch, Playmate: 
The Americanization of Sex. New York: Harper & Row, in Nelson 1978:61). A third theory highlights 
not only man’s direct fears of the woman (i.e. in relation to sexual intercourse); but a related 
“castration anxiety”, and the ever present fear of impotence (Nelson 1978:61). These theories can be 
linked to sexist dualism and located in man’s anxieties in the face of woman’s sexuality. 
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became, next to physics and mathematics, metaphysics: a science regarding the 
being of God” (Pannenberg 1973:15-17, in Louw 1998:103).127  
 
Naurath refers to Godehard Brüntrup,128 who claims that the history of philosophy 
has been written from the perspective of the mind. In modern times, besides the 
principle of causality in ontological questions concerning universal elements, critical 
positions were set to form the philosophy of the mind.129  
 
However, recent anthropological discussions tend towards interdisciplinarity with a 
growing criticism of fundamental dualism. Regarding the everyday life relevance of 
the topic, Büntrup addresses the dialogue with notions from empirical modern 
sciences on the relation between the body (Leib) and the soul, the body (Körper) and 
the mind, as well as between physical and mental aspects (Naurath 2006:38). 
Büntrup emphasises the experience of dualism in everyday life, in which the physical 
and psychical are dependent on and simultaneously influence each other. 
 
In respect to the history of Christian doctrine from a church historical perspective, it 
may be assumed that in today’s postmodern era, the emphasis has shifted from 
metaphysics to ethical questions. By reflecting on its (Christian tradition) origin, 
conditions and principle (through estrangement in order to get back to itself), 
theologians should also be reminded that talking about God is not superior to talking 
to God. Ethical reflection and argumentation begin with both the experience of 
suffering and the recognition that there is evil in the world. At the same time, there is 
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 The importance of a philosophical perspective to theology is that, with the help of philosophical 
methods, theological doctrines are to reflect critically for a new understanding in the light of context 
and human environment.  
128
 Büntrup, G. (1996). Das Leib-Seele-Problem. Eine Einführung. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.  
129
 Naurath (2006:39) describes them as: first, a genuine dualistic position that declares mental and 
physical entities as independent from each other; the body-mind-dualism and the problem of a 
psychophysical interdependency; second, monistic approaches, which consider mental entities 
dependent on physical ones: non-reductive physicalism (mental characteristics are dependent on the 
physical base but are not identical with it), and reductive physicalism (drawing back of all mental 
characteristics to the physical); and third, a radical monistic concept, which denies the existence of 
mental entities; abstractionism and eliminative physicalism doubt the reality of any mental aspects. 
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no surety when it comes to living a fulfilled life (Prechtl 1999:159). From a Christian 
perspective, the existential dimension is opened up between the ‘ought’ and the 
‘may’ of human beings coram Deo, that is, before God (Louw 1998).130 
 
Likewise, philosophical anthropology has contributed to theological anthropological 
reflections on ontology and human embodiment. Since the 19th century, the body 
phenomenon was already being addressed by Hegel, Marx, Kierkegaard, and 
Nietzsche, each of whom “employed concepts of the body to subvert Cartesian 
dualism” (Welton 1999:3).131 In the last century, within the debate of existential 
philosophy, the issue of embodiment shifted again to the centre of recent 
philosophical and theological reflection.  
 
In existential phenomenology, Martin Heidegger is concerned about ontology from 
the angle of the notion of being (Dasein). Overgaard argues that Heidegger’s 
concept of Dasein crucially involves the notion of embodiment and he explains 
further the reason that Heidegger avoids dealing with the topic explicitly in his 
magnus opum, Being and Time.132 133 Since for Heidegger the dualistic approach is 
unacceptable,134 he tries to avoid the terms “body” and “embodiment”. Overgaard 
notes Heidegger’s concern with articulating the mode of being-in-the-world by 
stressing the idea of the ‘whole’ human being, which shows that corporeality is 
essential to Heidegger’s concept of Dasein (Overgaard 2004:118). Heidegger‘s 
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 Stigmatisation may enable one to observe the tension between a practical ‘ought to’ and 
‘commitment’ (Prechtl 1999:159). For Huber, the sense of tradition lies in taking up the old and 
overcoming worldviews in order to transform or process them creatively. If rightly understood, tradition 
points to the future of human beings and mirrors the sense of the humanum, which is a normative 
idea. In its content, this idea emanates from human beings’ ideals of themselves. Therefore, tradition 
can be understood as the stimulus of education. Education should be understood as a process, rather 
than a result (Huber 1992:577ff.). 
131
 Welton, D.(1999). The Body. Classic and Contemporary readings. Oxford: Blackwell. 
132
 Heidegger, M. (1927). Sein und Zeit. 15.Aufl. Tübingen. Max Niemeyer Verlag. 
133
 Overgaard, S. (2004). Heidegger on Embodiment, in Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology, Vol. 35/2, 216-131. 
134
 In his speech, “Der Satz der Identität” (1957), Heidegger considered the history of metaphysics 
under the subject of how “thinking and being” and “being human and being” can be brought together. 
Heidegger focusses on overcoming metaphysical thinking in order to provide the lost unity of being 
human and his concept of being (Lübbe, H. (1959). Art. Identitätsphilosophie. Religion in Geschichte 
und Gegenwart.Bd. 4.  3rd ed. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 564-566).  
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hesitance on the conceptualisation of “the body” and “embodiment”135 may provide a 
hint about the delicate nature of the subject matter and the methodological 
consequences of its use. However, in the 21st century and in context of the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic, we are in dire need of categories for approaching the problem. 
 
Furthermore, in philosophical anthropology of the 20th century, M. Buber is also 
critical of the attempt to determine and define the essence of the human being in 
general.136 According to him, the entity of the human being needs to be traced back 
in an act of self-reflection, or in the act of life itself. In this relational approach, Buber 
is comparable to Husserl, Heidegger and French existential philosophy. In the same 
way, the ‘symbolic interactionism’ is against a substantial determination.137  
 
Influenced by existential philosophy, Max Scheler draws on Husserl’s methodology 
of phenomenology and develops it further. Scheler sets a new emphasis in 
philosophical anthropology by regarding the human being as a pneumatic being, who 
is ‘open towards the world’.138 However, instead of the pneumatic conceptualisation, 
Plessner accentuates the human position out of the self-consciousness, which sets 
the human being in an ‘eccentric position’.139 Gehlen, on the other hand, builds on 
Scheler’s thoughts; his conceptions have been developed further in the classic form 
of modern philosophical anthropology.140 
 
 
                                           
 
135
 Heidegger’s teacher, Edmund Husserl, first developed the notion of the lived body (Leib), and set it 
in opposition to the body (Körper) under a physicalistic description. A contrastive concept of the lived 
body is brought up by Max Scheler at the same time (cf. Walton 1999:4). 
136
 Buber (1948). Das Problem des Menschen, refered to in Pannenberg, W. (1973). 
Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
137
 In his book, “Embodiment” (1978), Nelson follows symbolic interactionism in his interpretation of 
human sexuality. Mead asserts that the exchange of signs is a characteristic of human beings. This 
line can be traced back to Dewey’s pragmatism. 
138
 Scheler (1930). Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, in: Lorscheid, B. (1962). Das 
Leibphänomen. H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag: Bonn, 14. 
139
 Plessner (1928). Stufen des Organischen, refered to in Pannenberg, W. (1973). 
Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
140
 Gehlen (1940). Der Mensch, in Pannenberg, W. (1973). Wissenschaftstheorie und Theologie. 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag. 
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● Ontology of essence according to Scheler (1962) 
Bernhard Lorscheid identifies the different terms used for the body in philosophical 
anthropology.141 Based on Max Scheler’s Wesensontologie des Leiblichen, 
Lorscheid identifies the nuances between the physical, the psychological and the 
somatological.142 Although Christian theology does not uniquely own a ‘being-
analysis’ (Wesensanalyse), a pastoral anthropology should consider a ‘philosophical 
analysis of being’ (philosophische Wesenseidologie) in order to throw light on the 
theological problems of becoming truly human.143 In the same way, a theological 
anthropology is needed for such an understanding in order to reflect on the notion of 
death and resurrection in human beings. Therefore, a philosophical reflection of the 
being structure of embodiment seems reasonable for a modern anthropology in 
which “being embodied” and “embodied processes” are confronted with existential 
philosophical and ethical questions.  
  
At this point, it seems useful to shed more light on Lorscheid’s investigation of 
Scheler’s work.144 Scheler considers the difference between “Körper” und “Leib”, but 
further identifies the ‘Leibphenomenon’ (Leibphänomen). Since he distinguishes 
between “Leibbody” (Leibkörper), “Leibsoul” (Leibseele), and “Leib” itself; the latter is 
a “mental-physical non-deviant phenomenon”.145 He defines “Leiblichkeit” in a 
phenomenological sense as a category, which is, apriori, consciously externally and 
internally perceivable for the Leibconsciousness.146 An external view describes the 
“Leibbody”, while an internal point of view regards the “Leibsoul”.147 It is important to 
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 Lorscheid, B.1962). Das Leibphänomen. H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag: Bonn. 
142
 Scheler’s “Wesensschau des Leiblichen” identifies with the existential philosophy of Sartre, 
Merleau-Ponty and Plessner on the objectifying assessment of the body and the emphasis on the 
subjective “Leib experience” (Lorscheid1962:17).   
143
 Likewise, Moltmann, J. (1985:233) states that in the light of the Gospel, “being human is becoming 
human”. 
144
 In his phenomenological method, Scheler distinguishes between eidetical reduction and 
phenomenological reduction. Of these two approaches, it is the first one, a phenomenology of the 
object (Gegenstandsphänomenologie), which explores the existence of being, and which can be 
called the actual method.   
145
 The original is, “ein psychophysisch indifferentes Phänomen” (Lorscheid 1962:29). 
146
 See also Louw’s distinction between the “external and internal person“(1998:163). 
147
 One can differentiate between an orientation towards the body that is culturally suggested and one 
that is independent of culture, since the body can be regarded as the expression (Ausdruck) of the 
inner being. Ringleben mentions the idea of the inside being recognisable on the outside (e.g. smile, 
flush of anger); “das Innere am Äußeren” (Ringleben 1998:218). 
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note that the Leib is much more fundamental for both; that is what Scheler calls the 
“Urphenomenon” (1962:29). 
 
For Scheler, the qualitative structure of embodiment (des Leiblichen) is crucial. He 
prefers to uncover the constituents of the embodied being and he develops a 
concept via the specific way of looking at reality.148 Scheler’s differentiation of the 
ontic structure of embodiment goes further than the existentialists’ by differentiating 
between lived Leibconditions (Leibzuständen)149 and an element which underlies 
those conditions as a fundamental fact: the actual Leib. 
 
Lorscheid further describes the function of the Leib. In a detailed reflection, he points 
out that the expression of Leib (leiblicher Ausdruck) works as a symbol for 
“something”. An almost ‘immediate’ perception150 of a “soulful substance” becomes 
possible “in” and “through” the expression of the Leib. Therefore, the Leib attains 
symbolic function in the recognition of the individual “I” of a person (Lorscheid 
1962:46). For Lorscheid, this concept is truly fertile in the discussion of body-
ontological questions in recent theology. Although in Scheler’s time, the full meaning 
of his work and method, Wesensschau des Leiblichen, was not recognised, 
Lorscheid’s interesting systematic exposition and terminology serve as a point of 
departure for regarding the phenomenon of embodiment in terms of a holistic 
theological anthropological reflection.151 152 
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 Lorscheid’s “eidetisch-reduzierende Erkenntniseinstellung”, from here Scheler obtains his 
“Wesenseideologie des Leiblichen” (Lorscheid 1962:10). 
149
 Note here the similarity and relatedness to the concept of attitude. 
150
 One has to distinguish between the internal and external sense of perception (Lorscheid 1962:46). 
151
 The differentiation between Leib und Körper should not be confused with dualism as promoted by 
Descartes’ philosophy, which is incompatible with the understanding of the Leib as a ‘mental-physical 
non-deviant Urphenomenon’ (Lorscheid 1962:29). 
152
 The Cartesian School regarded the mind (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa) as two different 
substances. The question of the unity of the two was answered by a causal relationship between mind 
and body thatfinally resulted in the dualistic mind-body-problem. Herms sees the development and 
spread of the dualistic anthropological concept not only in Descartes’ distinction between res cogitans 
and res extensa, but as having originated in the scholastic theology since Thomas Aquinus, including 
the protestant orthodoxy of the 16th and 17th centuries (1991:30). 
  
 
 
68
1.3 “Defining the body”: corporeality and embodiment  
According to Louw, following the philosophical anthropological debate on ontology 
and ethics of the human body, one cannot completely ignore a substantial approach 
to anthropology. In pastoral hermeneutics, “substantial then refers to ‘authenticity’ 
and the stance of the individual before God” (Louw 2004:17). In Louw’s conception, 
substantiality refers to the state of being and a qualitative condition determined by 
grace. Rather than focussing only on substantia from the angle of inclusive 
anthropology, Louw sees the importance of dealing with both, that is, the mutuality of 
relationships (relatio) as well as the identity of being qualities (substantia).  
 
From this point, the need for a holistic and relational approach to the human being 
arises. Louw (2004:13) argues for a holistic biblical perspective in emphasizing the 
connection between “each part of the body, whether it is soul, spirit, mind or kidney”. 
He stresses a fundamental affirmation of both physicality and embodiment in a 
Christian anthropology which follows a biblical understanding. The body is perceived 
as a “psycho-physical unity” representing the vegetative and physiological aspects, 
which is simultaneously “determined by the ego, consciousness and a moral 
awareness (ethics)”.  
 
In the same way, one can understand the body as “the medium through which 
human beings exist and express themselves” (Louw 1998:162). The emphasis is on 
being wholly physical, and not merely having a body but more accurately the “I and 
the ‘soul’ are ‘enfleshed’ in a bodily existence” (Louw 2004:162). Through the body 
one is in contact with the world so that the body is always a part of its surrounding. 
This also shows that the undertaking of investigating embodiment can never be done 
apart from the “system” in which human beings exist.153 Through embodiment, Louw 
(1998:162) refers to the quality of existence of human beings; it indicates “the way in 
which human beings, in their daily living, express their motives and goals through 
their bodily existence, and thereby reveal themselves within relationships”. Louw 
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 “System” here is understood as the social network in which one lives (Louw 2005:25). 
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(1998:162) further stresses that embodiment “should thus not be perceived as an 
external human element, but rather as indicative of the person him-/herself from the 
perspective of a certain mode of existence: a bodily awareness (embodiment)”.  
 
Even though the quest for meaning arises in borderline situations such as suffering 
and death, existential philosophy can solely describe a situation, but it cannot 
enlighten the ultimate. Louw (1998:145) argues that, “Existential analysis and 
phenomenological research cannot determine the meaning of our existence: still in 
need is a transcendental factor which reaches beyond phenomenological events.” 
For Karl Barth, the “knowledge” of the ultimate meaning of the human person is 
revelational; human existence should therefore be approached from a theonomous 
perspective (cf. Louw 1998:144).154 From the viewpoint of pastoral theology, it can 
be concluded that the body itself is not the object; more exactly, the human being in 
relation to another with a body is the object. The focus of interpretation has also 
been the attitude in place and time.155 
 
Eberhard Jüngel attempts to define what makes a human being a whole human 
being.156 He differentiates between wholeness regarding quantity (totalitas 
quantitas), essence (totalitas essentiae) and potential (totalitas virtutis or 
potentiae).157 These three are assimilated by the understanding of integral 
wholeness. For integral wholeness, irrelevant parts may be missing, but not essential 
parts. Jüngel argues with Luther158 that a theological definition of the human being is 
superior to a philosophical one, because theology does characterise the human 
                                           
 
154
 Barth does not deny the value of phenomenological insights. In fact, if phenomenological 
observations and hypotheses become absolutes, they only appear foreign in a Christian perspective 
(Barth KD III/2 1948:26, in Louw 1998:145).  
155
 In German, the meaning of the reflexive verb, “sich verhalten zu” (to behave), follows “Haltung” 
(attitude). 
156
 Jüngel hereby quotes the example by Thomas Aquinas of a bald-headed person, Calvi non 
dicuntur colobi. Bald-headed persons do not deserve to be called disabled because hair is not an 
integral part of being wholly human (Jüngel 2003:40). 
157
 Closely connected to the triples totalitas is the differentiation between totum universale, totum 
integrale and totum potentiale (Jüngel 2003:41). 
158
 See Luther’s thesis in Disputatio de homine. 
  
 
 
70
being as homos totus et perfectus (Jüngel 2003:43).159 Although philosophical 
anthropology, especially in the West, had a vast influence on the understanding of 
the human being compared to theology, philosophy does bring up only segments 
and knows very little about the human being.160 In addition, Luther does not discuss 
human wholeness in terms of the ambivalent body-soul unity; rather, it is God’s 
creative and justifying Word that makes the human being humane; homos totus et 
perfectus.161 
 
Caroline Bynum inquires, “Why all this play-acting about the body… In a certain 
sense, it is naturally wrong to make ‘the body’ the subject. Either ‘the body’ is not a 
topic itself, or it includes as good as all topics” (Bynum, cited in Janssen 2005:18).162 
Bynum argues that one cannot reduce the interdisciplinary discussion about the 
body to a common denominator. In order to make assertions about understanding 
the body in history, a nuanced understanding of history is necessary (ibid.) This is 
because body history lays open past and present “embodied” certainties. Besides 
historical conditions and cultural implications and specifications, political dimensions 
may also play a role.163  
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 Philosophical definitions of the human being, which describe animal rationale, sensitivum, 
corporeum or the aritotelic causae-scheme cannot designate the whole and perfect human being 
(Jüngel 2003:43). 
160
 Philosophy, in its true sense, should be more concerned about norms and values of the human 
being; by so doing, philosophy asks for “wisdom”. 
161
 Homo totus et perfectus is “creatura Dei et anima spirante constans, ab initio ad imaginem Dei 
facta sine peccato, ut generaret et rebus dominaretur nec unquam moreretur… Post lapsum vero 
Adae subiecta potestati diaboli, peccato et morti, utroque malo suis viribus insuperabili et aeterno… 
Nec nisi per filium Dei Christum Iesum liberanda (si credat in eum) et vitae aeternitate donanda: [er 
ist] Gottes Geschöpf aus Fleisch und lebendiger Seele bestehend, von Anbeginn zum Bilde Gottes 
gemacht ohne Sünde, mit der Bestimmung, Nachkommenschaft zu erzeugen und über die Dinge zu 
herrschen und niemals zu sterben… das aber nach Adam’s Fall der Macht des Teufels unterworfen 
ist, nämlich der Sünde und dem Tode – beides Übel, die durch den Sohn Gottes Christus Jesus zu 
befreien ist (sofern es an ihn glaubt) und mit der Ewigkeit des Lebens zu beschenken” (M. Luther, Die 
Disputation de Homine, These 21-23 (WA 39/I, 176,7-13; quote and trans. after G. Ebeling; 
Lutherstudien, Vol. II/1, 19, in Jüngel 2003:44).  
162
 Bynum Walker, C. (1996). Warum das ganze Theater mit dem Körper? Die Sicht einer Mediävistin, 
in Historische Anthropology, (4), 1-33, in Janssen 2005:18). 
163
 Philipp Sarasin makes an important statement that, “if the human body is not anymore the 
unquestioned point of departure of political and cultural discourses and practices, instead, if the 
human body itself has become the place and object of these actions, then body history becomes 
political history” (Sarasin (1999). Mapping the body. Körpergeschichte zwischen Konstruktivismus, 
Politik und “Erfahrung”, in Historische Anthropologie , 7, 437-451, in Janssen 2005:19). 
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The body, in history, has served as a fine demarcation between pagans and 
Christians, between orthodoxy and heresy, between norm and deviance, and as a 
constituent of individual and collective identity. Barbara Feichtinger cites several 
examples in which the body has been regarded as a central venue. One example is, 
the destruction of the body produces the martyr and the body is placed within the 
tension between Christian identity and pagan state power. The question of the social 
availability of the (female) body for reproduction separates ascetics from worldly 
Christians while the metaphor of the Corpus Christi is a symbol of unity as well as a 
symbol for the hierarchical structure of the institution of the church, which represents 
theological as well as social conflicts. Again, the question concerning the place of the 
body in a universal ontological value system divides orthodoxy and heresy as well as 
Christian and pagan philosophy. Besides, the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh 
focuses on central questions of Christian identity (Feichtinger 2004:13).  
 
The point that shall become clear is that religious, political and social fields of conflict 
have found expression in antagonistic perspectives of the interpretation of the body 
(Feichtinger 2004:13).164 Feichtinger contrasts the biological body with the reflected, 
discursive represented body. The first is the indispensable precondition of human 
existence while the latter, so to speak, is defining and reading the body as a “text”. 
So she can claim that the “body” represents an element of human culture 
(Feichtinger 2004:11). 
  
Lorenz understands body history as the “historisation of the body” (which includes a 
plural of bodies). She points out that the body is not an anthropologically constant 
factor, to be viewed only through the lenses of biosciences. The “body” can only be 
                                           
 
164
 In his study, the historian Ernst Kantorowicz draws from the concept of the King’s Two Bodies, one 
of which is a natural and mortal body, while the other can be described as a supernatural, political 
immortal body. “The King’s Two Bodies” is the central theme and serves the purpose of clarifying the 
idealistic preconditions of kingship in order to trace the myth of state, its development and its shaping 
(Fleckenstein, J. (1992). Geleitwort, in Kantorowicz, Ernst H. (1992). Die zwei Körper des Königs. 
Eine Studie zur politischen Theologie des Mittelalters. Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta’sche Buchhandlung 
Nachfolger GmbH, 9-24). 
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understood if regarded through differing and changing definitions.165 Central aspects 
of body history are, for example, “bodies in plural”, “body and language”, the relation 
of “sex and gender”, and the question of varying “definitions of the body”, which are 
mirrored back in a chosen term.166  
 
Often, modern thinkers associate “Körper” with the external body, which is the object 
of the senses, whereas “Leib” designates an internal experienced body, to which 
ensoulment is ascribed. Bernhard Lorscheid acknowledges that philosophical 
anthropology differentiated the two terms for the body. Lorscheid also refers to 
Joseph Ratzinger, who stresses the importance of the difference between “Körper” 
und “Leib” for theology. According to Ratzinger, a decisive point is that Körperlichkeit 
is characterised by “ceasing”, while the character of Leiblichkeit167 is “becoming” 
(Ratzinger 1957, in Lorscheid 1962:2).168  
 
A further dimension of the human body can be observed in Härle who cautions that 
Körperlichkeit should also not be ignored in theological reflections. The meaning of 
“soul” does not exist independently of the corporeality of living beings. Instead, 
corporeality is determined by the soul. In this understanding, the corporeality of living 
                                           
 
165The vast number of different meanings and names for the body in different languages speaks for 
the multiple meanings of the body (Lorenz, M. (2000). Leibhaftige Vergangenheit. Einführung in die 
Körpergeschichte. Berlin, in Janssen 2005:19).  
166In philosophical dictionaries, one can find differences in the reception of the definition of the body. 
In English especially, the word “body” describes two different expressions for the “body” in German. In 
German, one differentiates between “Körperlichkeit” (der Körper) and “Leiblichkeit” (der Leib). These 
terms correspond to the Afrikaans terms “Liggaamlikheid” and “Lyflikheid”, respectively. 
Etymologically, the term “Leib” is connected to “Leben” (life). Both have the same Germanic root ‘leib.’ 
The term “Körper” is taken from Latin corpus. (cf. Alexander Kluge (1999). Etymologisches 
Wörterbuch der deutschen Sprache, 23. erweiterte Aufl., bearbeitet v. Elmar Seebold, Berlin/ New 
York. 478, 511). 
167
 Korte (1995:309) pleads for a further development of the term Leiblichkeit in systematic theology. 
She understands Leiblichkeit as a hermeneutical category, which includes the critic of essentialism 
and dualism (Anne-Marie Korte (1995). Die Erfahrung unseres Leibes. “Leiblichkeit” als 
hermeneutische Kategorie in der feministischen Theologie, in Johann Jäger- Sommer (Hg.), Abschied 
vom Männergott. Schöpfungsverantwortung für Frauen und Männer, Luzern, 288-314, in Janssen 
2005:27). 
168
 Ratzinger agrees with Origenes who opened up the differentiation of the human body between 
materiality “εἶδος τὸ σωματικόν” in a state of flux, and the remaining form “εἶδος τὸ χαρακτηρίζον”. 
Ratzinger refers to H.E. Hengstenberg who notes that M. Scheler was the first to recognise the 
difference between Körper and Leib (Lorscheid 1962:2). 
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beings has the special character of Leiblichkeit (Härle 2000:431). Therefore, the term 
embodiment mirrors a rather holistic understanding of Leiblichkeit.  
 
Having differentiated and identified the terms, corporeality and embodiment, at this 
point it seems appropriate for one to question whether both corporeality and 
embodiment are valued on different levels and how a specific stance towards both 
aspects has developed. A closer inspection leads to the argument of a holistic 
understanding of embodiment, which subsumes both aspects, and which does not 
deny the other one. Having touched different perspectives and concepts in the 
definitions of “the body” and “embodiment”, in what follows, I point out aspects of the 
body in history that promoted a dualistic understanding of being human. Through 
this, aspects which have added to the degradation of the human body become 
clearer.  
 
1.4 Embodiment and the ethical discourse 
Despite the trend towards a fundamental critic on dualism and the shift towards 
ethical questions, Anne Reichhold sees an argumentative deficit in the lack of explicit 
analysis in the face of corporeality and embodiment of the human being in recent 
philosophy.169 Reichhold argues that based on the fact that humans are vulnerable 
and mortal, discussions of human rights, justice and the protection of life become 
meaningful.170 Embodiment of a person and the fact of being exposed to the world, 
finally, constitute finite subjectivity. This notion appears as conditio sine qua non, on 
which the discussion of the ethical term of personhood is built (Reichhold 2004:227).  
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 “Die Ausgrenzung der körperlichen Verfasstheit der Person aus den ethischen Bestimmungen der 
Person in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie birgt die Gefahr in sich, die Grundbegriffe ethischer 
Argumentation insgesamt zu negieren” (Reichhold 2004:227). 
170
 “Durch die Betonung des in der ethischen Personendiskussion vernachlässigten Aspekts der 
Leiblichkeit von Personen wird eine entscheidende Begründung für den ethischen Charakter der 
Person genannt, die implizit in allen ethischen Normen enthalten ist: die Verletzbarkeit und 
Sterblichkeit der Person, die Ethik überhaupt erst erforderlich und möglich macht” (Reichhold 
2004:229).  
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The point of departure for Reichhold is the tension between ethical and ontological 
theories of “persons” and their corporeality.171 She shows that ethical reflections do 
not pay attention to aspects of corporeality regarding the term “person”.172 On the 
contrary, one can argue that theories on ontology should be reflected if they 
adequately correspond with ethical concepts that are integrated in a time context.  
 
In analytic philosophy, the ontological metaphysical discussion of the person regards 
corporeality in the form of an individual person in space and time and mental 
characteristics as constitutive.173 Besides the bodily-material aspect in the use of the 
term “person” a counter term in the Cartesian tradition is the subject, purely defined 
by reason (Reichhold 2004:13). Talking about person in an ethical context, 
embodiment (in the sense of corporeality) completely slips the mind, because it is 
implicitly assumed (Reichhold 2004:227). Likewise, in ethics the emphasis is mostly 
on autonomy and reason as determining aspects of a person, so that the mind takes 
a dominant position. 
 
Reichhold observes that in regarding the understanding of the person, the bodily 
constitution is not the subject in ethical discussions. Rather, due to methodological 
reasons, ethical theories of the person avoid the bodily aspect, and tend to stress the 
nature of reason in a person. However, there is a close interconnection between the 
aspect of corporeality and the understanding of a person as the reflection so far has 
shown, especially in ethics (Reichhold 2004:13). 
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 Similarly, from a pastoral perspective, I have indicated the tension arising in the ethical dilemma of 
Christian ethics and the doctrine of sin. The term “person” is central in the context of the body-mind-
problem. Since the term also designates a moral unity of an acting subject as an ontological unity of a 
subject equipped with mental and bodily attributes, the term takes in a mediating function between 
the fields of theoretical and practical philosophy. Its major function is to synthesise the two in a 
modern determination of the subject (Reichold 2004:12).  
172
 For Reichhold (2004:228), only the connection between ethical and ontological theories on the 
human being may bring about the moral potentiality of the term, person. Simultaneously, the term 
“person” takes up a central role in the body-mind problem, because it often brings together 
dualistically determined mind definitions (Reichhold 2004:12). 
173
 Today, in the philosophical anthropological discussion of the ‘Leib-Seele-problem’, the term 
“person” is dominant. It points to a subject which is both physically and psychically determined 
(Schütt 1994:1122).  
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2. POWER AND EMBODIMENT:  THE GENDER DEBATE 
This section discusses the notions of power and embodiment from the perspective of 
the debate on gender. I begin by considering the alienation from the body in terms of 
the suppression of embodiment in the refusal of bodily expression. 
Nelson points out that the problem of rejecting bodily expression (e.g. in sexual 
expression) is not unique to Christian history.174 Nevertheless, it can still be 
acknowledged that the story of a tradition had and still has a formative influence in 
cultures and places all over the world (Nelson 1978:45). According to Nelson 
(1978:42), human alienation of the body may express itself as the “fear of the body”. 
He shows that the “fear of the body [even] finds expression in our daily patterns of 
human interaction”.  
 
Nelson claims that human beings may be distanced from emotions and relationships 
by withdrawing from society possibly because they want to avoid stigmatisation. The 
other extreme is that if we are only acceptable because of our trans-worldly divinity 
and not because of our concreteness, then the other can also only be of 
transcendent value. The other becomes “the occasion to experience God” (Nelson 
1978:43). This view implies the loss of particularity and the value of the individual.175 
Nelson concludes that body alienation is alienation from God and vice versa, and 
human beings are alienated from wholeness through this separation (Nelson 
1978:44).176 
                                           
 
174
 Theories become “enhanced when one reflects on the psychic strata of our sexual history” (Nelson 
1978:62). Rosemary Redfort Ruether further identifies three psychic layers in sexual history that have 
been present - though not explicitly - in any historical period. Roughly sketched, one can identify the 
perception of women as dependent on men and their property. Secondly, the identification of the 
woman with the body is prevalent but the latter represents carnality and evil. Thirdly, the perspective 
of women as the spiritualized ideal also plays a role. (Redfort Ruether, R. (1975). New Woman, New 
Earth: Sexist Ideologies and Human Liberation, New York: Seabury, and in Bianchi, E. C. and Redfort 
Ruether, R. (1976). From Machismo to Mutuality: Essays on Sexism and Woman-Man Liberation. 
New York: Paulist, in Nelson 1978:62).  
175
 Fenton (1974) declares that, “Non-bodily theologies are anti-self, anti-neighbor, anti-society, and 
anti-world” (Fenton, J.Y. (1974). “Bodily Theology”, in Fenton (ed). Theology and Body. Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 133, cited in Nelson 1978:42). 
176
 Nelson’s assertion of twenty years ago is still of current interest: “At this point it is important that 
we face honestly those elements of our common tradition which have contributed to the sexual 
alienation we presently experience” (Nelson 1978:57).  
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The struggle of human beings and the strive for understanding, belief, dogma, right, 
power, justice, or even God have been fought out more or less in the body; it has 
literally and metaphorically become a “battlefield”, distinct from the soul and mind. 
Social anomalies and injustices are mirrored on the level of gender and intimate 
relationship in the form of prevalent conflicts. Likewise, the HIV and AIDS pandemic 
can be regarded as an expression of disordered gender relation in which the human 
body has become the battlefield.  
 
2.1 Patriarchalism: background schema of interpretation 
Suppression of embodiment also takes place wherever any form of power is 
prevalent. In order to understand what is meant by the heritage of patriarchy, 
Culbertson mentions the main interlocking premises in different sectors of life, which 
have served as justification for biological, cultural, economic, and religious 
dominance by males. He draws on the assertion that physical strength is part of the 
intended natural law. Secondly, the notion of family and society is naturally based on 
aggression, domination, procreation, and protection. Another aspect is that property, 
production and distribution of the latter belong naturally to the male domain. Lastly, 
male superiority, dominance and privilege are part of the received religious 
revelation (Culbertson 1994, in Louw 2007:365).  
 
These aspects all form the cornerstone of patriarchalism and they should be 
acknowledged in the gender debate, because they directly point to the tension in the 
notions of power (Louw 2007:368). Patriarchalism finds expression in “male power 
and control in intimate relationships as well as discrete acts of behaviour” (Louw 
2007:366). It can easily turn into the misuse of power, in physical, visual, verbal, or 
sexual acts, called “male violence”. According to Louw (2007:366), “[m]ale violence 
feeds on gender inequality and is socially constructed as a hierarchy, that most men 
base their personal identities on being member of the dominant class”.  
 
Women may experience male power or even violence as threatening and assaulting. 
The consequence of being hurt or degraded becomes concrete when women are 
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robbed of their ability to take control in any (intimate or otherwise) encounter. Louw 
also offers an interpretation about what fuels male violence in the patriarchal 
paradigm. He sees interplay between patriarchalism, fear and resistance.177 178 For 
example, men’s fear may be bound to men’s cultural role in society. Men do not want 
to lose face in falling out of their ascribed role, and encounter shame – even stigma. 
Hence, the fear which stands in line with the patriarchal paradigm is the fear of 
powerlessness. In many cases, the only way of gaining power and shifting from 
being a victim is to become violent and to respond with aggressive behaviour (male 
violence).179  
 
2.2 The power game: masculinities – femininities (social constructs) 
When we assume that the gender debate is, to a certain extent, socially constructed, 
one can concede that males as well as females are victims of their culture and the 
connected stereotypes (Louw 2007:375). Male stereotypes are connected to the 
notion of power;180 whereas femininity is associated with vulnerability.181 While the 
danger that lurks in male gender symbols is violence, the danger in female gender 
symbols arises from the restricted perception of female sexual identity ascribed to 
them.182 183 
                                           
 
177
 The attempt to sum up male fears does not imply a generalisation of all men’s fears; the insight on 
one’s fears has to be accomplished by oneself, either male or female. In an attempt to summarise 
male fears, one can mention the fear of showing emotions or being exposed to affectiveness. Males 
tend to associate emotions with weakness or associate occupancy with processes of inner experience 
with triviality. Here, I would rather argue from a pastoral hermeneutics that intrinsically deep-seated 
cultural prejudices and fixed gender roles are connected to our being human, i.e. on fears. 
178
 Louw (2007:367) mentions here that “[t]he fear of being weak or called a woman, can quickly spill 
over into misogyny, the hatred of things associated with women”. 
179
 See Louw (2007:368). Louw also refers to violent crime in the South African context. He points to 
the lack of social security and the high rate of poverty, unemployment and experienced 
powerlessness among the people in the Cape Flats area. Being the victim of an unjust society 
especially affects the male population (Louw 2007:368).  
180
 Louw differentiates between threat power and integrative power. The latter is “the ability to bring 
about desirable results through affection, giving loyalty, care and other forms of bonding… Threat 
power includes manipulation, intimidation, even expressions of disapproval” (Louw 2007:372).  
181
 Louw designates to masculinity the p-factors and to femininity the s-factors. The p-factors are 
penis, power, phallus, performance. The s-factors are subtle, submission, seduction, sensual (Louw 
2007:370ff.). 
182
 “The strangeness between men and women brings out the point where the power lies, that is, 
where the stigmatisation works” (MacDonald 2005:42). 
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Louw explains that every culture has a gender system which lays down expectations 
of what female and male behaviour entails as well as what social norms or roles are 
implied.184 He also agrees with Mowrey, who presupposes that a dualism that runs 
all the way exists under the mentioned stereotypes and creates the problem of 
identity (Louw 2007:366).185 Gender images are constructed and identities are put 
into shape or ‘frames’. From there, also arises the danger of fixed gender roles and 
social prejudices, which fuel stereotyping and feed the gender discourse in terms of 
a gender war.186 
 
Louw sees through the gender debate the necessity to question culturally critical 
points. The notion of HIV and AIDS related stigmatisation necessarily raises 
questions in the field of disordered gender relation.187 Is the philosophical paradigm 
of patriarchy, which is related to a hierarchical understanding of human value and 
identity, culturally appearing to decline? Have the idea and debate of gender equality 
become stuck in the universal fact of women’s oppression (Louw 2007:360)? The 
quest for transformation in a society that is characterised by change arises. 
Concerning gender relations, one may conclude that to find new appropriate roles 
that no longer contribute to women’s oppression is a societal challenge for men. At 
                                                                                                                                   
 
183
 Women’s assertiveness lies in ‘femininity’ as softness and defencelessness. In contrast to men, 
women experience themselves as vulnerable and are likely to be exposed to exploitation (Louw 
2007:370). 
184
 Predominantly, the societal structure in Africa (and particularly in South Africa) is patriarchally 
constituted. In the same context, men are traditionally polygamous, and often have more than one 
sexual partner. Since polygamy and concubinage are silently accepted as normal among Africans, 
there is no public disapproval; therefore, processes of stigmatisation are not directed against male 
sexual activity (Louw 2007:394). In a different way, in some African communities there is a stigma 
attached to the use of contraception, since these restrict men’s view of sexual performance and 
fecundity (Louw 2007:399). 
185
 A dualism regarding the following aspects can be traced back: masculine/feminine, active/passive, 
mind/body, rational/emotional, independent/dependent, dominate/subordinate, objective/ subjective… 
culture/nature (Louw 2007:376). 
186
 Louw (2007:359) asserts that the difference between gender and sex lies in the fact that, “A 
person’s sex is indeed determined by biology, genetics and neurology and role functions are 
embedded in engendered constructions as social and cultural created systems of meaning”. 
187
 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the structures and context have to be taken into account in order to get a 
realistic picture of the HIV/AIDS threat and stigmatisation. Statistics mirror a high infection rate among 
key populations connected to poverty. Undeniably, HIV/AIDS and poverty are linked; poverty provides 
the social context in which the pandemic flourishes in Africa and in South Africa, in particular. Louw 
describes the pandemic as a “vicious circle”, since “poverty causes HIV and in turn, HIV causes 
poverty” (Louw 2007:393).  
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the same time, the dignity and contributions of women in society should be 
acknowledged.188 
  
For Louw, the decisive question concerning the gender reality in the recent process 
of democratisation is whether the heritage of patriarchy, which is located in deep-
seated cultural prejudice and fixed gender roles, will undergo a constructive 
transformation (Louw 2007:360).189 Louw points in the direction of an “intrinsic 
spiritual change as a devotion to norms and values geared to foster human dignity 
and human rights” (Louw 2007:368). From there follows the fundamental need for an 
approach to heal alienated gender relations whose battles have been fought out on 
human bodies.  
 
 
 
3. TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF HUMAN EMBODIMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY  
 
3.1 Shame 
Helen Lynd asks whether the feeling of shame implies an acceptance of the validity 
of the values or standards of the society in relation to which one feels ashamed, or if 
shame points towards trans-cultural values in terms of which one judges oneself as 
well as society. Concerning the origin of shame, Lynd tentatively states that shame 
can be understood only with reference to trans-cultural values. This awareness of 
values beyond one’s own society is one of the distinctions between shame and guilt 
(Lynd, in Morris 1971:167). Interestingly, it is the act of feeling ashamed and the wish 
to cover oneself that is described in Scripture as the first consequence of the Fall 
                                           
 
188
 “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female, 
for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal 3:28). The dimension for pastoral care is derived from this 
statement. 
189
 Compare Moltmann’s understanding of “democratisation” concerning the understanding of any 
human being as image, representative, servant, and reflection of God (Moltmann 1985:225).  
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(and not guilt).190 Shame, in contrast to guilt, can refer to the damage to life that 
occurred to people without their responsibility, e.g. without having “behaved 
wrongly”.  
 
The HIV and AIDS related stigma may communicate the association of shame in 
being wrong and having behaved wrongly, and consequently being guilty. Guilt in a 
religious sense means, on the one hand, falling short of expectations, and on the 
other hand, it concerns the notion of responsibility in terms of accountability (Härle 
2000:463).191 Regarding shame, the HIV and AIDS related stigma also seems to 
point towards an aspect of the identity that one would rather keep secret because of 
shame. Stigma stands for the “spoiled identity” (Goffman 1963); while one feels 
shame for what one has done (or neglected to do), or even shame for whom one is 
(Ackermann 2006:1). The experience of shame seems to embody the root meaning 
of the words to uncover, to expose and to wound (Lynd, in Morris 1971:159).192 
 
According to Louw, the notions of guilt and shame are important in order to 
understand sin meaningfully (2005:158). The concepts of shame, guilt and anxiety 
play an important role in human psyche (Augsburger 1986:126; Louw 2005:159). 
Louw refers to guilt and shame in line with existential life issues, while Slenczka 
(2007) adds guilt and shame to the category of negative relations toward oneself 
(negative Selbstverhältnisse).193  
 
Sartre sees the roots of shame in the structures of human beings. According to 
Sartre, the human ‘I’ needs other beings to recognise itself and its structures of 
                                           
 
190
 Genesis 3:7ff.  
191
 The spiritual dynamics of responsibility and respondability are an indication and expression of 
human beings’ ontic status before God (Louw 1998:156). 
192
 The German expression “Scham” refers to genitals, but the meaning of shame goes beyond the 
feeling of being ashamed due to the urge to cover one’s sexual organs. One can also act in a 
shameful or bashful way, which then may refer to the covering of intimate body parts or behaviour 
(Baudy 1994:862). 
193
 Slenczka, N. (2007). Notes from a discussion during the seminar on “Schuld, Scham und Angst als 
negative Selbstverhältnisse”, held at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the 2007/08 winter 
semester. 
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being, fully. He describes shame in the sense that one is ashamed because one is 
seen (doing something that is unacceptable or one is somehow unacceptable) by 
others. The primary structure of shame entails one being ashamed of oneself before 
another person. The other is the indispensable mediator between me and myself: “I 
am ashamed of myself, of how I appear to others.”194 The dilemma, according to 
Sartre, is that the human ‘I’, in being ashamed, acknowledges being the way he or 
she is perceived in the eye of the other; this has fatal consequences in the case of 
stigmatisation. His pessimistic view of the human being being in relationship is 
crucial for Sartre; he refers to being in relationship as being potentially dangerous 
(Sartre 2004:406). 
 
For Scheler, being embodied is the precondition for the experience of shame.195 
Similar to Sartre’s, Scheler’s view is that shame is constituted in the relational 
context of human beings. At the same time, shame is expressed in three aspects of 
being human: reflection, protection and tension. Scheler sees in reflection a human 
being turning towards his or her own embodiment (Leib) with own limitations in 
space and time (Scheler 1957:69).196 The tension expresses the contrary relation 
between the ideal, ‘ought to be’ (das Seinsollende), and the factual, ‘being’ (das 
Faktische). In shame, the personal worth of the individual, who experiences shame, 
is present, which clarifies the inherent moment of protection in the shame reaction.197 
                                           
 
194
 Personal translation of: “Doch der Andere ist der unentbehrliche Vermittler zwischen mir und mir 
selbst: ich schäme mich meiner, wie ich Anderen erscheine” (Sartre 2004:406). 
195
 For Scheler (1957:87), shame is “the natural clothing of the soul” (Seelenkleid) regarding one’s 
gender: “[S]o müssen wir die Scham geradezu einer feinen Aura von als objektive Schranke 
empfundener Verletzlichkeit und Unberührbarkeit vergleichen, die den Menschenleib sphärenhaft 
umfließt”.  
Further, Scheler (1957:87) explicates that it is not the ‘ensoulment’ (Beseelung) of body and flesh 
from the viewer’s perspective that  to this aura (this sphere of incorruption and purity), but actually is a 
less or more guilty ‘un-soulment’ (Entseelung) of the original phenomenon that leads to the perception 
of flesh and corporeality. (“Nicht eine “Beseelung” des Körpers und Fleisches seitens des Betrachters 
führt zu jener Aura, zu jener Sphäre von Unberührbarkeit und Reinheit – sondern eine mehr oder 
weniger schuldhafte Entseelung des ursprünglichen Gesamtphänomens führt zur Perzeption des 
Fleisches und der Körperlichkeit”).  
196
 Scheler claims that just because human beings are equipped with a body, they have to feel 
ashamed, and just because human beings in their spiritual way of being can reflect, they are able to 
feel ashamed (Scheler 1957:69).  
197
 Concluding, Scheler remarks that the human being primarily is ashamed because of oneself and 
“before” the God in oneself. “Er [der Mensch] schämt sich in erster Linie seiner selbst und ‘vor’ dem 
Gott in ihm” (Scheler 1957:69).  
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For Scheler, shame is the moment in which, in a strange way, “spirit” and “flesh”, 
eternity and time, essence and existence come together.198 
  
Moreover, Härle describes shame as an involuntary psychosomatic reaction of 
human beings who cannot accept a particular thing in their lives, because it does not 
belong to them. Stated differently, Härle (2000:486) regards shame as the outcome 
of an “inner split”. He also stresses that the feeling of shame has even deeper roots 
than the feeling of guilt. Shame seems to be even more closely attached to one’s 
identity; like guilt, shame contains the hope of overcoming sin. He, likewise, identifies 
the latter with an inner split or division (Härle 2000:486). 
 
Sartre and Scheler’s dimension of relation, which is fundamental for shame, is 
interesting. Similarly, the contrast between Scheler’s and Härle’s view is worth 
noting. While Scheler sees in shame a uniting factor, “in which in a strange way 
‘spirit’ and ‘flesh’, eternity and time, essence and existence come together” (Scheler 
1957:69), Härle points to an “inner split” connected to shame.  
 
In a further sense, one may conclude that the notion of shame regarding the HIV and 
AIDS related stigma is directed towards a spiritual dimension of wholeness. 
Similarly, in processes of stigmatisation both guilt and shame could play a 
therapeutic role in the counter process of healing: “the positive power of shame is 
‘discretion motivating choices, energizing “honour”, a disposition to virtue, while guilt 
is direction demanding the better, pointing to values, [and] an urge for integrity’” 
(Augsburger 1986, cited in Louw 1998:407).199 
 
                                           
 
198
 “Darum berühren sich in der Scham auf merkwürdige und dunkle Weise “Geist” und “Fleisch”, 
Ewigkeit und Zeitlichkeit, Wesen und Existenz” (Scheler 1957:69).  
199
 A further difference may be made in line with Augsburger, who differentiates between Western 
cultures as more guilt-oriented than Eastern cultures, which are more shame-oriented (Augsburger 
1986, cited in Louw 1998:407). Likewise, Baudy (1994:862) speaks of the differentiation between 
shame cultures (Schamkultur) and guilt cultures (Schuldkultur).  
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3.2 Embodiment  
The argument that HIV and AIDS related stigma and stigmatisation are directed 
towards a spiritual dimension of wholeness radicalises the question of personal as 
well as structural responsibility. One could question whether HIV and AIDS, in a 
certain sense, is a “behavioural disease” (Louw 2007:398). In that case, the question 
becomes the “cause-question” for HIV and AIDS individually and structurally.200 
Another focus is on the understanding of sin as a failure to take responsibility in 
processes of stigmatisation. Louw emphasises the principle that people should be 
educated to take responsible choices (asking people to take up responsibility is not 
comparable to the cause-question regarding HIV infection). HIV and AIDS 
“radicalizes human behaviour to the point that choices and responsibility obtain a 
new dynamic meaning” (Louw 2007:399). Like a “torch”, HIV and AIDS expose 
silence, unjust conditions and indifference on personal as well as on societal 
levels.201 The WCC document explains that “HIV/AIDS is a sign202 of the times, 
calling us to see and understand” (WCC 1997:2). How to deal with HIV and AIDS 
should not undermine the debate on HIV and AIDS related stigmatisation.  
 
At the same time, one has to face the fact that HIV and AIDS thrive on a picture of 
reality, where people in weaker positions are not free to respond, since their bodies 
are under the control of others with more power. HIV transmission too often “is the 
result of certain types of behaviour in often complex situations” (Ackermann 2006:2). 
The complexity of structures in which power relations play a decisive role (and the 
question of having power over one’s own body) interfere with a straightforward 
argument that HIV and AIDS (and therefore the HIV and AIDS-related stigma) are 
attracted by sin as a failure to take responsibility.203 Hence, a direct counter 
                                           
 
 
200
 Here it remains necessary to make people aware that in relation to HIV and AIDS, what they do is 
more important than who they are (Louw 2007:398). 
201
 HIV and AIDS have evoked responses from various national governments, United Nations’ bodies 
and Non-Governmental Organisations (WCC 1997:1). 
202
 Italics are mine. 
203
 An interesting metaphor regarding the “cause question” is the statement that the virus that causes 
AIDS is accompanied by two other “viruses”. Denise Ackermann affirms Teresa Okure’s recognition 
of the existence of a “virus” that causes men to abuse women, and “that is responsible for the 
shocking fact that in many countries in Africa the condition that carries the highest risk of HIV 
infection is that of being a married woman” (Ackermann 2005). With this example, Ackermann points 
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argument is the incompatible connection between sin and HIV transmission. Firstly, 
sexuality must not be associated with sin. Secondly, there are other ways of 
transmission, and it also affects people who cannot bear responsibility for infection, 
for example, babies born with the virus, abused women and children, faithful 
partners of unfaithful spouses (UNAIDS 2005:14).204 
 
Eilert Herms qualifies human action as the centre of ethics.205 The specific 
theological character of action is set within a Christian understanding of reality.206 As 
a precondition for an action, one can define the characteristic of being embodied in 
the world. Being embodied demands choices in any situation of which only one can 
be realised at a time. Decisions are also a kind of choice actions.207 Herms regards 
choice decisions as self-consciously free because of reason208 and the individual as 
an example of one who is obliged to and capable of making a choice out of given 
                                                                                                                                   
 
to the situation in which disordered gender relations, and the question of having power over one’s 
own body in a patriarchal society are prevalent. Hence, women are especially vulnerable to stigma 
because they experience discrimination and not only because of their HIV status (Weinreich & Benn 
2004:46).  
As a second “virus”, she mentions the context which circumscribes global economic injustice that 
causes poverty in parts of the developing world. In both aformentioned aspects, power relations play 
a remarkable role. Ackermann reminds us, at this point, that, “We live in a situation that raises 
legitimate questions about God’s justice and God’s power and presence in a suffering world” 
(Ackermann 2005:49). The notion of power, as mentioned above, needs closer examination in the 
context of religion and faith, so that it necessarily takes up a role in the pastoral anthropological 
reflection.  
204
 Although HIV/AIDS is a predominantly sexually transmitted disease, it is simultaneously factual 
that HIV can be transmitted through other ways as well, and one has to take into account that 
stigmatisation “leads to the rejection and exclusion of people on grounds for which they often bear no 
responsibility” (Ackermann 2006:4). The UNAIDS Report states that a vast majority of HIV infections 
is the result of sexual activity. It has been stated above that sex itself not inherently sinful, and “the 
responsible use of sex and human sexuality is part of God’s creation, to be celebrated and enjoyed” 
(UNAIDS 2005:14).  
205
 In fact, for Herms, ethics is social ethics because human actions are always interactions, i.e. 
sharing the same world (Herms 1991:xii). 
206
 Herms (1991:v) defines action as: “Undelegierbare eigene Entscheidungen einer Einzelperson, 
von denen jede den Charakter einer Wahl von leibhaftem Verhalten hat, die selbstbewußt-frei, 
regelmäßig, folgeträchtig und zielstrebig ist”  
207
 In comparison to the classical tradition, Herms notes that ethics is qualified through the choice of 
action under the criteria of priority or preference for the individual (Vorzüglichkeitsurteil). The criteria 
of preference, therefore, are connected to one’s certainty about origin, constitution and calling or 
meaning of one’s existence (Herms 1991: xii). For Herms, human existence is characteristically 
embodied and social (leibhaft-sozial). There is always a certainty (whether it is qualified Christian, or 
atheistic) underlying actions and ethics, which constitutes the co-operated life of human beings 
connected to norms and values.  
208
 I have chosen the word “reason”, for Herms uses the metaphor, “in the light of consciousness” 
(Herms 1991:x). 
  
 
 
85
possibilities. Choices become enacted not only about, rather also through the 
individual. Any choice draws consequences and therefore works effectually through 
social, physical or psychical rules.209  
 
Finally, any choice aims at something, which does not imply that each choice attains 
its aim.210 Herms (1991:xi) stresses that actions a person takes are not only physical, 
but also underlie psychic and social rules; that simultaneously qualifies the world in 
which we live as an embodied as well as a social and spiritual world.211 In this 
understanding, to reflect consciously on processes of stigmatisation (how the 
individual or society is involved) is a social and spiritual task for which human beings 
are called to answer (responsibility).  
 
3.3 Responsibility 
From the foregoing, the meaning of sin is bypassed if we reduce it to the notion of 
moral transgression. Louw articulates the importance of the meaning dimension. He 
remarks that, underlying the quest for meaning, the basic philosophical principle of 
responsibility and accountability needs to be stressed (respondeo ergo sum) (Louw 
2005:155). While Descartes’ principle of cogitio ergo sum places the emphasis on 
the human mind, and its rational capacities, respondeo ergo sum emphasises our 
responsibility and ability to make decisions. Ethics and the moral implications of 
human behaviour (menschliches Handeln) are taken into account. Louw (2004:123) 
confirms that, “Accountability is an important ingredient of our being-functions and 
reflects our sensitivity in dealing with our quest for meaning in a responsible 
                                           
 
209
 Enacted choices therefore underlie the criteria of technical and ethical priority or preference based 
on a certain knowledge or certainty. The first (technical criteria) refers to how to reach the aims of the 
choice inherent in the action. The latter criteria refer to the preferred ability of the aim in itself. They 
are based on an inner certainty (Überzeugung) about the “highest good” or one can say one’s calling, 
which is grounded in the constitution of life itself (Herms 1991:xii). 
210
 Thus, actions are geared according to orderly rules of interaction (Regelmäßigkeiten) and the 
knowledge of the arising consequences and effects of certain actions. Actions are therefore 
transparent and contribute to the world we all have in common (Herms 1991:x). 
211
 Herms further names three conditions for his definition of personal action, which are based on 
insight. First, for him, being capable of action is grounded in certainty, which is both technically and 
ethically oriented. The second insight refers to the content of certainty, which is qualified in being the 
“highest good” for oneself. Finally, the third gained insight is that this certainty is grounded in the 
indisposable self-experience (unverfügbare Selbsterfahrung) of each individual (Herms 1991:xxvi). 
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manner”. Being created in the image of God implies responsibility and 
‘respondability’. Nevertheless, this concept presupposes that the addressee can 
answer and is able to give account (Louw 1998:156).  
 
Further, the concept allows the association between ‘must’ (obligation) and ‘can’ 
(potential) though it does not provide a detailed understanding of what the obligation 
or the potential implies. Hence, human beings are owed freedom, “within which 
reason and volition play an important role” (Louw 1998:156). Louw concludes that 
people are moral beings because of accountability and the concept of responsibility 
(ibid.).212 For him, the basic notion underlying theological anthropology is the 
meaning of responsibility: respondeo ergo sum. I respond (and I am responsible), 
and therefore I am (ibid.).213  
 
In a pastoral context, the spiritual dynamics of responsibility and respondability 
indicate and express human beings’ ontic status coram Deo (Louw 1998:157). The 
threat posed by the HIV and AIDS pandemic requires that human beings should act 
responsibly in any area of life, whether as workers in health care departments and 
laboratories or as people in public, private and intimate relationships. Willful lack of 
responsibility in any area may be destructive to other people, and is therefore sinful 
(UNAIDS 2005:14). The understanding of sin as a failure to take responsibility leads 
to the division between guilt and sin (UNAIDS 2005:14). Finally, the task of pastoral 
care remains that of creating the space to confess and alleviate guilt in terms of 
forgiveness. In this regard, understanding of sin as a failure to take responsibility in 
processes of stigmatisation subsequently is a topic for pastoral theology.  
 
                                           
 
212
 Louw (1998:156) states that, “Responsibility and respondability are components of our spiritual 
dimension”. In the pastoral context, the etymological origin of the concept of responsibility is of 
interest. Derived from Latin and Greek terms, it seems that the notion of ‘response’ is connected to 
commitments within relationships and to the restoration of bad relationships. “People are responsible 
‘to’ and ‘for’, so that to be human means to be committed to someone and to live with a vocation to do 
something for someone” (Louw 1998:156). 
213
 “Responsibility presupposes the covenantal context of human existence, within which people are 
addressed by God’s Word and are thus responsible to God” (Louw 1998:156). 
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In conclusion, in this chapter I have dealed with corporeality and embodiment in the 
theological and philosophical perspective. I have shown that forms of dualism and 
the quest for ontology have been determining in theological and philosophical 
anthropology. This understanding has run the danger of neglecting or even 
degradating human embodiment in terms of corporeality. Addressing the human 
body has been reduced to the purpose of being a battlefield as in the gender debate. 
In the gender debate the notion of power and its misuse is prevalent. I have stressed 
that the paradigm of patriarchalism is the leading background schemata of 
interpretation, which fuels conflicts and that dualistic tendencies are based on social 
constructs.  
 
My argument has been for an anthropology of human embodiment and 
responsibility. The anthropology of human embodiment and responsibility takes in to 
account the human being, which is not perfect and yet is able to be ashamed. The 
aspect of shame points towards the direction of worth and value of the human being 
in its full existence and embodiment. Human beings live in the tension between the 
indicative of being and the imperative of becoming truly humane.  
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CHAPTER FOUR                                                              
DESTIGMATISATION WITHIN THE HIV/AIDS PANDEMIC: TOWARDS 
A PASTORAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF WHOLENESS 
 
Departing from different pastoral models, the main perspectives in pastoral 
anthropology are introduced here. Alternatively, I argue for a hermeneutical 
approach to pastoral anthropology. I also refer to biblical conceptions of the human 
being with emphasis on Pauline texts. Finally, I deal with the notion of 
destigmatisation from a pneumatical and eschatological perspective. Hence, this 
section focusses on the human being, characterised by wholeness, from a pastoral 
anthropological perspective.  
 
1. ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES IN PASTORAL CARE 
In the following I refer to the main pastoral models within pastoral theology focussing 
on the anthropological premises. In pastoral theology, pastoral models are based 
mainly on different perceptions and definitions of the essential characteristics of 
humans. Both the motivation for pastoral ministry and the therapeutic outcome are 
determined by anthropology, which functions as a presupposed framework (Louw 
1998:129). Louw (1998:129) traces two main streams of pastoral models that can be 
ascribed to “whether a model encompasses the incarnation motif (Christ’s becoming 
human) or the soteriological motif (Christ’s redeeming work as mediator)”. From the 
viewpoint of anthropology, it can be stated that the focus in these models is either on 
the humanity of people and their inner potentials, or the guilt of people and their sin.  
 
There is no static doctrine of pastoral care in the form of poimenics. Rather, 
interpretations of the character of pastoral care are connected with different 
conceptualisations and interpretations of pastoral models which are valid for all 
times. Outlining a preliminary definition of pastoral care, Winkler asserts that pastoral 
care can be understood as the exemption of a Christian habit or behaviour of coping 
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with life. In particular, pastoral care can be understood as the processing of conflicts 
under specific conditions (Winkler 2000:3).214  
 
The two most important theoretical models in pastoral care are the kerygmatic model 
(homiletic approach) and the client-centred model (empirical approach). In the last 
thirty years, both approaches have moved closer to each other making it possible to 
discuss the approaches in a more integrated way (Louw 2005:7).  
 
a) Kerygmatic model 
In the reformed tradition, the kerygmatic model has been influential. Through 
proclamation of Scripture, admonishment, confrontation, and directive advising, 
kerygmatic components (proclamation and conversion) had a central function in 
pastoral care (with the effect of remorse, confession, and conversion). According to 
Louw (1998:25; 1998:138), “Pastoral care was then mainly viewed as the offer of 
redemption to sinners through the therapeutic process involved in forgiveness and 
the care of the soul”.215  
 
Under the kerygmatik model, pastoral care is understood as proclamation, which is 
only through the communication of the Word of God directed at the individual.216 The 
accomplishment of the Word of God is the aim of proclamation, which is 
                                           
 
214
 In the context of pastoral care, Winkler speaks of the exemption of a Christian habit in order to 
cope with life demands and to undergo conflict management under specific conditions. “Allgemein ist 
Seelsorge zu verstehen als Freisetzung eines christlichen Verhaltens zur Lebensbewältigung. Im 
besonderen ist Seelsorge zu verstehen als die Bearbeitung von Konflikten unter einer spezifischen 
Voraussetzung” (Winkler 2000:3).  
215
 In the period after Worldwar I, dialectical theology after Karl Barth, Friedrich Gogarten, Rudolf 
Bultmann, and Eduard Thurneysen, have been influential in poimenics in terms of the kerygmatic claim 
of absoluteness. More empirical approaches such as those of Otto Baumgarten, Friedrich Niebergall, 
and Oskar Pfister operated on the basis of interdisciplinary dialogue to reform pastoral care theory and 
praxis (Naurath 2000:46). 
216
 Hans Asmussen’s definition is the classic formula of dialectical pastoral care theory: “Unter 
Seelsorge versteht man nicht diejenige Verkündigung, welche in der Gemeinde geschieht, sondern 
man versteht darunter das Gespräch von Mann zu Mann, in welchem dem einzelnen auf seinen Kopf 
zu die Botschaft gesagt wird” (Asmussen, Hans (1937). Die Seelsorge. Ein praktisches Handbuch über 
Seelsorge und Seelenführung. In: Pfarrbücherei für Amt und Unterweisung Bd 1. München, 15, in 
Naurath 2000:47).  
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characteristically expressed through a break in the dialogue from the anthropological 
level to a theocentric level. The understanding of the soul departs from the 
understanding of humans as being fundamentally sinners (Naurath 2000:47).  
 
Under the kerygmatic model, the understanding of the pastoral encounter and the 
faith relationship between the individual and God is accompanied by a specific 
Christian understanding of nature and the character of the human being (Louw 
1998:121).217 Thurneysen departs from the idea of human beings completely distant 
from God. There is no potential for humans to start a relationship with God; instead, 
only the recognition of one’s own sinfulness and the gracefulness of God are 
possible.218 Although dialectical theology criticises Platonism, Thurneysen is 
ambivalent concerning monistic and dualistic assertions. On the one hand, he 
emphasises the wholeness of human beings, while on the other hand, he 
differentiates dualistically between soul and body in terms of a hierarchical model.219  
 
Elisabeth Naurath (2000:49) questions the view that a dualistic image of human 
beings goes with a moralistic God-image, as suggested by Thurneysen. Naurath 
describes Thurneysen’s view as a decidedly dualistic approach that devalues 
embodiment.220 Simultaneously, the subordination of the body when compared to the 
soul has a theo-logical base. The focus on the qualitative difference between God 
and humans in dialectical theology finds continuance in anthropology because the 
anthropological differentiation between body and soul is, in fact, the differentiation 
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 Another characteristic is the unreflected patriarchal background which does not acknowledge 
women as independent subjects of pastoral care (Naurath 2000:47). 
218
 According to Naurath, this theology is an expression of the translation from an internal oriented to 
an external oriented type of human being, which has to be understood in the context of time and the 
shift from the traditional God-image of the 19th century to the inner God consciousness of the 20th 
century (Naurath 2000:49).  
219
 The experiences of two World Wars highlight the absolute sinfulness of human beings and the 
sola gratia of God. The soteriological conception of dialectical theology implicitly takes up the biblical 
understanding of soul, which does not know the separation of an immortal soul from the body, and 
attaches resurrection hope to the body-soul recreation of God (Naurath 2006:33). With this, the 
possibility of overcoming dualism theologically was set (Naurath 2006:34).  
220
 “Dezidiert dualistischen Ansatz, der die Leiblichkeit abwertet” (Naurath 2000:51). 
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between flesh and spirit. The notion of differentiation becomes the actual criteria in 
Thurneysen’s anthropology (Naurath 2000:51).  
 
Finally, within the kerygmatic model, meaning from the view of anthropology, the 
bipolarity between sin and grace is opened up. Christology is determined by the 
doctrine of God (Naurath 2000:53), and it is easily reduced to soteriology, whereas 
anthropology is reduced to harmartiology (Louw 1998:139).221 In fact, one can say 
that human beings in the kerygmatic model remain mere sinners (Louw 1998:169). 
 
b) Phenomenological model 
The focal point in the client-centred model is the concrete life situation of persons.222 
The conception is based on theological as well as on psychological premises 
(Naurath 2000:71).223 It has less to do with the what of the proclamation than with 
the how, that is, how to reach the modern human (Naurath 2000:79).224 Rather than 
the effectiveness of the divine word (healing through forgiveness, reconciliation, 
transformation, and conversion), methodological questions shift into the foreground 
                                           
 
 
221
 According to Barth, a theological anthropology is only possible based on an analogia relationis or 
analogia fidei, which depicts the human analogy of election by faith. Barth’s use of the term analogy is 
the pendant of Paul Tillich’s catholic doctrine of the analogia entis, which means the human possibility 
of an ontological analogy with God - “Die wirkungsgeschichtliche Kehrseite der dialektischen Kritik an 
der Anthropologisierung der Theologie ist die differenzlose Theologisierung der Anthropologie” 
(Naurath 2000:53).  
222
 The works of Anton T. Boisen, Russel L. Dicks, and Richard C. Cabot are considered important to 
the development of the phenomenological (client-centred) model. Boisen’s student, Seward Hiltner, 
developed the “Clinical pastoral training” under the reception of Carl Roger’s client-centred therapy 
(Gesprächstherapie) (Naurath 2000:71). 
223
 The phenomenological (client-centred) model brought a change in the paradigm of poimenics. 
Departing from the American context at the end of the 1960s, an ‘empirical change’ took place which 
influenced the German context in particular. Teamwork among medical and theological professionals 
in hospitals opened up the development of clinical pastoral care programs (Naurath 2000:70). 
Sociological as well as natural scientific perspectives were set aside and openess towards 
interdisciplinarity has made a way for a fundamental theological discourse (Naurath 2000:79; 
2000:82).  
224
 From this approach, Naurath speaks of a convergence model, in which psychology is established 
on an equal level with theology and not just as a mere assistant science. She sees the common point 
of departure in an incarnational theological base of God and human, transcendence and immanency, 
and sacral and profane (Naurath 2000:81).  
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(process of communication and counselling) (Louw 1998:27).225 The individual’s 
inner frame of reference such as self-insight, self-help, self-confidence, self-
integration, congruency, and the revelation of the inner potentials of a person, 
becomes the focal point (Louw 1998:139). The phenomenological model claims that, 
“People are their own therapists and have the inherent potential to arrive at 
transformation and constructive self-realization” (Louw 1998:27).226 
 
Departing from Thurneysen’s theo-logical anthropology, Stollberg claims that 
pastoral care is, first of all, about the human being and the empirical reference 
(Stollberg, in Naurath 2000:73).227 The human being in a specific situation 
(embodied, psychic, social, political, and cultural) becomes the subject of interest in 
the care that is based on a Christian perspective of life (Naurath 2000:82). 
Stollberg’s value for theology lies in the fact that he proves the necessity and 
legitimation of an approach to pastoral care, which takes seriously the human being 
in context (Naurath 2000:74).228 His conception is based on an optimistic image of 
human beings, which positively regards the chances of personality development by 
acceptance and allowance of all emotions.229  
 
Winkler (2000:54) criticises Stollberg’s use of a variety of concepts of the human 
being, whereas Naurath sees Stollberg’s approach as being clearly under Luther’s 
theology of justification and, therefore, distinct from a purely humanistic-inspired 
approach towards the human being. Rather, Christology, with incarnational 
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 Three components are considered as priority: Listening skills, empathy and communication; 
establishing of a relation of trust; and the phenomenological method of experience, observation and 
perception (Louw 1998:139). 
226
 Louw describes the “therapeutical functions” of the phenomenological model as healing, guiding, 
sustaining, reconciling, and nurturing (Louw 1998:139).  
227
 Dietrich Stollberg (1968). Was ist Pastoralpsychology? In Wege zum Menschen (WzM). 210-216. 
228
 “Der Mensch in seiner spezifischen Krisensituation wird zum Ausgangspunkt seelsorgerlichen 
Handelns, ‘die zwischenmenschliche Beziehung als das entscheidende Medium der Begegnung von 
Gott und Mensch (wird; E.N.) wieder zur Geltung’ gebracht” (Stollberg; Klessmann (1975). Fünfzig 
Jahre “etwas anderes”. Zum 50jährigen Jubiläum der Klinischen Seelsorgeausbildung, in LR, 355-361). 
229
 Naurath stresses that the concept’s origin goes back to the specific North American socio-cultural 
circumstance and it cannot be transferred to another context without reflection. In the German 
context, Dietrich Stollberg is one of the first scholars to absorb critically pastoral counselling and 
pastoral care training, providing the impulse for a change from the proclamation model to a 
counselling, client-centred model (Naurath 2000:71f.).   
  
 
 
93
theological implications, forms the basis of his model (Naurath 2000:74).230 Through 
God’s becoming man, humanity increases in worth, and human relationships 
become the theological point of departure.231 Departing from Stollberg, Naurath 
argues for an approach of human being’s corporeality (Leiblichkeit) in pastoral care 
(Naurath 2000:72; see also Louw 1998).232 
 
c) The qualitative, systemic model  
Louw sees the value of a phenomenological approach in its ability to help theological 
anthropology to understand the human being as a person within relationships, to 
concretise human knowledge and to concentrate on human needs (Louw 1998:142). 
Simultaneously, the consequence for theology is that if the emphasis is on human 
potential, then Christology may be narrowed down to incarnation in terms of a 
functional Christology and anthropology may be restricted to ethics. Ethics in this 
understanding, thus, runs the danger of being concerned with the perfection of the 
human being through his or her own actions, and of humanity solely on improving 
the quality of human life (Louw 1998:139).233 Hence, in a phenomenological model, 
one has to question the weight of human abilities and self-actualisation in pastoral 
care (Louw 1998:169). 
 
Likewise, if one considers the kerygmatic approach critically, it would be observed 
that the kerygmatik model holds the understanding of the human being as simul 
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 Following the clarification of Christology in the old Church through the Council of Chalcedon (451 
AD), Stollberg sees, in the distinct humane and divine nature of Jesus Christ, the basis for a 
theological anthropology, which considers the human being as a body-soul unity (Naurath 2000:75). 
231
 Rogerian influence becomes visible in the positive valuation of human relationships and the human 
body as a direct medium of revelation (Louw 1998:134). “Indem Gott in dieser Welt menschlich präsent 
wird, kann alle zwischenmenschliche Hilfe als Medium der Hilfe Gottes verstanden warden” (Stollberg, 
Dietrich (1978). Wahrnehmen und Annehmen. Seelsorge in Theorie und Praxis. Gütersloh, 39. In 
Naurath 2000:74). 
232
 Dietrich Stollberg’s conception of clinical pastoral care is one profound empirical-phenomenological 
approach. Naurath sees in it a dogmatically substantiated, antidocetical and antidualistical tendency 
which can be counted as a shift towards a theology which integrates the embodiment of humans. At 
the same time, it is clear to Stollberg, that his understanding of pastoral care in praxis is not fully 
practicable, e.g. in a hospital context (Naurath 2000:52). 
233
 Following the two approaches mentioned above, Louw (1998:139) poses a question to theological 
anthropology: “Is pastoral care about the sinner’s redemption, or about freeing a person from blocked 
potentials and suppression?” 
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justus et peccator. Due to guilt before God and the reality of sin, a person is a sinner 
and has to expect God’s wrath and punishment. Only through Christ’s expiatory 
sacrifice and God’s sovereign mercy can humans be freed.234 The notion of being a 
sinner dominates to the extent that being created in the image of God becomes 
secondary. Here, the danger of an overemphasis of the Fall arises, and one can 
speak of a ‘hamartiocentric theology’ (Louw 1998:130). Louw points out that there is 
the danger of diminishing human creatureliness in using the paradigm of sin (the 
Fall) as the hermeneutical key for a theological anthropology. Rather, “[s]in is 
secondary and not the final word about man… Nature is not identical to sin. Sin is 
not situated per se in matter or in the body. One can question if such a view would 
bring theology back to Greek philosophy with its dualism between spirit and matter” 
(Louw 1998:130).235 
 
●Towards a practical theological design 
According to Louw, the challenge in pastoral care is to address the existential life 
issues from the perspective of Christian faith and hope. God’s comfort should be 
conveyed and meaning instilled; that is the reason the existential perspective should 
be implemented in terms of a pastoral hermeneutics (Louw 2005:3). Practical 
theological concepts of pastoral care express the specific implicit understandings of 
the soul because each conception in pastoral care is based on a characteristic 
theological historical understanding of the “soul” (Naurath 2000:42). Naurath 
identifies the following consequences for the understanding of pastoral care. 
  
                                           
 
234
 Louw (1998:130) shows that, “The kerygmatic approach to the human being is determined by the 
scriptural declaration: ‘… for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, and are justified freely 
by his grace through the redemption that came by Christ Jesus’ (Rm 3:23-24)”.  
235
 Similarly, Eschmann (2000:169) states that a Christian theological meaning of sin, guilt and 
forgiveness cannot be understood outside the Christian horizon, since it becomes only 
understandable in the context of God’s revealing history with human beings. 
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Firstly, pastoral care has to focus on the whole human being as a unity of the body 
and the soul. Pastoral care draws on a biblical understanding of the soul, which 
implies the embodiment of human beings.236  
 
Secondly, based on intellectual history and popular belief, the term “soul” has been 
used ambiguously, being attached to the belief in the immortality of the soul which 
draws on the devaluation of embodiment. For this reason, pastoral care has to point 
towards the integrative unambiguousness of the biblical understanding of the soul 
and help to clarify differing understandings of the soul. No other term than the soul is 
suitable for expressing the religious dimension of the human existence based on a 
biblical and anti-dualistic understanding. The insecurity of theologians regarding the 
concept of “soul” lies in the intellectual historical alienation and transfiguration of the 
term.237 The term “soul” affords the theological chance of bringing the modern feeling 
of being pulled apart (Zerissenheit) in empiric graspable segments into a holistic 
human image. 
 
Thirdly, in so far as pastoral care offers help for the integration of embodiment and 
the soul in the own understanding of identity, clinical pastoral care, in particular, has 
to face eschatological questions concerning illness, dying and death. In those 
experiences (the crisis of one’s embodiment), the theme of a body-soul unity 
becomes of present interest. Facing the absoluteness of death, the radical fear of 
death has to be taken serious and should not be suppressed in terms of reducing 
death to the area of the body. This can be regarded rather as a way of strengthening 
identity crisis. 
  
In summary, pastoral care with its biblical foundation entails the care for the body 
and soul. Pastoral care only becomes relevant when not only the spiritual dimension 
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 Due to that unity, one can neglect the understanding of an “anima seperata”, which would lurk 
behind the term “Seel-Sorge”, that is, the care for a separated soul (Naurath 2000:42).  
237
 Likewise, modern sciences today assume that the body and the soul are an inseparable unity; 
therefore, theology and pastoral theology also have to work it out. 
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in human beings is addressed but the fact of human beings as a body-soul unity is 
also addressed (Naurath 2000:42-43). If one could add, the spiritual dimension in 
human beings in terms of their corporeality also needs to be acknowledged.238  
 
● Pastoral care as cura animarum  
The classical understanding of pastoral care as cura animarum describes care for 
the whole person from a spiritual perspective. For Louw, a more specific, non-
ambiguous understanding of pastoral care offers the phrase cura vitae. It directly 
refers to the healing of life without the reference to a possible exclusive substantial 
understanding of the soul (Louw 2007). Soul care refers to the healing of life and 
addresses humans in the centre of their existence, which is the faith relationship, or 
the dependence on God.239 From a pastoral perspective on embodiment and 
corporeality, the human soul is an integral part. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic 
based on a biblical understanding, the human soul is not solely part of the transient 
world, it is also concrete. 
 
Naurath examines the philosophical and theological history concerning the term 
“soul” and shows the actual inherence of the bodily dimension in the Protestant 
theological context. Even though Naurath (2006:23) attempts to differentiate 
between philosophy and the theological processes of thought in history, the 
portrayed interconnection between the history of theology and philosophy indicates 
that both have influenced and presupposed each other. The history of Christian 
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 According to Louw (1998:158), biblical realism describes and incorporates the ambivalence 
between our misery (sinful nature) and our new being (redeemed nature). See also Louw (2004:123) 
on the concept of a “realistic stance”. 
239
 I agree with Louw that when people “understand” the mechanics of the soul, they are more 
unlikely to experience a breakdown in internalizing stigma or less prone to stigmatizing others. How 
they orient themselves in situations reveals a specific stance, aptitude and attitude towards crises. 
Louw concretely identifies it thus: “One cannot change what befalls one, but one can indeed change 
one’s approach to the different happenstances of life. One’s approach reveals the quality of one’s 
soul” (Louw 2004:10). 
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doctrine shows that reflections on the soul had been greatly influenced by philosophy 
(Louw 2004:13).240  
 
The discussion of the conceptualisation of pastoral care is intrinsically linked to the 
biblical understanding of the soul.241 In order to understand the meaning of the term 
“soul”, the Hebrew Bible and New Testament’s perspectives are useful (Naurath 
2000:20). The Hebrew term vp,n<å (nèphèsh) has a broad meaning and shows the 
following characteristics.  
 
The human being is portrayed as an indivisible psychosomatic whole, which through 
God’s creation has become a human soul. Becoming a human soul (instead of 
receiving a soul) then means being vivid and becoming a person.242 To be a soul is 
first defined by the God-relationship. The term vp,n<å designates life energy and life 
affirmation, which essentially accompany the human being, even through pain and 
despair. It describes the wholeness of the human being. The human being in the Old 
Testament does not define himself or herself by a subject-object split; the term vp,n<å is 
not restricted to mind and thinking, but is an anthropological characteristic. The 
human being realises himself or herself in his/her own vividness and individuation 
from life. This life energy includes intellect, emotions, reason, and instinctual life. It 
points towards the whole human being in any situation; it may be in illness, lament, 
or praise in the experience of God’s blessing. The understanding of the soul also 
includes the bodily dimension;243 it does not presume the idea of an indestructible 
core that could exist separate from the body. Only later, under the influence of 
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 In particular, the aspect of subjectivity, individuality and self-awareness gradually surfaced in the 
discussions of the soul in the 19th and 20th centuries (Louw 2004:13). 
241
 This is highly regarded under the high relevancy of Scripture within the Protestant tradition. 
242
 The second creation report in Genesis (2:4b-25; cf. Gen 2:7) reads: “[T]hen the LORD God formed 
the man of dust from the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became 
a living creature”. 
243
 The bodily dimension of the vp,n<å has the basic meaning of “throat” as the organ for breathing and 
repleteness. It therefore points to the existential functions of vividness and personality. One can 
speak of a synthetic thinking, since the physical function and the organ are one. Hence, the bodily 
aspect of the biblical understanding of soul is not only obvious but also fundamental (Naurath 
2000:21).  
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Hellenistic-dualistic thinking, did some accents of a bodily division of the soul from 
the body after death appear (Naurath 2000:20).  
 
In the New Testament, the term yuch, (psuché) has a broad meaning. In line with the 
Hebrew term, the Greek term for living soul yuch, za,w  designates the vividness in the 
human being.244 It expresses the vitality closely linked with affects of the human 
being. Here, the soul is also connected with the bodily dimension and stands against 
a dualistic anthropology. Louw notes that in the New Testament, the soul is linked to 
the spirit pneu/ma (pneuma).245 Paul specifically draws this interconnectedness and 
refers to the “very unique relationship between God and human beings” when he 
discusses the spirit (Louw 2004:13). Both Louw and Naurath warn against regarding 
the New Testament in terms of a dualistic paradigm; likewise, one should not 
misinterpret Paul’s differentiation of life according to the spirit or the flesh.246 In 1 
Corinthians 15:35-49, Paul speaks of the resurrection in terms of the recreation of 
the sw/ma fully belonging to the pneu/ma. Louw also interprets 1 Thessalonians 5:23 in 
terms of a trichotomy of spirit, soul and body; that is, instead of a threefold division, 
“different perspectives within a unity” are meant (Louw 2004:13).247  
 
According to Paul, the human being is a body-soul unity, but there is no way of 
separating these perspectives of a human being. From this ambivalence in Scripture 
(described in terms of soul, spirit, body), Louw wonders how these three different 
perspectives help to understand and interpret the human being’s coram Deo position 
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 Additionally, Louw emphasises that both nèphèsh and psyché “refer to life and its quality” (see Mt 
16:25; John 15:13; Louw 2004:12). Especially note 1 Cor 15:45 “Thus it is written, ‘The first man 
Adam became a living being’; the last Adam became a life-giving spirit.” 
245
 The New Testament also sees the soul, post-mortem bodily. The platonic idea of freeing the 
immortal soul out of the bodily prison is foreign to the New Testament’s belief in the resurrection 
(Naurath 2000:22). 
246
 “sw/ma yuciko,j ist im Sinne des Paulus nicht vorzustellen als minderer materieller Leib, dem nach 
der Auferstehung ein feiner durchsichtiger oder sonstwie entmaterialisierter Geistleib folgt. Paulus 
redet in diesem Passus dualistisch, sofern er die totale Nichtidentität zwischen zwei 
Wesensbestimmtheiten darstellt, und undualistisch, sofern er das sw/ma nicht als Leib, dem der 
eigentliche Mensch gegenübersteht, versteht” (Schottroff, Luise (1970). Der Glaubende und die 
feindliche Welt. Beobachtungen zum gnostischen Dualismus und seiner Bedeutung für Paulus und 
das Johannesevangelium, in WMANT 37. Würzburg, in Naurath 2000:22). 
247
 Different anthropological categories are not meant; rather, an “eschatological understanding of the 
Kingdom of God and its implication for the new life in Christ” is implied (Louw 2004:13). 
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(Louw 1998:157). He notes that other sources claim that the “[s]oul therefore does 
not refer in the first place to a different anthropological category, but to a different 
mode of being” (Louw 2004:11). Louw departs from the basic assumption that the art 
of coping with life demands interlocks with the quality of the soul (soulfulness). The 
soul thus “designates a specific stance in life” and the “soul refers to a complexity of 
networking and systemic relationships” (Louw 2004:10).  
 
In systemic theories, the concept of soul is explained in terms of position and 
corporative structure. The healing of space is then related to “interconnectedness 
and relatedness, [to] presence, value, norms, meaning, perception and attitude” 
(Louw 2003:212). Louw further states that, “the space of the living God in this world 
is the space of Christ in our place (substitution)”. In a systemic approach, “to be 
healed” means to shift one’s position and attitude. Hence, it is about the “quality of 
being” that is also indicated in Louw’s understanding of “soulfulness” (Louw 
2004:16). Consequently, “if one can understand the complexity of soulfulness within 
the happenstances of life, one should be better equipped to cope” (Louw 2004:10).  
 
Further deriving from what has been said, the term “soul” never describes an 
immaterial substance and the Scripture’s view of the soul does not depart from a 
purely spiritualistic and immortal part of the human being. Naurath differs with Heino 
Sonnemans and remarks that the absence of a body-soul dualism leads neither to 
monism nor to an undifferentiated understanding of the human being. Rather, the 
influence of Hellenism on the Hebrew way of thinking since the 5th century BC had a 
sustaining influence on the Christian theological paradigm of the human being. With 
Naurath, an anti-dualistic critique of the theological use of the term, soul, implies that 
pastoral care has to integrate consciously the dimension of embodiment, without 
diminishing body-soul (Leib-Seele) or body-mind (Körper-Geist) differences (Naurath 
2000:42). From here, it becomes clear that the paradigm of the soul is of importance 
to any paradigm of pastoral care. 
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Related to the concept of the soul in a pastoral approach is the concept of attitude. 
For Louw, “attitude” (aptitude, habitus, position) indicates a mode of being, and is a 
qualitative concept related to meaning and the reality of the soul. The hermeneutics 
of soul and soulfulness is essential for the understanding of attitude. Louw (2004:11) 
notes that in this understanding and in working with the notion of position within a 
relational systems model, it is possible to approach a shift in the pathological state of 
affairs such as stigmatisation. 
 
This section has clarified the need to re-assess the human body from a theological 
and philosophical perspective. The embodiment addressed in pastoral care is a 
biblical category referring to a different mode of being. It incorporates different 
perspectives of the human being (i.e. spirit, soul and body) and even more, since it 
goes beyond the meaning of relation (systemic theories). Hence, in talking about 
soul and embodiment, we can speak of the embodiment of the human soul and the 
ensoulment of the human body. Likewise, related to the concept of soul in a pastoral 
approach is the concept of attitude (Louw 2004:111), which indicates a mode of 
being and is a qualitative concept. In what follows, I consider the approach of 
destigmatisation based on embodiment and inhabitation.  
 
 
2. TOWARDS A THEOLOGY OF EMBODIMENT 
 
2.1 Human embodiment in Pauline theology  
The theological understanding of Paul points the way for a Christian interpretation of 
human embodiment. Crucial for a pastoral hermeneutic of embodiment is the new 
perspective in the interpretation of Pauline theology.  
 
● The body in Pauline theology as a theme in New Testament theology 
Claudia Janssen provides an overview of the research on the body in Pauline 
theology and in the last century, Rudolf Bultmann’s work on the topic has had a 
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particularly lasting influence. Janssen criticizes the individualistic interpretation of 
sw/ma in Rudolf Bultmann’s work, claiming that it is limited (Janssen 2005:30). 
Broader dimensions than the individual have to be understood concerning the term 
sw/ma. The reference to history and the social field is important and is stressed by the 
new perspective in the interpretation of Pauline theology. In particular, S. Heine 
points out the necessity of taking society and ways of action into consideration in 
interpreting sw/ma Janssen also refers to the seeming meaninglessness of the 
physical body in Bultmann’s concept, which claims that humans have a body, but 
does not pay attention to the theological meaning of that physical body (Janssen 
2005:43) as done by Albert Schweitzer and John A.T. Robinson.248 
 
Janssen comments on the lack of clear assertions concerning the body, which is 
also prevalent in the discussion of the resurrection. Although it is stressed that the 
resurrection concerns the present life reality, understanding it and the consequences 
that the resurrection has for the present body and life praxis are, however, not clear 
(Janssen 2005:43).249   
 
Paul talks about the body in different layers of meaning. His body-talk is concrete, 
metaphorical and ultimately, theological (Janssen 2005:13). It is important to 
consider that people in the ancient world had a different view of being human and of 
individuality from today’s view. Moreover, in Hebrew, there is no word for either a 
                                           
 
248
 Robinson (quoted in Nelson 1978:50) observes that the concept of the body (soma) forms the 
cornerstone of Paul’s theology. According to him, “It is from the body of sin and death that we are 
delivered; it is through the body of Christ on the Cross that we are saved; it is into His body the 
Church that we are incorporated; it is by His body in the Eucharist that this community is sustained; it 
is in our body that its new life has to be manifested; it is to the resurrection of this body to the likeness 
of His glorious body that we are destined.” Robinson, J. A.T. (1952). The Body: A Study in Pauline 
Theology. London: SCM, 9. 
249
 In arguing for a new perspective, for example, regarding Jewish theology and eschatology, 
Janssen considers Albert Schweitzer’s view, and claims that the point of departure for Schweitzer is 
not anthropology but historical sciences. The emphasis is on the interpretation of Paul not being 
individualistic, but focussed on the question of how the promise to Israel shows them as a people who 
are included in the history of salvation (Janssen 2005:46). Other important researches include 
Sanders, P. (1977). Paul and Palestinian Judaism. A Comparison of Patterns of Religion. The new 
perspective in Pauline research is further clarified in the works of James G. Dunn; Heikki Räisänen; 
Nicolas T. Wright and Lloyd Gaston. Using different concepts, they deal with Paul’s view of Judaism, 
the inclusion of other peoples and the role of the Torah (Janssen 2005:46).   
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person or a body (Janssen 2005:20). In the New Testament, the word sw/ma stands 
not explicitly for the individual body, but also for the collective. In the centre of the 
theological exposition of Paul is the necessity to survive as well as experiences of 
joy and happiness. The biblical tradition, in which Paul stands, therefore, is 
especially interested in describing the eating, working, dying and anxious body 
(Janssen 2005:25).   
 
From the background of a Hebrew tradition, Paul refers to the body and single body 
parts for the purpose of theological coherence. Having faith, recognizing and fulfilling 
the commandments of the Torah, being in relation with God and other human 
beings, loving and caring – all these aspects are made distinct through the body. In 
that sense, the body becomes the place of God-relation. Janssen explains that the 
power of the Spirit flows into the hearts of human beings and makes their limbs work 
for justice (Janssen 2005:63). Hence, Paul’s use of body language makes the 
relational aspect of human beings towards each other and towards God visible, and 
gives rise to the possibility of transfering own experiences into what is said. One can 
argue that the heart of Paul’s theology in the New Testament, that is, God’s 
revelation and grace, is not understandable unless we first understand his 
presuppositions on anthropology. Important key terms which Paul uses are the 
Greek words sw/ma and sa,rx.  
 
The flesh sa,rx,,,    
In the Septuagint (LXX), the term, sa,rx is the translation of the Hebrew word rf'B'. 
This means “flesh” in its concrete physical sense and is used in reference to humans 
and animals. Simultaneously, it can refer to the whole human being, the body or a 
corpse. All human beings and everything alive are circumscribed with rf'B'. Further, 
the origin of illness and suffering lies in the “flesh”; relatives who have the same 
blood and sexual organs are regarded as the same. A man and a woman in one 
living community are also regarded as “one flesh”. In rf'B', human beings are 
appointed as creatures (in spite of their limitations and mortal dimension) as well as 
in being an expression of life (Janssen 2005:64). Paul uses the term in the contexts 
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of bodily need and misery250 and in the context of work and fight for survival in the 
face of experiences of violence and the threat of death (Janssen 2005:65).251  
 
Regarding sa,rx also James D.G. Dunn identifies a whole spectrum of meaning with 
varying interpretations for the term. The spectrum of the meaning of flesh ranges 
from denoting the physical body to the sphere of being opposite to God. One can 
distinguish between the expressions, “to live in the flesh” evn sarki, and “according to 
the flesh” kata. sa,rka. The latter can then be understood as the antithesis to Christian 
living. It can also characterise human weakness and the assertion that no sa,rx is 
justified before God (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:64).252 The variety of the spectrum 
becomes clearer when we consider Paul’s context of being a Hebrew in a Hellenistic 
world. In this sense, the idea of sa,rx as a material body reflects rather the Hebrew 
sense of rf'B'.  
In a different way, the idea of flesh as antagonistic to God is rather Hellenistic in 
character (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:62). There are conflicting views on the term, 
“flesh,” in scholarship. For R. Bultmann and E. Käsemann, “flesh and sin” are 
regarded as an entity.253 Janssen follows an interpretation of sa,rx which originates 
from the social history.254 She sees in Paul’s use the characteristic of sa,rx in 
                                           
 
250
 In the same way, Paul uses the term, sa,rx, created and corporative human being (2 Cor 12:7), to 
refer possibly to his own illness (Gal 4:13). He describes the Gestalt of a living creature parallel to 
sw/ma (1 Cor 15:39). “Flesh and blood” refers to groups of human beings (Gal 1:16; Mt 16:17; 1 Cor 
15:50); while descent or origin may be expressed in the phrase kata. sa,rka (Rom 1:3; 4:1; 9:3.5.8; 
Rom 11:14; Phlm 16). The phrase also stands for natural procreation because in sexual intercourse 
two human beings become one flesh (1 Cor 6:16; cf. Janssen 2005:65). 
251
 Compare also 2 Cor 10:3; Phill 1:22.24; 1 Cor 7:28; Gal 2:20. The experience of exhaustion and 
hopelessness is perceivable in 2 Corinthians 4:7-18. In verse 7, Paul describes his persecution and 
the despair he experiences. The experiences go beyond his individual (he uses the first person in 
plural). Paul sets his own and the suffering of others in the communities in relation to the suffering and 
death of Jesus. What serves as encouragement for them is the resurrection (2 Cor 4:14; cf. also 
Janssen 2005:65). 
252
 Dunn, J. D. G.  (1998) The Theology of Paul the Apostle. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 
253
 This understanding which includes the devaluation of sa,rx as being sinful and in moral categories 
has been regarded often as critical in research. Daniel Boyarin, for example, concedes this 
understanding of sa,rx to the Lutheran understanding of sin, but not to Paul’s (cf.Boyarin, D. (1997). 
Art: Resurrection, in Encyclopaedia Judaica, 4. Aufl., Jerusalem, 98-103, 83-84; cf. also critics in a 
Lutheran interpretation of Paul, in Stendahl, K. (1978). Der Jude Paulus und wir Heiden. Anfragen an 
das abendländische Christentum, München; (1996). Der Apostel Paulus und das “introspective” 
Gewissen des Westens, in Ku I Heft 1, 19-33; in Janssen 2005:67). 
254
 This refers to life under the Pax Romana at that time. 
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connection with the vulnerability of human beings. The consequence is that the 
power of harmatia (e.g. the influence of the politics of that time) manifests itself in 
their bodies, their flesh, their action and even their thinking (Janssen 2005:69). Σa,rx, 
in this meaning, is the place of the social experience of violence.  
 
Paul encourages people not to give up on themselves in spite of their feelings of 
helplessness and the power of sin manifested in the structures around them. Rather, 
they should orientate their lives according to love avga,ph and the power of the spirit 
πνεῦμα (Janssen 2005:69; cf. also Gal 5:13). Paul expresses both aspects with the 
word sa,rx. On the one hand, all creation is related to God, and on the other hand, is 
distant from God, with the societal and social consequences. In this way, he shows 
the intertwinedness of the individual human being and his or her action with the 
structures of society (Janssen 2005:69).  
 
Subsequently, sa,rx does not stand solely for a sphere of distance from God, but 
simultaneously, sa,rx  is the concrete place, where the consequences of society 
which is distanced from God and its power structures become perceptible. Σa,rx 
describes the vulnerability of human beings, as well as the ongoing circle of violence 
and death, experienced bodily. Janssen (2005:70) formulates it clearly thus: “The 
injuries and hurts, which are the traces of violence, and and unjust supremacy, are 
written in the ‘flesh’” (cf. 2 Cor 4:7-18; 1 Cor 15:31). It is interesting that in Galatians 
6:17, Paul uses instead the word sw/ma to end his letter. This brings us right into the 
heart of his theology: “From now on let no one cause me trouble, for I bear on my 
body the marks ta. sti,gmata  of Jesus.” 
Inevitably, we are involved with sa,rx  due to our human constitution, being vulnerable 
to discrimination, violence and death; yet being gifted with a new bodily-self, marks 
remain.  
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The body (Körper und Leib) - sw/ma///  
Paul’s spectrum concerning sw/ma refers to the human body, to the “body of Christ”, 
and once to the celestial body (1 Cor 15:40).255 Paul describes the concrete human 
body as sw/ma, when he writes about his own body and about punishing himself (1 
Cor 9:27); the same body he wants to hand over to the fire to be burnt at the stake (1 
Cor 13:3). It is also with that body he stands in the congregation (1 Cor 5:3), and the 
same body, he refers to as “weak” (2 Cor 10:10; cf. Janssen 2005:71). His mention 
of, ta. sti,gmata, the marks of Jesus on his body, can be associated with the scars on 
his body due to his persecution (cf. Gal 6:12-14; 2 Cor 4:10). At the same time, they 
might be understood, metaphorically, because he compares them as “stigmata” or 
“signs” of Jesus with the circumcision of the “flesh” (cf. Gal 6:13). Σw/ma therefore 
designates the degraded and humiliated body in its total existence (cf. Phil 3:21), as 
well as the transformed body, for which the suffering, men and women, are yearning 
(cf. Rom 8:23; Janssen 2005:72). Recreation is inseparably connected with the hope 
dimension. 
 
In another use of the term, sw/ma, Paul describes those bodies that are determined 
by the power of God’s Spirit, that is, sw/ma pneumatiko,n (Janssen 2005:71ff.; cf. 1 Cor 
15:44). The individual bodily being is not to be separated from the participation in the 
σῶμα Χριστοῦ (1 Cor 12:13). The human bodies shall glorify God through their 
bodily existence (1 Cor 6:20; Phil 1:20). In this case, the close relation between 
human bodies and the presence of God is stressed. By the gift of the Spirit, human 
bodies are sanctified and do already participate in the reality of the new creation, that 
is, embodiment (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; cf. Janssen 2005:73).256  
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 Few examples of the use of the term, sw/ma, are “the body of sin” and “the body of death” (Rom 6:6; 
7:24); Christ’s body of flesh (Col 1:2; 2:11); the resurrected body (1 Cor 15:44), the church as the 
body of Christ (e.g. Rom 12:4-5). 
256
 Janssen remarks that in the verses she examined, she could not recognise that Paul describes 
sw/ma as a bodily substance, which stands materially opposite to soul and spirit. Σa,rx stands for the 
whole human being in his or her capability for relationships, which is manifested bodily. Interestingly, 
Janssen notes that only in 1 Thess 5:23 is there a division of the human body in pneu/ma, yuch. and 
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Hence, for Paul, the “body of Christ” (as a spiritual and ecclesial concept) is at least 
as much in the foreground as the concrete body. The σῶμα Χριστοῦ is central 
because in it the “resurrected body” finds expression in the world. In Christ, human 
beings become participants of the “new creation” (2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; cf. Rom 6:4). 
The consequence of being in Christ is that people participate in the sanctity of life, 
which includes their bodies and what they do with their bodies. At the same time, 
being in Christ is the foundation for responsibility and integrity of “the body” (1 Cor 
6:12-20).257 The close and existential relation of human beings with the life, dying 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ, which they experience within their own bodies,258 
allows them to live from the power of resurrection, now; and they hope for the total 
transformation of their degraded bodies, then (Phil 3:20ff; Rom 8:29). Here lies the 
reason why the behaviour of the single members of the body towards other members 
and towards their own bodies is of so much importance. In them the new life “in 
Christ” is taking place (Rom 6:13.15; 11:27.29), which is the realization of the 
change of regiments, that empowers the individual human being to act in solidarity 
and live in mutually giving relation (Gal 3:28; cf. Janssen 2005:75).  
 
For Dunn, Paul’s use of sw/ma includes the physical body, and more, hence, the use 
of the alternative term embodiment. The body, sw/ma, as the personal embodiment of 
the person denotes a relational concept, since Paul uses it extensively as a model of 
human co-operation and interrelationship. Dunn asserts that Paul’s distinction “made 
possible a positive affirmation of human creatureness and of the interdependence of 
humanity within its created environment” (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:73). His use 
enforces the concept of embodiment in its importance. With Dunn, one can say that 
the “body” or “embodiment” denotes a being in the world, whereas the “flesh” 
denotes belonging to the world, but importantly, the flesh should not be 
misinterpreted as being devalued. 
                                                                                                                                   
 
sw/ma, which points to a trichtonomological anthropology that stands in contrast to Paul’s 
understanding of the body as examined in other verses (Janssen 2005:73). 
257
 Through baptism, people become a part of the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:12, 27). In the Eucharist, 
participation in the body and blood is represented (Janssen 2006:74).  
258
 Here I refer to both sw/ma and sa,rx (cf. 2 Cor 4:10; Rom 6:10.) 
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Aspects of dualism 
As mentioned above, the main problem with the translation of sw/ma into German is 
that the term can refer to two clearly different concepts, Leib and Körper. Janssen 
refers to R. Ammicht-Quinn259, who closes her examination of the recent theological 
Leib-Körper discussion with the remark that the material aspect of the body which is 
represented in Körper carries basically a moral blemish (Janssen 2005:26). The 
theological use of the body in Körper stresses the concrete material dimension of 
human life, while in the use of Leib the same aspect is missing. Even in terms of a 
biblical argumentation, in which Leib and soul are seen as analogous, Leib is 
mentioned with great respect and it is far from sin. Janssen points out that there is a 
little crack of a door left open for dualism, since Leib is not to be mixed up with 
Körper (Janssen 2005:26).260  
 
Despite the warning against reading Paul and the New Testament dualistically 
(Naurath 2006:21; Nelson 1978:50), dualistic tendencies in our interpretations are 
there, where there is differentiation between the body as Leib and the material 
conditions of the physical life; namely the split of the flesh sa,rx from the bodily 
existence (leiblich) (Janssen 2005:44). 
 
One also has to recognise the narrowness of the term Leib. The theme of 
Leiblichkeit has to take into account the concrete and ambivalent experiences of 
human beings within their bodies as well, in order to offer a holistic description of 
being human. This problem is avoided in the English word, body, which includes 
both Leib and Körper. One the other hand, both terms in their variety and richness 
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 Ammicht-Quinn, R. (2002) (ed). The Body and Religion. London: SCM Press 
260
 In the same way, the result of Christl Maier’s work, which shows in her exemplary exegesis of 
Psalm 139 how the function of the body is constituted in relationships, is remarkable. This function is 
expressed by the human as well as the divine body. Maier discusses capability and need for the 
relations which lie in concepts of the body “Leiblichkeit”. (Christl Maier (2003). Beziehungsweisen. 
Körperkonzept und Gottesbild in Ps 139, in Körperkonzepte im Ersten Testament. Aspekte einer 
Feministischen Anthropologie, Hedwig-Jahnow-Forschungsprojekt, Stuttgart u.a., 174, in Janssen 
2005:26). 
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have to be explicit in the explanation of body and embodiment as they are used 
here.261 
 
On Janssen’s part, one can conclude that, for Paul, bodily existence is never 
isolated, but is always in relation to God, other human beings and creation. It is 
important to note that, for Paul, the life of human beings happens in a fleshly body. 
The measure for life is given by the Torah (Rom 3:31; 7:12; 8:4). Paul is not 
interested in separate parts of the body; instead, his focus is on the function and the 
specific aspects they embody (Janssen 2005:82).262 
 
Further, Pauline theology may not be separated from its social and political context. 
This explains why Paul’s language, on the one hand, is characterised by the 
experience of violence and death, and on the other hand, the experience of life and 
solidarity. His own experiences and those of the people around him serve as the 
point of departure for his comments on the body. The bodies he knows (and to which 
he counts himself) are abused, tortured, whipped, raped, enslaved, freezing, hungry, 
and anxious bodies (2 Cor 4:7-18; 11:20-33; cf. Janssen 2005:82).  
  
With the help of the term sw/ma Paul shows the close relation of human bodies to 
Jesus Christ, who as a human being went through the same experiences of suffering 
as they do, and who now, as the resurrected, constitutes the congregation of 
believers, the σῶμα Χριστοῦ. This body (the church of Christ) is more than a 
metaphor for Paul, because it describes the presence of the resurrected, which 
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 With the consideration that the theological tradition in using the term Leib has pushed a form of 
dualism between spiritual existence (leiblich) and material (körperlich) existence, C. Janssen prefers 
to deal with Körper as the translation of sw/ma in order to ask if both aspects have been considered. At 
the centre of her reflection is the relation between body, death and survival/life (Janssen 2005:28).  
262
 From the writings of Paul, one can relate to the social, historical, religious and cultural background 
of the people of his time. Again, the content of 1 Cor 15 stands in the context of a dialogue with 
people about their conflicts and anxieties concerning their bodies, life, dying and resurrection 
(Janssen 2005:29). Paul’s answers based on contemporary anthropological premises, culturally 
characterise understandings of embodiment, biblical views of embodiment and his own experiences 
and those of the people around him. Paul’s theology is highly relational (he sees humans as social 
beings), and rather practical than speculative (Dunn, in Janssen 2005:53). 
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becomes a new identity for the believer, and is therefore concrete (Janssen 
2005:82).  
 
For a further perspective of Pauls’ body theology I shall here refer to Lorscheid’s 
investigation of Scheler’s work, in which the dualistic aspect shifts to the background 
(Wesenseidologie, a phenomenological method) as already mentioned above. In his 
philosophical reflection of the being structure of embodiment, Scheler considers the 
difference between “Körper” und “Leib”, but further identifies the ‘Leibphenomenon’ 
(Leibphänomen). Since he distinguishes between “Leibbody” (Leibkörper), “Leibsoul” 
(Leibseele), and “Leib” itself (the latter is a “mental-physical non-deviant 
phenomenon),”263 he defines “Leiblichkeit” in a phenomenological sense as a 
category, which is, apriori, consciously externally and internally perceivable for the 
Leibconsciousness.264 An external view describes the “Leibbody”, while an internal 
point of view regards the “Leibsoul”. It is important to note that the Leib is much more 
fundamental for both; that is what Scheler calls the “Urphenomenon” (Lorscheid 
1962:29). 
 
Hence, for Scheler, the qualitative structure of embodiment (des Leiblichen) is 
crucial. He prefers to uncover the constituents of the embodied being and he 
develops a concept via the specific way of looking at reality and identifying the actual 
Leib.265  
 
2.2 Embodiment within an eschatological approach  
Does an understanding of the human person in terms of personality [stigma] and 
physicality [embodiment] suffice for a pastoral anthropology, or is the human person 
a spiritual being with a transcendental destiny? (Louw 1998:157)  
So far, the discussion has touched aspects of personality (stigma), physicality and 
embodiment of the human being in the context of pastoral anthropology. Next, I shall 
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 The original is, “ein psychophysisch indifferentes Phänomen” (Lorscheid 1962:29). 
264
 See also Louw’s distinction between the “external and internal person“(Louw 1998:163). 
265
 Lorscheid speaks of “eidetisch-reduzierender Erkenntniseinstellung”, from which Scheler obtains 
his “Wesenseideologie des Leiblichen” (Lorscheid 1962:10). 
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refert to the phenomenon of stigmatisation from the perspective of eschatology. The 
quest for the wholeness of the human being is oriented in pneumatology. The Spirit 
of God is, both, the gift to human beings now in the context of their time, and the 
eschatological new creating power, through which God allows creation to participate 
in eternal life in the thereafter (Härle 1999:636). 
 
Being human means being embodied in the world. Therefore, the question of 
embodiment (which implies human corporeality) is interlinked with the human being’s 
calling in the world; coram Deo. 
 
● Created in the image of God 
In the Christian understanding, the world has been created by God. It is the work and 
result of God’s creative involvement.266 Theologically, therefore, it is appropriate to 
ask what the expression of creation reveals about the relationship between God and 
human beings, and how the relationship is qualified (Härle 2000:410). In that 
understanding, the term “creation” can refer to the act of creating as well as the 
result of creating, namely all that was created. The Christian worldview is primarily 
interested in the element of the relationship that is connected to the “created world” 
(Härle 2000:411). Theological anthropology refers to philosophical anthropology and 
the results of biological, sociological, psychological and pedagogical anthropologies. 
The specific contribution of theology is that it reflects on the human being and his or 
her calling through God taking into account the philosophical and human sciences. 
At the centre of theological anthropology is therefore the question of the divine 
calling of the human being (Härle 2000:430). 
 
The creation and calling of the human being is the most decisive theological 
assertion about the human being.267 The human being, through creation and calling, 
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 The world as creation is creatio ex nihilio. The world is unique and created out of nothingness 
(Härle 2000:409). 
 
  
 
 
111
is in a certain outstanding relation to God.268 It is important to note that there is 
nothing in or about the human being, which makes him or her to be the image of God 
(not the bodily shape, the upright walk, the spirit nature, responsiveness, two sexes, 
or the order for dominion).269 Rather, altogether, human beings’ existence in the face 
of God and in relation to God is what determines being created in the image of God. 
This calling is given in the being in the world of human beings and in meeting up with 
this calling by living a life of justice (Härle 2000:435).270  
 
Being created in the image of God, therefore, entails the relation of God to humanity 
and, on the other hand, the relation of human beings to God (Moltmann 1985:226). 
From the point of view of God’s relation to the human being, being the creature does 
not solely lie in specific characteristics but in the whole being of humans (in seinem 
ganzen Dasein).271 It should be clear that the human being does not have the image 
of God as a characteristic or a part of his or her being. Rather, the image of God is 
the promised, intended, and expected calling of God for love (Härle 2000:437). 
                                                                                                                                   
 
267
 Important biblical assertions concerning the human being as the image of God are found in Ps 8 
and Gen 1:26. (Other references to the image of God include Gen 5:1; 9:6; 1 Cor 11:7; Col 3:10 and 
Jam 3:9; cf. also Härle 2000:434). 
268
 This relation is expressed through the Hebrew terms zelem and d’mu” (Grk. ei;kw and o`moi,wma; 
Lat. imago and similitude). According to Irenäus of Lyon, two separate human conditions can be 
understood. On the one hand, there is the remaining creative equipment of the human being in terms 
of reason and will, and on the other hand, there is the analogy of human beings within the will of God, 
which was the original status of perfection (“status integritatis”) that was lost because of the Fall. 
Nowadays, one commonly agrees that both terms, zelem and d’mut, do not describe two separate 
entities; rather they describe two mutual rapprochements (Härle 2000:435). 
Moreover, Moltmann sees the heavy influence of substance ontology in the theological tradition, 
which has shaped the understanding of human beings as being created in the image of God. In terms 
of the soul, the human nature is characterised by reason and will because the soul was said to be 
immortal and of divine nature. A second argument lies in the Gestalt analogy which is based on the 
human beings’ upright walk and fixing their gaze above. A third perspective is opened up according to 
the analogy of proportionality in that human dominion over the earth is proportional to God’s reign on 
the earth. Finally, in line with Moltmann (1985:226), in the analogy of relation, the human being is 
created in the image of God as male and female (which relates to the inner Trinitarian community of 
God).  
269
 Louw notes that being created in the image of God implies respondability and responsibility (Louw 
1998:151; 155ff.). 
270
 Human beings can deny and contradict their calling due to their freedom, but they have not lost 
their calling even after the Fall (Härle 2000:435). 
271
 “Der ganze Mensch, nicht nur seine Seele; die wirkliche menschliche Gemeinschaft, nicht nur die 
einzelne Person; die mit der Natur verbundene Menschheit, nicht nur die der Natur 
gegenübertretenden Menschen sind Bild und Ehre Gottes“. Moltmann also argues against the 
physiognomy of human beings concerning the image of God. The eschatological providence of 
human beings being created in the image of God can be recognised in the “face-to-face” notion. 
Physically, the face becomes the mirror of God (Moltmann 1985:227). 
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● God’s image and the HIV and AIDS pandemic 
Stigma has been associated with being wounded, and being vulnerable as part of 
the human constitution. There can be wounds or stigmata on the body and in the 
body.272 Another conception is that in stigma the characteristic “vulnerability of God” 
finds expression. The meaningful symbolic “different nature” (of God’s being-with) in 
which God acts, finds manifestation and reaches its climax in the stigma of Jesus’ 
death on the cross. The resultant paradox stands in contrast to human expectations. 
Instead of transcendence, this event reveals God’s condescendence. In a unique 
and actually unmistakable way, God expresses his innermost quality in being with 
the humble and wounded (Louw 2004). The experience of being different as a point 
of departure is at the heart of Christian theology. Being different is now defined from 
the perspective of God’s work in Christ (eschatological perspective).   
 
Hence, the deviant person is not defined by his status (social, health status) but by 
his relationship within God. God’s condescendence finally reaches those who defy 
all expecations - the humble, and those who experience their weaknesses. In the 
case of HIV and AIDS pandemic, not only is the “human body” afflicted physically, 
but the HIV/AIDS-related stigma also afflicts “human embodiment,” individually and 
socially, in a mistakeable moral sense, which is actually immoral. In the same way, 
healing in the form of destigmatisation is only possible through human embodiment 
(reconciliation and sanctification) which is qualified by the God relationship and 
inhabitation of the Spirit.   
 
According to John, the evangelist, the incarnation of Jesus is not the only fulfilment 
of God’s faithfulness273 and his death on the cross is not the end. Jesus’ death 
stands for a new beginning, through which the resurrection of all human beings, 
                                           
 
272
 Ackerman also mentions stories “about the body” and “stories in the body”. The latter can be 
understood as stories internalized in one’s body and, therefore, in one’s embodied being. In the 
present context, a story may refer to our being wounded (Ackermann 2003:69), for example, stories 
referring to the stigmatised body or the internalized stigma in a Narrative aproach in Pastoral Therapy.  
273
 See also Jhn 16:7; 17:4. 
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which are followers of Christ, becomes a possibility. In terms of the Gospel, suffering 
and stigma are closely connected to the gift of the Holy Spirit.274 Nevertheless, the 
question for the meaning in suffering needs to be raised. 
 
● Eschatological dimension 
Moltmann explains that the restitution or recreation of human beings being created in 
the image of God happens in the faith relationship of the believer with Christ. Since 
Christ Jesus is the messianic imago Dei, believers become the imago Christ and 
through Him, they are on the way to becoming the Gloria Dei on the earth (cf. Rom 
8:29). It is God who creates the believer according to the image of the Son, as Paul 
states in Romans 8:30: “And those whom he predestined he also called, and those 
whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified.”  
 
Through grace and God’s justification, the sinner again becomes the image of God 
on the earth. Nevertheless, glorification is futuristic, because it lies in “the 
redemption of our bodies” (Rom 8:23), which is the “[transformation of] our lowly 
body to be like his glorious body” (Phil 3:21). Hence, justification is the present 
beginning of a futuristic perfection of justification. Both happened due to God’s 
choice by grace, due to the creator’s faithfulness.  
 
Between justification and glorification of the justified human being in the future, 
stands the way of sanctification, which happens by putting on the new human being 
as written in Ephesians 4:24: “[a]nd to put on the new self, created after the likeness 
of God in true righteousness and holiness.” Similarly, Colossians 3:10 states: “And 
have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of its 
creator”. 
                                           
 
274
 “Der Zusammenhang von Liebe und Leiden, der sich vom Kreuz Christi her auftut, könnte das 
Tragfähigste sein, was vom Christlichen Glauben her zur Realität des (physischen) Übels in der 
Schöpfung zu sagen ist“ (Härle 2000:450). Herein lies the basis of the Christian hope concerning 
suffering in this world and time, and the emphasised notion of God’s co-suffering and presence (Härle 
2000:450).   
  
 
 
114
 
Being created in the image of God, according to the Scripture, is charisma, task, and 
hope - indicative and imperative at the same time (Moltmann 1985:232). To be 
human means becoming human in the historical process. The image of God is here 
the whole, embodied human being - the human being in community, not excluded or 
excluding. This is because human beings in the messianic community with Christ 
become whole, embodied and societal human beings, whom death cannot split 
(body and soul) anymore or tear apart from God. To be human in this way means to 
live in the process of resurrection. In the resurrection process, one can experience 
oneself wholly, embodied and socially accepted/accepting and at the same time 
demanded and relieved (Moltmann 1985:233).  
 
The messianic calling leads human beings into eschatological history of recreation: 
from calling to justification, from justification to sanctification, and from sanctification 
to glorification (Moltmann 1985:234).275 Eschatology becomes then the schemata of 
interpretation and the frame of reference for being a Christian. The understanding of 
human embodiment in an eschatological perspective is pointed out by Paul. 
 
 
3. TOWARDS A THEOLOGICAL PROCESS OF DESTIGMATISATION 
From Paul’s body theology, it can be inferred that the whole human being is affected 
by the reality of the cross and the resurrection. How are being and becoming whole 
possible, and what is the place of stigma in these?  
“When the perishable puts on the imperishable, and the mortal puts on 
immortality, then shall come to pass the saying that is written: ‘Death is 
swallowed up in victory’" (1 Cor 15:54).  
                                           
 
275
 The eschatological notion of becoming like God (Gott-gleich-werden) in human beings is rooted in 
the term, “looking”. Because looking at the face of God, that is, how God is, makes the viewer to be 
looked at, and allows him to participate in the life and aesthetics of God (Moltmann 1985:234).  
See 1 Cor 13:12: For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I 
shall know fully, even as I have been fully known. See also 1 John 3:2: Beloved, we are God's 
children now, and what we will be has not yet appeared; but we know that when he appears we shall 
be like him, because we shall see him as he is. 
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Being and becoming whole in terms of recreation through the Spirit of God enables 
stigma to become charisma. 
 
3.1 The Christological perspective 
According to Louw (2000:99), essentially, a theology of the cross is pastorally 
structured since in the cross, God deals with human guilt, conquers death and 
enables a new relationship with God and oneself. In what follows, the Christological 
aspects relating to the cross, the theology of the cross and the paradox of the cross 
will be examined amongst other issues. 
 
The New Testament entails as much as the reign of God, healing, the justice of God, 
or reconciliation (Härle 2000:304). To express the notion to. euvagge,lion in the Old 
Testament Hebrew and the profane Hellenistic Greek was meant to be a “message 
of victory”, or “the wage for a good news” (Strecker 1992:177).276 The meaning of  to. 
euvagge,lion in the New Testament is more specific. It designates the news of God and 
by God. Although it is understood as the “good news”, it contains both grace and 
judgment (Rom 2:16; Rev 14:6; cf. Strecker 1992:177).  
 
There is a gap opened up by the paradox that to. euvagge,lion in the New Testament is 
also connected to poverty, lowliness, and even to the shame of dying the death of a 
criminal (Härle 2000:304). The euvagge,lion of Jesus Christ is a possible ska,ndalon of 
which one may be ashamed of (Rom 1:16; 1 Cor 1:18-2:5); the same is valid for its 
content and the addressee of to. euvagge,lion . It is the promise of healing for those 
who are lost and the election of those who count least in the world (Lk 15; 1 Cor 
1:26-29; cf. Härle 2000:304). 
 
                                           
 
276
 Earlier, it was connected to the cult of the Emperor Caesar, being associated with the power of the 
Emperor and his lordship (Strecker 1992:177). 
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What we know about the person and the work of Jesus Christ is taken from the 
synoptic tradition of the Gospel and the letters of Paul. As a person on the earth, he 
was a preacher and a healer at the same time. For Paul, Jesus is the crucified,277 
who died and was buried.278 Additonally, Jesus is the person whom God has 
raised.279 According to Paul, the assertions about Jesus stand in relation to the 
human being; hence, the understanding that Jesus died “for us”.  
 
Likewise, his resurrection is to be understood as a process, which includes those 
who believe in Christ (Janssen 2005:76).280 It is also valid that in the Christian belief 
God has revealed himself as love in the person of Jesus Christ (Härle 2000:305). 
Further, the cross becomes the expression and tool for connecting the loving God 
and the sinful human being without being identified with both (Slenczka 1994:1752). 
 
Theologically, one can differentiate between the meaning of healing in the work and 
fate of Christ, on the one hand (de opere/munere Christi), and the person, on the 
other hand (de persona Christi). Protestant Christology also makes a distinction 
between different states of the Christ (de statibus Christi), that is, between 
humiliation (exinanitio) and raising “exaltation” (Härle 2000:306).281 Even though a 
distinction exists, it is important to keep an eye on the unity between the work and 
the person of Christ (Härle 2000:306).282  
 
● Estrangement and alienation - paradox of the cross 
“For the word of the cross is folly to those who are perishing, but to us who are being 
saved it is the power of God” (1 Cor 1:18).  
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 Cf. 1 Cor2:2; 2 Cor 13:4; Gal 3:1; Phill 2:8. 
278
 Cf. Rom 6:4; 8:34; 14:9; 1 Cor 8:11; 15:3.  
279
 Cf. Rom 6:9; 7:4; 8:34; 10:9; 1 Cor 15:5;12.21; 2 Cor 4:14.  
280
 Cf. 2 Cor 5:15 and Phil 3:9-11. 
281
 The differentiation of the “states” is not on the same level as the differentiation between the person 
and the work of Christ; rather, they refer primarily to the doctrine of the person and, secondarily, to the 
doctrine of His work (Härle 2000:306).   
282
 Christology deals with Jesus as the Christ (Messias, the Anointed One) in its salvific meaning. The 
title has the important function of keeping alive the continuity with the Jewish context, which was 
Jesus’ origin, and wherein he was active. In this title, the special meaning is expressed in the form of 
a confession that Jesus is “the Christ” (Mt 16:16; cf. Härle 2000:305).    
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This verse of Paul’s is characterised by an inherent opposition; because the world 
does not recognise the word of the cross as God’s power and wisdom, God and the 
world have to be constructed as being in opposition here. Paul does not talk of 
human wisdom because the word of the cross, according to human measures, 
remains folly even for the believer. In this sense, it is God’s wisdom which remains 
secret (cf. 1 Cor 2:7). Paul’s statement on “God’s power” is based on the connection 
to “being saved”. Since faith springs from the saving power of God, its perfection 
cannot be human wisdom or realization. The word of the cross sets humans in the 
position of choice whether one accepts the foolishness of this word as the power of 
God or not (Merklein 1992:178). In the HIV and AIDS context of suffering and the 
dilemma of stigma, the why-question belongs in the sphere of the paradox. Likewise, 
the possibility that stigma becomes charisma is the paradox per se. 
 
● Theology of the cross - a systematic theological sketch 
According to Michael Korthaus, the terminus technicus, theologia crucis, unites 
diverse concepts. Thus, one cannot speak of ‘the’ theologia crucis. Korthaus 
examined several designs of a theologia crucis.283 Commonly, they are determined 
by their reference to the loci classicus of theologia crucis, which are the first and 
second chapters of Paul’s letter to the Corinthians, and Martin Luther’s Thesis 19 
and 20 of the Heidelberger Disputation (Korthaus 2005:363). Hence, the concept 
itself is rooted in the theology of Paul, and later in Luther’s theology. Luther’s 
qualification of the formula sets the foundation for dealing with a theologia crucis in 
the 20th century. 
 
In this sense, working with the idea of a theologia crucis is in itself a hermeneutical 
undertaking (that is, in reference to the theologies of Paul and Luther). A 
characteristic of any theologia crucis is that in its attempt to explain the reality of the 
cross either in a systematic abstract design or in a specific context, it simultaneously 
fulfills the word of the cross, because the reflection process wants to undergo the 
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 An in-depth study of the history and content of the terminus technicus theologia crucis is offered by 
Michael Korthaus in his work, Kreuzestheologie (2005), Mohr Siebeck: Tübingen.  
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folly of the cross by explicating it. Korthaus explains the paradox in the sense that a 
theology of the cross breaks into itself, at the same moment, it wants to interpret and 
open up the word of the cross (Korthaus 2005:364). Hence, any attempt to work out 
a theologia crucis is folly because it wants to undergo the character of the 
foolishness of the message of the cross (1 Cor 1:22).  
 
Nevertheless, the paradox is constituted in that a theologia crucis has to claim to be 
an appropriate way of talking about salvation as constituted by God. If theologia 
crucis would resist being broken, then it would become a theologia gloriae. This 
refers to a human undertaking under the sign of the cross which does not want to 
become affected by God who gives and takes life (Korthaus 2005:364f). The 
paradox of the cross resists any approach; therefore, it remains a hermeneutical 
undertaking to explicate the life reality concerning (HIV and AIDS) stigma and 
embodiment. 
 
● Theologia crucis as a critique of a theologia gloriae 
The current tragedy in the HIV and AIDS context challenges (pastoral) theology to 
offer clear answers regarding the meaning and significance of human life. 
Nonetheless, theology has to resist the optimism and the danger of a theologia 
gloriae (Louw 2006:1). For the latter, it is constitutive that God is the “embodiment” of 
positive predicates and stands for omnipresence, omnipotence and omniscience. In 
contrast, a theologia crucis sees in the cross of Christ the place of God’s self-
definition in expressing himself as the one who makes human suffering and the 
human condition his own. A theologia crucis identifies human suffering and being 
distant from God as the place where God’s being with the human being is only 
accessible by trusting in the faithfulness of God (Slenczka 1994:1752). The WCC 
Report states “that we do not ‘posses’ the truth but are constantly to search for God’s 
will in a changing world” (WCC 1997:4).  
 
Theologia crucis, from this point of view, opposes theologia gloriae. (Korthaus 
2005:366). On the one hand, the argument against any power turns human life in the 
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direction of untruthfulness, bondage and hopelessness and, therefore, destroys 
human life. A theology of the cross instead does always articulate anew the radical 
argument and the question of power and talk about God (Korthaus 2005:367). On 
the other hand, a theology of the cross articulates God’s argument, which happened 
in the death of Jesus on the cross against the sin of human beings. The latter is the 
actual theological layer, from which a theologia crucis can then be unfolded 
(Korthaus 2005:367). Sin then represents the general condition of human beings; sin 
rules their thinking, their volition, and their actions. Since human life is an embodied 
life, besides discussing sin in an abstract manner, it is necessary to articulate the 
symptoms of sin in their ever-changing relations of existence. Consequently, the 
connection to theological anthropology is made. 
Furthermore, Korthaus argues for the interpretation of a soteriological understanding 
of a theology of the cross in concrete situations. Connected to such an interpretation 
is therefore the pneumatic visualization of the word of the cross (Korthaus 
2005:367).  
 
Louw opts for a Christology from below, in which God’s condescendence and the 
unity between Christ’s divinity and humanity are stressed, rather than God’s 
transcendence and the differentiation between divinity and humanity. For Louw 
(2000:108), “[t]he contribution of a theology of the cross is that it enables what could 
be called a ‘hermeneutics of the cross’ from below”. The cross, therefore, is about 
God’s identification with human misery and that identification discloses the being of 
God. Louw explains that, “a theology of below thinks in terms of relationality and is 
interested primarily in God’s passibility and identification” (Louw 2000:109).  
 
● Cross and the HIV and AIDS-related stigma 
A realistic view of the HIV/AIDS pandemic does not ignore the reality of suffering and 
evil. Louw asserts that theology cannot ignore judgment and sin. Nonetheless, 
concerning the pandemic, we have to get rid of the stigma that ‘HIV is the sinner’s 
disease’ because such an understanding falls short of evidence and deeper 
meaning, and theology should advocate for the final word of God’s grace and 
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salvation (Louw 2006:4). Obviously, the notion of death is inherent since in the 
context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, people are exposed to devastating suffering due 
to HIV and HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation, which is a form of death manifested 
in rejection.284 Death does not only imply the physical extinction of life; it entails 
much more, especially in the context of the HIV pandemic, “death refers to the 
destruction of relationships, i.e. human beings’ exposure to loneliness, isolation, 
rejection and loss” (Louw 2004:2).285 Further, Louw agrees with Kierkegaard that 
when death is the greatest danger, then one hopes simultaneously for life (Louw 
2004:2).286 
 
●The paradigm of sin and death 
The death of Jesus on the cross was meant to be a cursed death (Gal 3:13). The 
object of a theologia crucis makes this objectionable death and distance from God, 
part of the news from Christ’s rising from death (Slenczka 1994:1753). In order to get 
near the cross as it were (namely the central symbol of soteriology, first, one has to 
get rid of fixed and mellow associations. “The cross is dumb, and makes dumb. God 
was silent. Jesus died. The disciples ran away.” Korthaus sees the cross in itself as 
soteriologically silent (cf. Dalferth 1997:62).287 The relation between the cross and 
the resurrection has to be clarified in order to recognise the soteriological quality of 
the cross. 
 
Korthaus provides an explication of the connection between sin and death. The 
cross of Christ shows that human sin brings the one without sin to death. On the one 
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 Again, stigmatisation adds to already existing social problems, i.e. the aforementioned gender 
debate and the power question. In the South African context, Louw describes the dilemma of a 
vicious circle opened up by poverty and social problems which fuel the spread of HIV/AIDS. The 
people are thus caught up in the circle (Louw 2007:335).  
285
 Sin understood as the separation of human beings from God corresponds to the transgression and 
destruction in the relation with oneself and other human beings. “Therefore, the consequence of sin 
as a destructive urge into disconnectedness is death”: “Die Folge der S[ünde] als zerstörerischer 
Drang in die Verhältnislosigkeit ist deshalb der Tod” (Rom 6:23; Krötke 1994:1868). 
286
 Louw refers to Kierkegaard, S. (1954). Fear and trembling and the sickness unto death. New York: 
Doubleday. 
287
 Dalferth, I.U. (1997). Das Wort vom Kreuz in der offenen Gesellschaft. In ders., Gedeutete 
Gegenwart. Zur Wahrnehmung Gottes in den Erfahrungen der Zeit,  57-85. 
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hand, God’s judgment on sin is symbolized in the death on the cross. On the other 
hand, through the turning away of human beings from God and the urge to destroy 
real life, life is covered by the reality of death. In this sense, life is inseparably bound 
to death (not only to physical and natural death), which is qualified by ‘God’s no’ to 
the work of sin. Consequently, in the cross of Christ, both death as the “wage” of sin, 
and God’s judgment on sin, come together. Only in the cross does sin reveal its 
deadly quality (which is the God-imposed consequence of death). Therefore, only in 
the cross of Christ can the human being truly recognise him or herself. At the same 
time, with the recognition of oneself in the cross of Christ, humans may recognise 
God’s will for our salvation (Korthaus 2000:381). 
 
Here again it is important to note that sin should not be viewed as something 
substantial.288 Louw defines sin in the context of “irresponsible choices, hypocrisy, 
false motives and distorted needs of self-interest. Essentially, as discussed above, 
sin is a problem of distorted relationships” (Louw 1998:162). Sin denotes separation 
from God and the falling away from a faithful relationship to God expressed in 
concrete acts of disobedience to the divine will and the breaking of the covenant 
established with creation (Barton 1997:759). One can state that the link between sin 
and stigmatisation is disconnectedness which consequence is, theologically 
speaking, death (Krötke 1994:1867).  
 
In concluding this section, the reflection on the interconnectedness of sin, death and 
stigmatisation has shown that stigmatisation of others is a “sin” far greater than most 
of the so-called “misdeeds” on which the HIV infection is often blamed. In terms of 
hermeneutics, the notion of sin can be regarded as analogous with a stigmatizing 
attitude (which is characterised by making human expectation the yardstick), that is, 
putting oneself in the place of God (self-righteousness). Moreover, the acceptance 
and internalization of the negative stigma as the final word is ambivalent individually 
and socially, because of the dangerous effect that stigma becomes the master status 
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 Substantial refers to the origin of sin in an ‘inner component’ or ‘material principle’ (Louw 
1998:162). 
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(see chapter one) of a person or group of people. In the sphere of death, stigma 
(being stigmatised and being wounded) produces more stigmas (stigmatizing and 
wounding others). The task is to move beyond stigma in terms of healing. 
 
● Essence of a theology of the cross as the core of the doctrine of reconciliation 
Salvation in all its facets includes the character of overcoming harm.289 From the 
Christian perspective, the character of contrast and overcoming are essential, since 
salvation can only be experienced in contrast to harm and the overcoming of it (Härle 
1999:500). Thus, salvation should not be regarded as an “intact world”; rather, 
salvation means a “healed”, “freed” and “reconciled” world; that is, a world which has 
gone through the experience of harm in the encounter with the power of sin (Härle 
1999:500). Härle points out that the words “healed”, “freed” or “saved” may “say too 
much”, since harm, sin and evil are still prevalent. In the Christian understanding, it is 
“just” that the power has been broken (Härle 1999:500).290  
 
There would remain a misunderstanding, if one concludes that the power of sin 
would have to be broken only once. Surely, experiences may occur occasionally, 
which could be circumscribed with what the New Testament calls “salvation”, but it 
becomes dangerous, if such an experience is evaluated as an end. Rather, it is the 
beginning; one can speak of a breaking through experience, of a setting off point of a 
hard, difficult and painful way, on which one encounters sin repeatedly (Härle 
1999:501).291 Nevertheless, an important aspect would be missing if one would 
ignore the principle of hope embedded in the cross, which can be characterised as 
the resurrection hope (Moltmann, in Louw 2006:6).  
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 “Heil [hat] in allen Erscheinungsformen auch den Charakter der Überwindung von Unheil” (Härle 
1999:500). 
290
 Luther has expressed this difference with the formula “peccatum regnans” (ruling sin, herrschende 
Sünde) and “peccatum regnatum” (ruled sin, beherrschte Sünde). (Luther, M. (1521). Wider den 
Löwener Theologen Latomus. WA 8, 94,9f.In: Härle 1999:500). 
291
 Härle adds that it would be another misunderstanding, if one assumed that the power of sin would 
become weaker in that way; rather, the opposite is the case. The more deeply a human being is 
touched by the love of God, the more it hurts him to experience his incapability and unwillingness to 
love, which is the manifestation of the power of sin. By contrast, the experience of overcoming the 
power of sin also becomes more intensified (Härle 1999:501). 
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3.2 Resurrection: the reframing of power 
The resurrection of the dead is the central image of hope in the Christian faith. It 
states in a metaphorical way that the triune God does not hand over the dead to 
death; instead, God’s creative power overcomes the power of death and makes the 
dead participate in life and in his glory (Louw 2006; Schwöbel 1994:919). The idea of 
the resurrection of the dead according to the Christian understanding cannot be 
separated from the quest for the realization of the salvation of God, which brings 
justice and life (Schwöbel 1994:919).  
 
The distance of human beings to salvation and their being bounded in sin are 
expressed in the powerlessness of humans to live life when faced with death. Finally, 
because of God’s creative power, justice breaks through. This is revealed in God’s 
love, which even overcomes death, for the one who is lost in alienation. In this 
sense, the Christian faith can confess truly that, “The righteous shall live by his faith” 
(Habakkuk 2:4b; cf. Schwöbel 1994:919). 
 
Korthaus asserts that the reflection on the relationship between the cross and 
resurrection formally belongs at the forefront of a theological interpretation of the 
death of Jesus on the cross, because the message of the resurrection is initially the 
precondition for understanding the cross conveying the healing message (Korthaus 
2005:373). Korthaus agrees with Dalferth that God’s work in the resurrection 
constitutively refers to the history of the crucified Jesus of Nazareth, which compels 
one to refer to the complete assertions of Christology.292 
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 Korthaus agrees with Dalferth thus: “Daß das Auferweckungshandeln Gottes sich, konstitutiv auf 
die Geschichte des gekreuzigten Jesus von Nazareth [bezieht] und… insofern zu den perfektischen 
Realitätsaussagen der Christologie [nötigt]” (Dalferth, in Korthaus 2005:377). 
Simultaneously, Korthaus distances himself from the theology of the cross as proposed by Moltmann. 
He criticizes Moltmann’s understanding of eschatology, because he sees in Moltmann’s interpretation 
of the resurrection message, the proof of God’s being God in the future, which is characterised by the 
assistance of human beings. “Wird mit der Auferstehungsbotschaft eine Eschatologie im 
Moltmannschen Sinne verbunden, in der der Erweis des Gottseins Gottes im Grunde erst in einer 
Zukunft erwartet wird, an deren Heraufführung der Mensch durch sein Handeln antizipatorisch bereits 
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The message of resurrection constitutes the word of the cross in such a way that it is 
understood as the implication of the message of the cross under the presumption 
that the resurrection is about God’s action in and at the person of the crucified Christ 
(Korthaus 2005:373). In this understanding, the message of the resurrection does 
not add something material to the word of the cross; rather, it recovers its actual 
meaning (Korthaus 2005:373). Consequently, Korthaus sees the locus of the 
resurrection message as a “preamble” to a theologia crucis. The resurrection 
message neither substitutes a theology of the cross, nor wants to go over it 
(Korthaus 2005:373). 
 
Hence, in defining the relation between the cross and resurrection, Korthaus regards 
the resurrection as the act in which God identifies himself with the crucified Jesus. 
The event on the cross becomes the decisive and unparalleled event of salvation. 
Through the resurrection, the crucified participates in God’s Kingdom, and the 
soteriological sufficiency of the event stands in the perspective of the eschatological 
completion of God’s reconciling work in the whole of creation (Korthaus 2005:375). 
Therefore, the resurrection can be named the “yes of God towards the crucified one” 
(G. Ebeling, in Korthaus 2005:375). For Dalferth, the message of the resurrection is 
“the word of the cross which articulates the same as a reconciling event” (Dalferth, in 
Korthaus 2005:375).  
 
The question of whether the event is a subjective inner or rather an objective 
external event is not appropriate because it divides what can only be grasped as an 
                                                                                                                                   
 
mitwirkt, dann wird das Kreuz als Heilsereignis deutende Auferstehungsbotschaft zu einer Art 
“trojanischem Pferd”, die das Kreuz notwendig zum vorübergehenden Tiefpunkt auf dem Wege zum 
künftigen Gottesreich missverstehen wird. Es kann dann nur noch als Negativfolie der Vergangenheit, 
vor der sich die erwartete und im eigenen Tun immer schon zeichenhaft vorweggenommene Zukunft 
strahlend abzuheben vermag, fehlgedeutet werden. Man mag es drehen und wenden, wie man will: 
trotz aller gegenteiligen Beteuerung ist das Verständnis des Kreuzes als des zentralen Symbols der 
Soteriologie dann zugunsten einer Auferstehungstheologie mit eschatologischem Sog verspielt. Oder, 
mit der Heidelberger Antithese Martin Luther’s ausgedrückt: die theologia crucis ist auch dann unter 
der Hand einer Spielart der theologia gloriae gewichen, wenn diese sich mit dem Namen jener 
schmückt” (Korthaus 2005:376).    
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entity. The resurrection of Jesus did not happen solely as a historical factum to be 
believed. Rather, Jesus’ resurrection happened in that way so that people’s faith can 
be evoked (Härle 2000:314).293 This faith-evoking event happened as the work of 
God in certain people at a certain time294 and through the image of the crucified 
Jesus of Nazareth (Härle 2000:314). Consequently, the belief in resurrection is 
based on the assurance that God has not left the crucified to the power of death. 
God has not “forsaken” him; rather, he has recognised his person and work, which 
means that God has “exalted” him (Phil 2:9).295  
 
● God and humans reconciled  
The God-image portrayed through a theology of the cross transfers clearly the 
aspect of vulnerability. In terms of a theology of the resurrection, power and victory 
can be ascribed to God, who raises and exalts the crucified. Louw explains that the 
cross and the resurrection, connected through pneumatology, reveal even more than 
God’s power. Simultaneously, “[p]eople who are in a crisis and are exposed to 
despair, anxiety and guilt, need more than ‘vulnerability’ and a ‘vision about victory’” 
(Louw 2000:101). 296 Louw also notes that the actual need of people is the need for 
continuity and security. With this, Louw refers to what is offered in the Gospel and is 
expressed in terms of the paradox and mystery of faith, what he calls a “strange 
                                           
 
293
 The Gospel tells of the disciples who lacked understanding about the death of Jesus. They were 
frightened, disappointed and anxious (Mk 8:31; 9:32). For them, it seemed that God had “forsaken” 
Jesus (Mk 15:29-37; Lk 24:19-21). Shortly after that, the same people related their experience of the 
resurrected Christ. Their confession is articulated in the formula: “he appeared to” (1 Cor 15:5-8; Mk 
16:9-11; Lk 24:34; Act 9:17).   
In the assertions of Paul, who counts himself as a witness of the resurrection, it becomes clear that 
the Easter event is based not only on a visionary and auditory realization but on insight (Gal 1:16; cf. 
2 Cor 4:1-6). Only when seeing becomes realization and insight faith in the resurrected becomes 
awakened (Härle 2000:313).  
294
 From the beginning, determining the time that was associated with the resurrection has proved 
significant; it was always “the third day” (1 Cor 15:4; Lk 24:21; Mt 16:21, 17, 23; 20:19; Lk 9:22; 18:33; 
24:7, 46; cf. Härle 2000:314).  
295
 “Rising from the dead” (Auferweckung) and “exaltation” (Erhöhung) describe two distinguishable 
aspects which formally belong together in one event:  
▪Jesus Christ participates in the life of God, which overcomes the power of death. He is the 
 “firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep” (1 Cor 15:20). 
▪Jesus Christ has been legitimized and confirmed by God, and so participates in the dignity 
 and glory of God (Rom 1:4; Phil. 2:9; cf. Härle 2000:314). 
296
 To stress the existential component of pastoral care, Louw remarks that, “The full impact of 
reformation moves beyond sola fide: the indwelling Spirit expresses Himself in us in hope (spes) and 
care (caritas) as well” (Louw 2000:99).   
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ontology” and the work of the Holy Spirit (Louw 2000:101).297 In the centre of a 
theology of the cross, and hence, valuable for pastoral theology, is the faithfulness of 
God. Louw’s view is that, “The how of God in suffering is vulnerability because of his 
faithfulness: ‘I shall be your God.’ Behind God’s pathos is his faithfulness. His pathos 
gives rise to a vivid, everlasting hope” (Louw 2000:100).298 
 
The core of the proclamation and the work of Jesus is the Kingdom of God as the 
salvation breakthrough in the world (Härle 2000:602). Nevertheless, that work 
through which the fallen world shall be saved attains its goal in world history only in a 
fragmental way (Härle 2000:602).299 Salvation becomes visible only in parts, and 
remains threatened by its opposite; hence, “the end” under earthly historical 
conditions always seems to be open as well as the question of how to end the battle 
between God and the power of sin (Härle 2000:602). The strangeness of this 
openendedness is evoked by the fact that God’s Kingdom and the all-determining 
reality is at stake in this battle. At the same time, God’s will for salvation is expressed 
in Christian hope. A characteristic of Christian hope is that it is aware that the 
restrictions (resulting from the finite nature of the world, human freedom and the 
reality of suffering) will be overcome by God, and that hope remains in the state of 
being a fragment (Härle 2000:603).  
 
The point is that the realization of something being a fragment already keeps alive 
the yearning for completion. In this way, in the reception of the temporary, the final is 
present in the present experience (Härle 2000:603).300 In this view, according to 
                                           
 
297
 Here, Louw refers to the verses in Romans 8:24-25: “For in this hope we were saved. Now hope 
that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees? But if we hope for what we do not see, we 
wait for it with patience.”  
298
 It is important to keep in mind that eschatology is connected to soteriology (Härle 2000:601); and 
that eschatological assertions represent the core of all systematic theological reflections (Härle 
2000:602). 
299
 Härle claims that the effect of Jesus’ work in history is restricted in that it reaches only a restricted 
number of people of whom only few follow the way which is opened up by Jesus. Therefore, it should 
be noted that Jesus’ work breaks through the power of sin, but does not remove it. Finally, Jesus’ 
work meets and challenges the resistance of the power of sin (Härle 2000:602). 
300
 Louw (2000:148) introduces the aspect of time regarding the question of when one would 
overcome suffering in the form of anxiety, rejection and stigma. He reasons that in terms of 
eschatology, the concept of “when” is the status of our new being in Christ; it refers to the realm of life 
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Härle, the need for eschatological assertions becomes obvious. They are necessary 
because they bring to light the final message of salvation as proclaimed by the 
Gospel, and at the same time, they identify the present experience of healing as a 
fragment (Härle 2000:603).   
 
A pastoral context in eschatology deals with the final expectations of human beings; 
similarly, the HIV and AIDS pandemic offers the stage in which people struggle with 
hope or anxiety concerning death and dying (Härle 1999:601). At this point, one can 
connect with Louw’s understanding of eschatology as a basic principle for a pastoral 
care design. In his view, eschatology links the twin concepts of death and life, and 
fear and hope with the cross and the resurrection (Rom 6:4; cf. Louw 1998:59). The 
relation between the cross and resurrection is only then complete, if the resurrection 
message points to the eschatology of the cross. Resurrection eliminates the sting of 
death (1 Cor 15:55).   
Finally, this polarity opens up two concepts, which are fundamental to a pastoral 
approach to suffering and the reality of evil, namely God’s identification with suffering 
and the transformation of suffering by God (Louw 1998:147). Here, one arrives at the 
most fundamental notion of theology, that is, trust in God (Louw 2000:147). In as 
much as tragedy and drama are part of human life, the question of theodicy compels 
human beings to search for meaning. In the words of Louw (2005:155): 
Eschatology makes it impossible to regard sin and human guilt as the primary point 
of departure for a pastoral anthropology. The point of departure is salvation. This 
means that in pastoral care human beings should not be addressed in terms of their 
negative and destructive components (guilt and death), but in terms of grace: the 
positive and transforming power of eschatology. 
  
The above statement has implications regarding the concept of embodiment (Körper 
and Leib) in care. Moreover, the (more or less dormant) concept of embodiment 
                                                                                                                                   
 
as defined by the resurrection of Christ.” The answer and proof of God’s power is the resurrection of 
Jesus Christ (Louw 2000:149). Louw refers here to Romans 6:4: “We were buried therefore with him 
by baptism into death, in order that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, 
we too might walk in newness of life.” In this reference, “when” should not be considered as a 
temporal category but as an existential and ontological category of status and quality (Louw 
2000:148). 
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shifts to the foreground. The (stigmatised or stigmatizing) human being in his or her 
embodiment attains the status of a means, that is, as far as salvation is concerned; 
human beings have a calling and do not have a purpose in themselves. The new 
being in Christ is this calling and the status in which one is aware of this fragmental 
participation (in one’s embodiment) in the process of salvation because of finiteness 
in time. Simultaneously, through anticipation of one’s embodiment (the spiritual 
being; one’s embodiment is the recreation of God in terms of an inhabitational 
approach), one already participates in the eternity of the Kingdom of God. 
 
● Resurrection and embodiment  
In the Reformed concept of sanctification, the process “through which the Holy Spirit 
applies the implications of the new reality of salvation” (Louw 1998:179) is inherent 
and points to the everyday life behaviour of human beings. Louw explicates that 
because the person is sanctified in Christ and in God Himself, who is holy, he or she 
should become holy in all conduct as well (1 Pet 1:15-16). The sanctification process 
of the individual as well as of the congregation is the orientation in a moral life (Eph 
5:26-27; Col 1:22). Morality should not be understood in terms of moralism. Rather, I 
would support living an ethical life, and keeping an eye on the spiritual dimension of 
life by reflecting on true biblical values, norms and virtues. In the opinion of Louw 
(1998:180), sanctification labels a person as a moral being, who is thus called to 
respond to salvation (vocation in life).  
 
Louw also refers to the fact that, in a special sense, the human body becomes part 
of this process of pointing to eschatology. In line with the argument of the thesis, the 
role of the body is such that, as the temple of the Holy Spirit, it is the locus through 
and in which God should be inseperably glorified (1 Cor 6:20). Here the argument 
does not point towards natural theology; instead, a person is viewed from the 
perspective of the resurrection and eschatology. 
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● Resurrection as a pastoral category 
Louw describes stigmatisation as a form of death (rejection), which becomes nullified 
by the resurrection as a divine act; in so doing, the implementation of a theologia 
resurrectionis “can act as a theological critique on all forms of human suffering, 
including the spiritual suffering of punishment, guilt, rejection and stigmatisation” 
(Louw 2006:1). The resurrection in relation to the cross is a multidimensional 
concept, which opens up the hermeneutical horizon for a dynamic understanding of 
God and the discovery of meaning in suffering.  
 
According to Louw, the resurrection is an indication of God’s trustworthiness and the 
conclusiveness of the Gospel: “And if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching 
is in vain and your faith is in vain (1 Cor 15:14; cf. Louw 2000:161).301 Louw 
describes resurrection as a pastoral category pointing to growth in faith, to 
admonition, and to comfort and hope. In order to help understand and interpret 
suffering from the perspective of the resurrection, he identifies theological indicators 
which function as important paradigms in a hermeneutics of pastoral care. These are 
the following notions:  
 
(1) Transformation - the new reality within the reality of pain and destruction;  
(2) Freedom and liberation - the experience of forgivingness and reconciliation;  
(3) Vision, imagination and future - the motivating and driving force behind 
anticipation and expectation;  
(4) Witness - the intention to reach out to others in their suffering and pain;  
(5) Faithfulness - the guarantee for trust despite disorientation and disintegration;  
(6) Support - edification within the fellowship (koinonia) of believers;   
(7) Comfort - the courage to be, to endure and to accept; and  
                                           
 
301
 Louw (2000:161) further notes that, “The resurrection hope has served as a paranetic principle for 
those in the Corinthian community who wanted, firstly, to deny the resurrection from the dead; 
secondly, to spiritualize existence and thus also the body, and thirdly, ultimately degrade creation”.  
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(8) Truth - divine confirmation and guarantee, promise for Life (Louw 2000:161-
167). 
 
These indicators are explicated in a biographic example below in which embodiment, 
from the perspective of eschatology, means becoming whole by going through the 
paradox of the cross.  
 
In his writing, Ernesto Barros Cardoso describes “[t]he experience of faith in the face 
of suffering despair, the search for healing and salvation, the expectation of death, 
[and] the hope of resurrection.”302 Being affected himself, he describes how he 
experiences mystery, grace, hope and resurrection which are proclaimed in the 
Gospel. Cardoso’s reflection expresses comfort in understanding hope, first, as 
having the courage “to throw oneself into Mystery”, or deliver oneself up to the 
Mystery.303 For Louw, it is the courage to be (affirmation), to endure and to accept, 
which characterises comfort. It is the resurrection hope which enables patience and 
endurance “without which suffering becomes unbearable” (Louw 2000:165). Comfort, 
therefore, means not only a word of consolation, but “a new state and condition of 
being: to suffer in close communion with Christ” (Louw 2000:165)  
  
Further, Cardoso illustrates his identification through his body with the bodies of 
other people in anonymity and solidarity.304 He departs from his individual 
experience “in one body” and “feel[s] one with all bodies that suffer”. Here, Cardoso 
expresses his identification and being witness with others in their suffering and pain 
(Louw 2000:161). Cardoso describes his perception of the Kingdom as it is 
presented in the Gospel, and in signs, gestures, indications and insights, which point 
                                           
 
302
 Ernesto Barros Cardoso was a member of the WCC’s AIDS consultative group. He died from HIV 
and AIDS in 1995 (WCC 1997:43). 
303
 The headline of one of his paragraphs is “Theology from the perspective of the body that suffers 
and dreams and delivers itself up to the Mystery” (Cardoso 1997:37). 
304
 “In one body, all bodies. The tired, suffering body of the world, the oppressed and downtrodden 
body of the poor, the repressed and violated body of so many women, the bodies, without energy and 
resistance, of boy and girls … It is impossible not to have the feeling, in spite of the particularity of my 
experience, of identifying with millions. Yes, we are millions who are infected and affected” (Cardoso 
1997:38).  
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to the “quality of life, the defence of the dignity of life and of people [and] their 
integrity. [This] can be experienced not as struggle, which must lead to the naming of 
winners, of new holders of power…” (1997:40).305 Instead, he describes the 
challenge of God’s kingdom as one, which is to be faced in “anti-power”, “anti-
institution”, the “madness of faith”, and in “hope against all hope”. The people’s 
challenge is developing sharpened senses to discover revelation, and doing theology 
as pure sensibility, as an expression of dependence and surrender, and as a 
response of faithfulness (Cardoso 1997:40). Louw also stresses the notion of 
faithfulness as the guarantee of trust despite disorientation and disintegration (Louw 
2000:161). The hermeneutical process of interpretation orientated at the work of God 
in Christ conveys a theology of resurrection. 
 
Cardoso further asserts that, “the most profound experience for the sufferer who 
does not find a reason for suffering… is precisely living a totally new experience 
based on a change in approach and perspectives, on openness to the newness of 
the revelation of God. This is something like being born again, being born in the 
Spirit” (Cardoso 1997:42). In describing the pneumatological event, Cardoso opens 
up “the new reality within the reality of pain and destruction” in which transformation 
is taking place (Louw 2000:161).  
 
In other words, from a pastoral perspective, Cardoso asks for embodied actions, a 
liturgy of symbols, gestures, and silence in order to perceive contact with the 
Mystery. He uses the words of Job 42:5:  “I had heard of you by the hearing of the 
ear, but now my eye sees you”. Cardoso speaks up for a radical change of 
perception, of view and of projection. The change should also reach the leadership 
of the churches, theologians and ministers. Their attitude should help people who 
are existentially affected such as the HIV and AIDS-traumatized and -stigmatised 
person “to recover and to re-encounter, from within their pain and their suffering 
body, the responses and arguments, the inexhaustible spring that helps to make 
radical changes” (Cardoso 1997:41). Consequently, theology, as well as the pastoral 
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 Italics by Cardoso. 
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ministry of the church, becomes a direct protest against all forms of human 
discrimination.  
 
3.3 Wholeness and destigmatisation: the pneumatological perspective  
● Presence of the Holy Spirit 306 
Louw (1998:167) points out Paul’s modified understanding of the Old Testament vp,n<å 
(nèphèsh) to pneu/ma (pneuma). By talking of the “spiritual body” - geistlicher Leib - (1 
Cor 15:44 sw/ma pneumatiko,n), Paul refers to the mystic insight on the resurrection.307 
The key to understanding the doctrine of resurrection lies in the formula of Romans 
8:11: 
If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised 
Christ Jesus from the dead will also give life to your mortal bodies through his Spirit 
who dwells in you.  
 
Romans 8:11 literarily clarifies that God gives the Spirit to dwell in human beings and 
to make them alive. From the verse, Härle claims that to assume, that a substantial 
essence within the human being would constitute the relation with God, with other 
human beings and with oneself, is not appropriate. Rather, a relational ontology and 
anthropology is able to transfer and articulate assertions of Pauls’s theology. Härle 
pleads that the essence of human beings in terms of a structure of relation 
(Beziehungsgefüge) or a relational happening (Beziehungsgeschehen) should be 
taken serious. This structure of relation is constituted by the (creative) relation of 
God towards the human being (human beings refer to it in their belief or unbelief) 
and their external relation to the world and other human beings, as well as their 
internal relation to own identity (Härle 1999:635).  
 
                                           
 
306
 John refers to the Holy Spirit as Paraklet, in Greek ‘counsellor or one who gives comfort’, who 
would be sent after Jesus’ death (John 16:7). 
307
 According to Härle, Paul refers to the metaphor of the seed, which provokes the question of how 
the dissolving and changing mortal body could remain alive and be full of life energy (Härle 
1999:635). 
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The relational ontological approach allows the thinking that although the relations, in 
which human beings exist, become passive in death, God’s constitutive creative 
relation to the human being remains even beyond death (Härle 1999:635). The Spirit 
of God as the saving spirit is constitutional for the perfection of the human being in 
God’s Kingdom (Härle 1999:636).308 Further, one may question the understanding of 
God’s Kingdom as the eschatological hope for resurrection and new life, and the 
present effect of the resurrection on human bodies. Here, it can be suggested that, 
“If God is the in-betweenness of self and self [relational encounter], the occasion 
itself is the communion with God” (Nelson 1978:35). In addition, bodily issues 
become concrete spiritual issues.309 The Christological understanding of a person’s 
new being and the pneumatological interaction between God and the human spirit 
play an important role in a theological anthropology (Louw 1998:167).310 
 
● Role of pneumatology in the design of a pastoral anthropology towards 
destigmatisation 
Louw makes the important point that a theological hermeneutics of the cross is 
linked to the resurrection through pneumatology (Louw 2000:99). Therefore, the 
cross should be interpreted pneumatologically. He claims that, “The divine dimension 
of the cross has been disclosed and declared by the Spirit in terms of the 
resurrection, which is the pneumatological exegesis of the cross: it reveals God’s 
weakness as power” (Louw 2000:99). Louw recognises that the mystery of the 
                                           
 
308
 The relational understanding of the human being in the theology of Luther requires explanation. In 
Luther’s understanding, basically, the human being relates to the world (coram mundo) and to God 
(coram Deo). These relations are constituted by the creative relation of God towards the human 
being, and towards which the human being (in the world and God-relationship) may correspond to in 
faith or reject in sin (Schwöbel 1994:920). Schwöbel, in reference to Jüngel and Härle, interprets 
death as the end of active possibilities of relations, which include the absolute dependence that God 
maintains in the creative relation with the human being which is beyond death because of the new 
everlasting life (Schwöbel 1994:920).  
309Naurath also stresses an important point that spirituality should not be abstract but concrete and 
and should have consequences for our earthly life here and now. Hence, she pleads for a departure 
from solely spiritualistic to body friendly pastoral care. When the human being is approached “only 
spiritually”, belief remains one dimensional and inconcrete: “Wo der Mensch nur spirituell 
angesprochen wird, bleibt der Glaube eindimensional und unkonkret. Da die Bibel jedoch von 
Gotteserfahrungen erzählt, die den ganzen Menschen berühren, hat die Theologie die Pflicht, 
reduktionistische Tendenzen ihres Menschenbildes aufzudecken und zu verabschieden” (Naurath 
2006:236). 
310
 Louw refers to Romans 8:16, where the link between the human pneuma and the work of the godly 
pneuma is described (Louw 1998:166). 
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suffering God and the divine presence in and with death points to a pneumatological 
event, so that comfort to human beings is also pneumatologically manifested. 
 
Louw further explains that, “God enters into suffering through the Spirit and is in 
suffering because of the Spirit. The notion of the suffering God is a pneumatological 
act and reality” (Louw 2000:99). A theology of the cross “becomes a theology of 
comfort and liberation on the grounds of the reality of the Spirit. In the midst of 
suffering, the Holy Spirit enables one’s human spirit to appropriate the offer of 
salvation and to express it in faith, hope and love” (Louw 2000:99). With a theology 
of the cross, pastoral care can reach out to people who are suffering. At the same 
time, it is the work of the Holy Spirit to concretize the presence of God and to 
actualize salvation (Louw 2005:120). 
 
Referring to destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS pandemic from a pastoral and 
faith perspective, the transformation of prejudices in terms of stigma goes with the 
transformation of the person. Volition and thoughts are transformed and the person 
can experience new life every day.311 In 1 Corinthians 2:11-12, Paul asserts that 
people realise what God has given them through grace in pneuma. From the 
viewpoint of pneumatology, the new person’s potential is called charisma, that is, the 
received potential (Louw 1998:173). The new person then can approach life from a 
spiritual perspective as represented in Christ’s person and Spirit. In a new focus on 
God, this transformation imparts new meaning to the human spirit and makes 
humans dependent on (or empowers them in terms of) the transcendental dimension 
of their Christian life (Louw 1998:167). In this process the HIV and AIDS-related 
stigma looses its power and painful “sting”. 
  
In 1 Cor 6:19-20, Paul clarifies the meaning of the human body in the metaphor of 
the temple:  
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 Hereby I refer to both, the person who formerly stigmatised another and the person who was the 
former recipient of the “stigma”. 
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Or do you not know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit within you, whom 
you have from God? You are not your own, for you were bought with a price. So 
glorify God in your body.  
Subsequently, one can agree with Louw (1998:172) thus: 
Christ lives in a person through the Holy Spirit (inhabitatio Spiritus). So radical is this 
in-dwelling presence of Christ that [likewise] human sexuality and physicality have a 
special place in God’s revelation: the body becomes a temple of the Holy Spirit (1 
Cor 6:19), and the new person is commanded to honour God in his/her body (1 Cor 
6:20).  
 
Louw also asserts that the function of pneumatology is “to concretize this new life in 
and through daily behaviour and conduct” (Louw 1998:169).312 In this understanding, 
being human is the most concrete bodily expression and possibility for glorifying and 
honouring God. Nevertheless, in a theological anthropology, the abilities of a person 
should be viewed with regard to the work of the Holy Spirit and human potential 
viewed from the perspective of faith (Louw 1998:169). 
  
However, in terms of Christology, resurrection transforms life into the new mode of 
the fruit (charisma) of the Spirit (pneumatology). In this way, God’s recreation 
promotes human dignity, justice and the reconciliation in the Kingdom of God. Thus, 
the body becomes the means “to glorify God”. Paul explains in the same context that 
it is about the right use or the appropriate being with and in the body.313  
 
To sum up, it can be assumed that in terms of pneumatology, the purpose is to 
develop our being qualities in the presence of God; humanity is interpreted as 
charisma, which is followed by a positive confirmation of our being functions (Louw 
1998:173). Louw explains that the Holy Spirit addresses people in their inner being - 
the soul. In this sense, the human pneuma can be described as “a point of 
connectedness or point of mediation for continual spiritual growth and the 
                                           
 
312
 Cf. the concept of attitude (habitus) in Chapter One. 
313
 That Jesus was much concerned for the temple shows in the narrative of Jesus and the money 
changers (Jesus und die Tempelreinigung) in the Synoptic Gospels and in John (Mk 11:15-19; 11:27-
33; Mt 21:12-17; 21:23-27; Lk 19:45-48; 20:1-8; Jhn 2:12-25). His actions are remarkable - he was 
angry and aggressive and quoted from the book of Isaiah (56:7): “For my house shall be called a 
house of prayer for all peoples”; and from Jeremiah 7:11: “Has this house, which is called by my 
name, become a den of robbers in your eyes?” 
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development of Christian faith” (Louw 1998:167). This pneumatological point of 
contact is important, according to Louw, since it indicates that the continuity between 
the earthly and the eschatological life is not situated in inner psychic abilities, but 
only in the faithfulness of God and in his transforming actions through the renewing 
power of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit in our hearts acts as the security deposit and 
guarantee (cf. 2 Cor 1:22).  
 
Louw (1998:167) disagrees with K. Barth and concludes that pneuma is the centre of 
a Christian understanding of personality. According to Barth, the human pneuma is 
the impact of God upon creation or God’s movement to human beings (Barth, in 
Louw 1998:167). However, for Louw (1998:168), “[t]he pneuma of the new person 
endowes the psuché/ sarx/ soma with an eschatological identity: one now lives from 
God’s grace and promises”.    
 
One can state that the cross (and therefore Christology) is an ontic principle, which 
indicates our new status as new beings in Christ and creates fellowship between 
God and human beings. In this concern, Louw adds, that this solidarity (between 
God and human beings) in both the Christological-soteriological as well as the 
theological-pneumatological dimension should be acknowledged. The divine 
presence in terms of God’s being with us, which finds expression in the suffering 
God in a theology of the cross, needs to be acknowledged first (Louw 2003). The 
“resurrection paradigm” as a consequence and precondition of the cross at the same 
time, therefore, opens up a new category in life.314 Life attains sacramental and 
symbolic meaning. Just as the pastoral encounter should be interpreted 
metaphorically, the totality of real existence becomes an embodiment of God’s 
grace, in which we are gifted and challenged to overcome stigma and stigmatisation 
in a constructive way (Louw 1999:119). 
 
                                           
 
314
 The Gospel proclaims that through the Holy Spirit life becomes a transformative category (Louw 
1999:119). 
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Louw concludes that only in the concept of pneumatology do human beings attain 
their healed and transformed humanum, which is the gift of the Spirit (Louw 
1998:171). Whereas in Christology, salvation is the object of faith, in pneumatology, 
human embodiment (the totality of a person; body, soul and spirit) is the object of 
salvation (Louw 1998:171). In Christology, Christ becomes human (incarnation 
verbi), and in pneumatology, Christ becomes a person’s Saviour, as Paul explains: 
‘But by the grace of God I am what I am’ (1 Cor 15:10). Thus, the Spirit of God as the 
reconciling spirit is constitutional for the recreation of human beings as children and 
heirs of God (Gal 4:17; Rom 8:12-17). 
 
● Structural healing as becoming whole - the resurrecting body 
According to Louw, another helpful aspect of the notion of healing offers systemic 
theory and a Gestalt approach to healing of space and relationships.315 Since “HIV 
has become a structural and systemic pandemic” (Louw 2006:334) the issue should 
be addressed as such in a consequent way, rather than being mistaken for a 
problem “in terms of personal morality and behavioural changes”. In this way, Louw 
(2006:334) concludes that when confronting the HIV and AIDS pandemic, the 
emphasis should be on the change of community structures. 
 
Louw uses the term Gestalt for the notion of space and position taken from systemic 
thinking.316 In terms of a systemic approach, “[l]ife is viewed as an event of ongoing 
Gestalts [Gestaltung] which continually form, reach completion and recede for the 
next emerging Gestalt” (Louw 2005:26). Regarding space, Louw refers to it as “the 
quality of atmosphere within an encounter due to attitude, aptitude and reciprocal 
influence” (Louw 2004:26).317 Space implies the dynamic occurrences in life 
                                           
 
315
 Louw remarks that where two or more people encounter one another within a spirit of availability, 
acceptance (unconditional love) and appreciative awareness, a space of intimacy occurs… Within the 
space of intimacy (belonging), meaning is discovered. The bipolarities and positions within this space 
designate the mechanics of the human soul” (Louw 2005:27). 
316
 Sociological system theory is based on the understanding of system as the interdependence of 
relations of the system elements and their exchange with environment (Noetzel, T. (1999). Art. 
System, In Metzler Philosophie-Lexikon, 583). 
317
 For Louw (2005:26), “Attitude and aptitude create an atmosphere which can either separate (push 
away, detachment, [rejection, death]) or draw nearer (attract, attachment, [acceptance, love])”.  
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(happenstances of life) through which life becomes a dynamic organism of 
encounter. Furthermore, the characteristics of a Gestalt perspective are the trans-
personal area, the processes of networking, the place of space and the dynamics of 
positioning (Louw 2004:26). Here, one can regard the notion of soul as an emergent 
property of the whole system (Watts 2002, in Louw 2005:22).318 
 
The outlined structures reflect the extent to which the character of society is a 
subject of ethics, which is based on the social interaction of each individual 
according to specific principles. In order to apply Gestalt in the society, actions 
cannot avoid interaction rules. In Herms’ view, interaction rules are the only moment 
in the process of Gestaltung in which each member of the society has an influence 
according to his choice action. Interaction rules (i.e. in terms of norms and values) 
are the only point where the process of Gestaltung can be influenced (Herms 1991: 
xviii). The meaning of social structures becomes clearer when we recognise the 
place of any encounter, more specifically, the social setting. In terms of a pastoral 
hermeneutic, any encounter is directly or indirectly an embodied encounter. 
 
Likewise, an understanding of African spirituality points to the understanding of life, 
in which the dynamics are more communal than individualised. The human body in 
African thinking is seen as a living organism that serves relationships. Understanding 
of the body refers to “the instrument by which human beings relate to others” 
(Byamungu 2002, in Louw 2005:23).319 In an African context of spirituality, one may 
add the idea of the principle of ubuntu, which states that a human being is only a 
person through others (Louw 2005:23). The space created by soulfulness represents 
the warmth of God. Within the Christian church and congregation, this space is 
called koinonia or the σῶμα Χριστοῦ. Louw (2005:22) asserts that a theological 
understanding of space refers to the intimacy of covenantal and sacrificial love and 
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 F. Watts (2002). Theology and Psychology. Ashgate Science and Religion Series. Ashgate 
Aldershot/ Hant: Ashgate Publishing, 72.  
319
 Byamungu, G.T.M. (2002). Lichaamsbeleving en verbondenheid. Een overzicht van het situatie in 
Afrika, in Concilium 2, 123-132, 124f.  
  
 
 
139
solitary relations. He therefore denotes the quality of Gestalt and space as the 
opposite of discrimination and stigmatisation. 
 
The point here concerns the resurrection as a life category in the here and now. 
Resurrection as recreation is a process that finds expression in the relations of life 
(space and position/Gestalt). This process is characterised by trust in God’s 
faithfulness despite the happenstances of life. It shows that life should be lived in 
terms of the hope of resurrection hope as a totally new and sanctified recreation 
through God’s Spirit:  
And he died for all, that those who live might no longer live for themselves but 
for him who for their sake died and was raised. From now on, therefore, we 
regard no one according to the flesh. Even though we once regarded Christ 
according to the flesh, we regard him thus no longer. Therefore, if anyone is 
in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold, the new 
has come (2 Cor 5:15-17). 
 
In inhabitation, the process of destigmatisation of the human being takes place, that 
means becomes embodied. Becoming whole from a pastoral and a faith perspective 
of the HIV and AIDS pandemic implies that the transformation of prejudices in terms 
of stigma is consistent with the transformation of the person. Embodiment becomes 
the means and occasion “to glorify God”. Paul explains in the same context that, it is 
about the right use, the appropriate being with and in the body.  
 
In conclusion, one can say that the meaning dimension points to the purpose of 
developing our being qualities in the presence of God; humanity is interpreted as 
charisma, which is followed by a positive confirmation of our being functions. The 
reality of the HIV and AIDS related stigma and stigmatisation is inherent in “the 
cross”. The pneumatic event determines the new relation of recreation in terms of 
embodiment/attitude. The Holy Spirit addresses people in their inner being, which is 
otherwise called the “soul.” Therefore, God’s recreation promotes human dignity, 
justice and the reconciliation in the Kingdom of God and destigmatisation in terms of 
“the resurrection” takes place.  
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HIV and AIDS related stigma and stigmatisation in the HIV and AIDS pandemic 
becomes the motivation for developing our being qualities, to live the gift of 
embodiment (charisma). In this sense, the whole human – including the body in the 
sense of corporeality - as the temple of the Holy Spirit, can be found as the locus of 
connectedness and mediation of continual spiritual growth and development of the 
Christian faith. 
 
A pastoral understanding of wholeness can contribute to destigmatisation within the 
HIV and AIDS pandemic because the whole human being is perceived as a spiritual 
being. Spirituality is then immanent in everyday life; everyday life conduct becomes a 
matter of spirituality. The beauty and aesthetics of life is the actual focal point in such 
an approach towards life. It is in this understanding of life that “God enters into 
suffering through the Spirit and is in suffering because of the Spirit. The notion of the 
suffering God is a pneumatological act and reality” (Louw 2000:99). “The divine 
dimension of the cross has been disclosed and declared by the Spirit in terms of the 
resurrection, which is the pneumatological exegesis of the cross: it reveals God’s 
weakness as power” (Louw 2000:99). The resurrection power in terms of the Spirit is 
the category of life for Christians, in which destigmatisation takes place. In terms of 
Christology, resurrection transforms life into the new mode of the fruit (charisma) of 
the Spirit (pneumatology). Referring to destigmatisation within the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic from a pastoral and faith perspective, the transformation of prejudices in 
terms of stigma goes with the transformation of the person. Volition and thoughts are 
transformed and the person can experience new life every day.320 Like Paul states in 
1 Cor 2:11-12, people realise what God has given them through grace in pneuma. 
Louw also asserts that the function of pneumatology is “to concretize this new life in 
and through daily behaviour and conduct” (Louw 1998:169).321 In this understanding, 
being human is the most concrete bodily expression and possibility for glorifying and 
honouring God. Nevertheless, in a theological anthropology, the abilities of a person 
                                           
 
320
 Hereby, I refer to both the person who formerly stigmatised another and the person who was the 
former recipient of the “stigma”. 
321
 Cf. the concept of attitude (habitus) in Chapter One. 
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should be viewed with regard to the work of the Holy Spirit and human potential 
viewed from the perspective of faith (Louw 1998:169).  
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS  
 
Regarding pastoral anthropology, Chapter One has investigated a working definition 
of stigma and what constitutes stigma in the HIV and AIDS pandemic. In this study, 
stigmatisation is understood as the phenomenon in which an individual or a group of 
individuals consciously or unconsciously define another individual or a group as 
different and consequently exclude and reject the other.  
It has been shown that stigma may be attached to social status (material wealth), 
sexual orientation, sharing certain characteristics with other people such as being 
physically disabled, being of a specific ethnic background, or being infected with a 
specific virus, which is enough to be a sign or a mark referring to bodily expression. 
The understanding of a stigma as schemata of interpretation and the connection 
between stigma and power has been identified as main features of stigma; likewise, 
a definition of stigma involves reference to societal power differences. One of the 
fatal effects of stigmatisation is that generalisations about the person lead to a 
definition of the person in terms of the stigma in all social relations. The threat is that 
stigma then becomes a “master status”, which, like no other feature of the person, 
determines the place in society and the social intercourse with other human beings 
(Hohmeier 1975:8). 
 
I have further argued that processes of stigmatisation are verbal or non-verbal 
behaviour, based on an ascribed stigma (social prejudice) that is brought upon an 
individual or a group (Hohmeier 1975:7). The paradigm of stigma has been identified 
as a way of behaviour that judges people downwards, who are perceived as deviant. 
In the form of a judgemental attitude, a stigmatizing addressee departs from his or 
her own body-soul constitution, which is qualitatively determined by stigmatisation 
and discrimination. Stigmatisation is a more or less subtle violence and aims at the 
body-soul constitution of the stigmatised recipient.  
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Moreover, I have given an interpretation in relation to the concept of “attitudes 
normals have towards a person with a stigma” (Goffman 1990:15). One can speak of 
expectations or a stigmatizing attitude that people hold towards the stigmatised. 
From a sociological perspective, attitude is the “affective-judgemental expression” 
towards the object of attitude (Abele & Nowack 1975:146), while in a pastoral 
context, “attitude” (aptitude, habitus, position) indicates a mode of being, and is a 
qualitative concept related to meaning and the reality of soul and its networking 
(Louw 2004:11).  
 
Attitude finds orientation in norms and values. The pastoral challenge that could 
ensue is in establishing the norm of the will of God. Thus, destigmatisation would 
presume an overhaul of our normative systems. (In this understanding, any 
expectation would be geared towards God’s recreating power as expressed in 
Chapter Four by the indicators of: (1) Transformation - the new reality within the 
reality of pain and destruction; (2) freedom and liberation - the experience of 
forgivingness and reconciliation; (3) vision, imagination and future - the motivating 
and driving force behind anticipation and expectation; (4) witness - the intention to 
reach out to others in their suffering and pain; (5) faithfulness - the guarantee for 
trust despite disorientation and disintegration; (6) support - edification within the 
fellowship (koinonia) of believers;  (7) comfort - the courage to be, to endure and to 
accept; and (8) Truth (Louw 2000:161-167).  
 
Chapter Two of this study has examined stigma and stigmatisation within the context 
of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. In discussing HIV and AIDS-related stigma and its 
association with the degradation of the human body in pastoral theology, I have 
probed the notion of sin (hamartiology) and its impact on theological anthropology. 
The discussion focussed on the question of how sin is interpreted by pastoral 
anthropology in the context of the HIV and AIDS pandemic. Here, I have outlined the 
complexity of HIV and AIDS-related stigma and stigmatisation, the use of HIV and 
AIDS-related language and metaphors and especially that the paradoxical 
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connection between “life creating sexuality” and the “threat of death” provides a 
strong base for stigma and stigmatisation.322  
 
My argument has been that it is necessary to refer appropriately to the notion of sin, 
which means neither to deny it nor to overemphasise it. The pastoral ethical 
dimension has been discussed in terms of sexual ethical aspects, God-image, 
responsibility and the aspect of shame. From an ethical perspective, stigmatisation is 
a relational process, in which judgment and prejudice are the determining factors. In 
theological language and in connection with the notion of sin, the connotation in the 
case of HIV and AIDS related stigma is one of moral blemish. Destruction of human 
relationships is a sin far greater than the so-called misdeeds for which persons, who 
are trying to live positively with HIV and AIDS, are blamed.   
 
In Chapter Three, the focus has been on corporeality and embodiment in theology 
and philosophy. I have given a historical introspection of the theological and 
philosophical discussion of body concepts considering those paradigms which may 
have contributed to the degradation of the human body in philosophical and 
theological history. Further, I have referred to the current gender debate in order to 
clarify that the human body, in history and at present, is the “battlefield” in which 
discursively and practically a fight expressed in an ongoing tendency to dualism 
takes place. I would argue that dualism is essentially a quality in itself, which can be 
regarded as an anthopological constant, since it has been prevalent throughout 
history.  
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 Here, I refer to already mentioned sources and functions of an HIV and AIDS related, stigmatizing 
attitude. The first source of attitude results in an “instrumental HIV and AIDS-related stigma”, which 
can be interpreted as grounded in fear. The second source of attitude results in the “symbolic HIV and 
AIDS-related stigma”, which can be associated as based on certain norms and values. 
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Even in the theology of Paul, it cannot be denied totally.323 Expressions such as 
“degradation”, “discrimination” and “stigmatisation” represent what we can call the 
“alienation of human embodiment”. Subsequently, I have proposed a pastoral 
anthropological reflection of embodiment based on a biblical but holistic 
understanding of the human being. In this regard, I have referred to a practical 
theological design (Louw 2005; 2007) that argues for the re-assessment of the 
human body in pastoral theology and care.  
 
I have dealt with the main challenge of a theological reflection in terms of a pastoral 
hermeneutics in Chapter Four. The aim was to interpret previous scholarly 
discussions on the notion of stigma and embodiment in the light of Scripture. In 
terms of a pastoral hermeneutics, the pneumatic notion of destigmatisation describes 
a new stance and life attitude (human embodiment) that are marked and gifted by 
the eschatological dimension of the cross and resurrection.  
 
Stigmatisation itself has been identified as sin against the Creator God, creation and 
the human self. One argument is that because being human means being corporeal, 
its denial would be a denial of creation, which is a gift of God. Thus, the theological 
argument for the re-assessment of the human body and the wholesomeness of the 
human being stands against the notion of stigmatisation. The identification of the 
human body as the object of stigmatisation in the pandemic, which is an expression 
of woundedness and alienation, requires healing and reconciliation. It is only through 
God’s gift, one’s incarnated embodiment in inhabitation of the Spirit in the human 
being, that being human can become a means “to glorify God”, a means through 
which life attains new meaning despite the contextual reality of suffering.  
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 Despite the warning against reading Paul and the New Testament dualistically (Naurath 2006:21; 
Nelson 1978:50), dualistic tendencies in our interpretations are there, where there is differentiation 
between the body as Leib sw/ma, the bodily existence (leiblich), and the material conditions of the 
physical life, the flesh sa,rx (Janssen 2005:44). 
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Just as human embodiment is about the right use, and the appropriate being with 
and in the body, 324 it is also simultaneously about the aesthetics of life (on which the 
thesis has fallen short to describe). Reconciliation with ourselves, with others and 
with God and our God images is necessary. In other words, the first step is to 
recognise ourselves as integral persons living integral lives, which includes sexuality 
and vulnerability etc.. This acceptance reveals the beauty or aesthetics of life. The 
passion of the cross entails both love and suffering, at the same time, and while this 
world is characterised by finitude, resurrection may mean being raised from death (or 
from sin as estrangement in the form of isolation and rejection). Therefore, this 
understanding characterises an eschatological approach. An eschatological 
approach for dealing with the pandemic in a constructive and meaningful way is what 
Louw refers to as “AIDS competence” (Louw 2006:1). The hermeneutical process of 
interpretation becomes an important tool in the pandemic. 
 
Becoming whole (in terms of the resurrection and pneumatology) in the HIV and 
AIDS pandemic means that the transformation of prejudices concerning stigma goes 
hand-in-hand with the transformation of the person, the mind-set and paradigms. 
People must become whole within themselves and acknowledge their own bodies 
and the bodies of the other with dignity. They need to grasp the meaning, task, 
challenge, and opportunity of being equipped with a body and living an embodied 
life. In being a “tool”, one finds meaning, and may discover the beauty in life despite 
suffering.  
 
If pastoral care, cura animarum, is perceived as cura vitae (Louw 2007), then an 
approach to pastoral anthropology (being-in-relation) has to take into account the 
need for structural healing regarding the notion of HIV and AIDS and its related 
stigma and stigmatisation. In terms of a pastoral anthropology, then, being embodied 
becomes the occasion for the pneumatological event. In the change of attitude arises 
the change and the realistic hope of the transformation of the stigma to charisma; 
that which formerly has been characterised by the language of violence then 
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 Here it can refer to the human body and the Body of Christ (koinonia). 
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becomes an embodied word of love in a changed response. The main challenge in a 
pastoral context is the radical aspect of healing and salvation that is revealed by the 
Gospel, as well as to understand and interpret human existence within real life 
contexts and relationships.325 After all, the paradigm for a pastoral approach in the 
HIV and AIDS context should emphasise the resurrection category as the central life-
giving message of the Gospel, which is about faithfulness, its promise and hope.  
 
This study in the field of pastoral anthropology has primarily introduced the 
problematic questions of HIV and AIDS-related stigmatisation and destigmatisation. 
It has, on the one hand, shown the need to reflect critically on pastoral responses 
and the theological paradigm behind. In terms of a pastoral hermeneutic, the 
paradigm behind processes of HIV and AIDS related stigmatisation has been 
identified by norms and values that miss the biblical understanding of the human 
being in relation to God, embodying grace and faithfulness. On the other hand, 
destigmatisation can be identified as process and event, action and hope, the 
potential of the Christian message, which is about acceptance and being with the 
other, in the one body of Christ, now and then.  
 
Further, the research has opened up new questions for me that go beyond the 
framework of the thesis, such as to have a closer look at body concepts, as well as 
concepts that shed light on the meaning of (embodied) awareness. The issue, 
therefore, would be whether such approaches could have a sustaining effect on the 
development of being qualities (Louw 2000). An underlying factor here is the 
assumption that a truly conscious perception of the human body on an experiential 
level is necessary for the development of being qualities which contribute to the 
process (of destigmatisation) of human beings becoming embodied words of love. 
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 Louw notes that the challenge is essentially a hermeneutical one (2005:1). 
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